


# **OCCASIONAL PAPERS/ REPRINTS SERIES IN CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES**

**NUMBER 2 — 1978 (14)**

## **NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: PROBLEMS, ANALYSIS AND DOCUMENTS**

**Edited by Hungdah Chiu, with contri-  
bution by G. J. Sigur, Robert A.  
Scalapino, King C. Chen, Eugene  
A. Theroux, Michael Y. M. Kau,  
James C. Hsiung and James W.  
Morley.**

**School of Law  
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MARYLAND**



# **OCCASIONAL PAPERS/REPRINTS SERIES IN CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES**

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## ***PREFACE***

Since the time of President Nixon's visit to the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the issuance of the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972, voluminous literature on the question of normalization of relations with the PRC has appeared. Most of the published literature, however, has dealt with the question of whether the U.S. should move to normalize relations with the PRC. The present book, however, assumes normalization as an established national policy of the U.S., and, beginning from that premise, analyzes some basic considerations or practical problems relating to the implementation of the normalization policy. While this book is a collective work, the views expressed in each chapter are those of the respective authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the editor or other contributors.

In implementing normalization, the U.S., being a superpower with world-wide responsibilities, must seriously consider the policy implications of its actions with regard to other parts of the world, and especially with regard to its allies. In Chapter I, Professor Robert A. Scalapino discusses normalization in its international context, thus establishing the context that permeates this book.

Among the considerations crucial to the process of normalization of relations with the PRC are the repercussions of that policy upon Taiwan. Despite the importance of this issue, it has recently had no thorough and updated analysis. In Chapter II, Professor King C. Chen analyzes Peking's attitude toward Taiwan, with special emphasis on the attitudes of the Post-Mao leaders. A problem closely related to the Taiwan question is the range of possible options of the Republic of China (ROC) in response to the U.S. move toward normalization. These problems, and other related ones, such as the legal status of Taiwan, are discussed in detail in Chapter III, of which I am author.

At present, there are over 220 U.S. firms with direct investments in Taiwan, accounting for over US \$500 million in investment. In 1977, US-ROC trade reached a record level of US \$6 billion. Regardless of the necessity of normalization of relations with the PRC, it is virtually a consensus that the present status of U.S. relations with the ROC should not be disturbed in the process of normalization. Chapter IV, written by Mr. Eugene Theroux, analyzes some areas in which legislative or administrative efforts are needed in order to continue the present

close economic and trade relations with the ROC in the post-normalization period.

Public opinion is one of the major factors in shaping American foreign policy. Professor Michael Y. M. Kau and his associates recently conducted a poll of opinion leaders to solicit their views on normalization; these results are published in Chapter V. In that Chapter, it should be noted, Professor Kau and his associates also compare their results with public opinion polls done by other organizations such as Gallup and Potomac Association. These polls almost uniformly indicate that the security of Taiwan must be assured before the U.S. can reasonably move to normalize relations with the PRC. The last two chapters, by Professor James C. Hsiung and James W. Morley, deal with possible formulas for normalization and their impact on the ROC and other countries.

For the convenience of readers, some important documents concerning normalization are reproduced at the end of the book. Similarly, a selected bibliography is prepared to facilitate further research on the subject.

Hungdah Chiu

Baltimore, Maryland  
March 12, 1978

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Hungdah Chiu

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## INTRODUCTION

GASTON J. SIGUR

There has been a growing awareness in the United States over the past couple of years of the immense complexities of U.S. relations with China — that is, with the two capitals that claim to speak for China, Taipei and Peking. For the first year or so after President Nixon's historic visit to Peking in 1972, it seemed to many that the U.S. was moving toward a shift of its embassy in Taipei to Peking and its liaison mission from Peking to Taipei. This step came closer to reality with the Japanese action of granting diplomatic recognition to Peking in September 1972. It was said by some that the Japanese had set the example and that Washington should follow. However, it soon became clear that such a move by the U.S. would involve great changes in policy and dangerous risks which deserved careful discussion before decisions were made.

Professor Hungdah Chiu of the University of Maryland Law School has been one of the persons who has urged the most cautious deliberations before the U.S. shifts policy toward China. As a person trained in the law, he is more aware than most of the legal problems that would be created if the U.S. broke diplomatic relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan. But Professor Chiu also recognizes that legal matters are only part of what is at issue. There are economic, political, security and moral aspects of any possible American move. These all have to be dealt with before a policy acceptable to most Americans can be formulated by the U.S. Administration.

In order to assist with the needed clarification process, Professor Chiu has edited this book, *Normalizing Relations With the People's Republic of China: Problems, Analysis and Documents*. Chapters are written by leading authorities on U.S. policy in Asia. The authors all seem to point out that what is needed is the development of an American policy in keeping with the great responsibilities borne by the United States in helping to maintain peace and stability in the Asian region and, indeed, globally. What the U.S. does vis-a-vis China will have repercussions throughout the world and U.S. policy makers must be fully cognizant of this fact.

Advocacy is not the major point of this book, nor should it be. U.S. foreign policy specialists, both in and outside the government, want to see improved relations with the People's Republic of

China. No one argues against this. The question is how to go about it while at the same time preserving fundamental U.S. interests. Professor Chiu and his co-authors make the tasks of understanding these interests and sorting out the priorities a little easier for those trying to understand the complexities of the problem. This is no mean achievement and, for this, the editor and his colleagues deserve our thanks and gratitude.

Gaston J. Sigur

## Chapter I

### Sino-American Relations in An International Context

ROBERT A. SCALAPINO

In this transitional era, any simple, monodimensional characterization of the international system is inadequate. There remain only two global powers in military terms, and in this sense, the era of bipolarism is still with us despite the attempts to consign it to the past. The United States and the Soviet Union are the only two states with a strategic reach that can extend to any part of the world. Moreover, as was not the case earlier, the Soviet Union has achieved near military equality with the United States, and in the view of some, is striving for superiority. In any case, there can be little doubt that the Soviet Union now seeks the status of a global power, one at least co-equal to the United States.

Under these conditions, it is understandable that "the Soviet issue" should be uppermost in the minds of American policy makers. Since Russia is the one country today that could wreak great physical damage upon the United States and since our interests are in conflict with Soviet interests in many instances, the concept of a "united front" against the Soviet Union, one encompassing China among others, has an appeal in certain American circles. Prior to exploring the advantages and disadvantages, the possible gains and risks of such a strategy, however, I should like to pursue the complex question of the international order further.

#### TOWARD POWER DISPERSAL AND STATE AUTHORITARIANISM

As is commonly recognized, the past two decades have witnessed a growing dispersal of power in all of its diverse forms. The military capacities of various states, groups and even individuals have grown in extraordinary degree, the product of massive arms transfers, new technology, and the proliferation of political entities and movements. The effective, or at least the

extensive use of violence, ranging from terrorist acts to nuclear war, has thus been extended to an ever-widening circle within our world. Correspondingly, the costs and risks of maintaining order, whether at local, national or international levels, have greatly increased.

In the same brief period, there has also been a substantial dispersal of economic power. The basic facts are well known: Portions of West Europe and Japan have enjoyed phenomenal economic growth and can now be considered economic forces in the first order of magnitude. Japan in particular currently stands with the United States as one of two truly international economic powers of this era. For unique reasons, moreover, certain states of the Middle East have not only acquired great wealth in an incredibly brief period of time, but also a capacity to affect the international economic scene to a degree scarcely equalled in history. In addition, some other late developing countries have sustained growth rates in recent years that move them ever closer to the "advanced world," even as they prove to be stiff competitors with it.

At the same time, the vulnerabilities of many states — including all of the major societies — in the economic sphere often appear to equal their strengths. For the advanced nations, stagflation has been a recurrent problem, accompanied by growing unemployment. And the rules which once seemed so effective in regulating the international economic relations among advanced industrial societies are now increasingly inoperative or ineffective.

Nor are the communist states in better shape. The economic problems of the Soviet Union are well known, and some of these have an impact upon Soviet relations with the COMECON states of East Europe. The grave difficulties of the Chinese economy, underestimated by most Western observers, are now in the course of being exposed by the Chinese leaders themselves, as they seek corrective measures.

The combination of economic dispersal and fragility has led to a curious paradox. In a period when interdependency is steadily growing, the pressures in the direction of economic nationalism are also mounting. Sometimes, these two seemingly incompatible forces are combined via a regional economic organization like the European Economic Community, and this may be the wave of the future. Regionalism, not as an exclusive force, but as a part of the continuum of governance, political and economic, appears to be a concept whose time has come.



At the same time, the quest for a workable mix between economic self-reliance and interdependence has led to different trends in individual states. Almost without exception, the communist states are modifying the intensive self-reliance of the past, cognizant that their technological backwardness constitutes a major obstacle to more rapid progress. In varying degrees, they are preparing to turn outward economically, seeking the skills of the advanced world. Thus, both Russia and China want to tap American science and technology.

Meanwhile, other states — many of them from the so-called Third World and coming from a colonial background — are pursuing policies of greater self-reliance and economic nationalism. They are demanding a new economic order for the world, one with greater benefits for them.

As in the military-strategic field, it has proven to be enormously difficult up to date to summon the will and strength to exercise creative leadership in international economic policy. Aware of its own economic vulnerabilities and apprehensive over the growing complexity of the international arena, each major state finds effective international, even regional management impossible. This includes the United States and Japan, the two nations with the greatest potentials for leadership among the mixed economies of the advanced world. It also includes the Soviet Union, a nation whose record of economic interaction with other socialist states and developing countries has not been notably successful.

In the strictly political realm, meanwhile, the broadest trend has been away from Western-style parliamentarism and the open political society. This trend, however, has not generally led to the advance of communism. Rather, we have witnessed the advent of a great variety of quasi-authoritarian states, widely differing in their social and economic achievements. For the most part, the charismatic mobilizers who served as nation-founders for such states are gone, replaced by civil or military bureaucratic types whose primary commitment is to rapid economic development and through this, a consolidation of state power. Thus, they are prone to give their technocrats an increasingly important role in decision-making.

In this setting, the role of ideology is undergoing significant changes. As a society moves away from its revolutionary inception, the thrust of ideology becomes essentially conservative: to legitimize existing authority and to rationalize major policy decisions. Its intellectual content evaporates as it becomes dogma

in the hands of political high priests. Intellectualism gravitates toward science and technology. Less and less does ideology serve as the progenitor of concrete policies, although it may continue to impose vitally important perimeters within which policies must be confined.

These basic trends have affected the communist as well as the non-communist societies of our times, since such societies are but one sub-species of the "late developing world." When Soviet and Chinese spokesmen castigate each other as "revisionists," both are correct. In each society, a type of pragmatism now holds sway. The remark ascribed to Teng Hsiao-p'ing typifies the mood: "It does not matter whether a cat is black or white so long as it catches mice."

Having made this point, however, one should also assert that there are important differences which generally separate communist states and non-communist states of the quasi-authoritarian type. One pertains to the institutional framework within which each operates. The communist state is committed to a one-party dictatorship, with all other institutions subordinate to it. That element of pluralism that exists in quasi-authoritarian states thus receives no ideological or institutional sanction, and is badly stunted.

In general, therefore, such basic human rights as the right of privacy and the right of silence are far more prevalent in the quasi-authoritarian state, and this frequently extends to more positive rights including those of speech, assemblage and religion. In specific terms, there is a very important difference both in the current scope for individual rights and in the potential for political evolution between Taipei and Peking, Seoul and P'yongyang. To the extent that our commitment to human rights is meaningful, it must take these differences into account.

Given the trends briefly summarized above, it is not surprising that we have sought new designations for the international order of these troubled times. Thus, "multipolarism" has replaced "bipolarism" as a short-hand description of this era. In point of fact, however, we have no overarching international order at present, although multiple efforts to construct one are in process. The attempt to create new rules for maritime jurisdiction, new regulations pertaining to international economic interaction, and to give substantive meaning to a concept like "peaceful coexistence" testify to the efforts. At present, however, we live in an international state of quasi-anarchy, moderated by a balance

of weakness. Each of the major actors has a sufficient number of weaknesses so that, combined with the complexity of the world, its capacity for action is limited, its sense of risks enhanced, and its ability to influence or control others is reduced. Unfortunately, however, a balance of weakness is no more stable than a balance of power.

#### THE SINO-AMERICAN-SOVIET TRIANGLE

In this context, how should we view American relations with China? Let me now return to one central question, namely, our role in the Sino-American-Soviet triangle. The following facts seem to me established: First, American-Soviet and American-Chinese relations are and will continue to be different in kind, and in their impact upon us and the world. The Soviet Union, like the United States, is now a global power, as we have noted, and all issues of a global character must involve both of us. If we cannot make progress on critical issues like strategic arms limitations, the entire world will be affected, directly or indirectly. China is a regional power, one capable of affecting the future of many Asian states and anxious to be accepted as a major power in Asia. It also has the ability to alter triangular relations, quite possibly its greatest leverage. On balance, however, the range of our concerns with China is of lesser importance than that with the USSR at present and for the foreseeable future.

Should we pursue a classic "balance of power" policy, aligning with the lesser power against the greater one? The advantages would supposedly be to confront the Soviet Union with a two-front challenge, providing China (in combination with Japan) with the political-strategic capacity to oppose Soviet threats and adding to the strength of NATO in the West. It is also argued that such a policy would insure against any future rapprochement between China and Russia, thereby removing the type of threat that loomed large for the Eurasian continent for a brief period after 1949.

What are the costs and risks of such a policy? First, it would inevitably lead to a worsening of American-Soviet relations, and make the attainment of any agreements relating to SALT and other vital issues vastly more difficult if not impossible. We might well re-enter the so-called "cold war," a war, incidentally, which is not dead but which is currently being waged most intensely between China and Russia. We could expect Soviet retaliation in a variety of ways and on a variety of fronts. Secondly, such a policy

would be, on balance, destabilizing in Asia. To understand this fact, one must appreciate certain basic aspects of the Asian scene.

#### SOVIET GOALS AND ACHIEVEMENTS IN ASIA

At present, each of the major powers has a commitment to the Pacific-Asian region, and each feels its national interests to be vitally affected by developments in this region, with attention focused first upon Northeast Asia. If one examines the Soviet presence, the following trends prevail. Unquestionably, the USSR intends to be a major Asian as well as European power, and in the course of the coming decades, in pursuit of this objective, it will develop Siberia and Central Asia, both economically and militarily. Its military presence in the Pacific-Asian region is now increasing, and that will continue.

The central question, however, is whether the USSR can translate military power into political influence. If one examines the past developments and current trends, the answer is not promising from a Soviet point of view. China up to date has been a debacle for the Russians. Relations with Japan have not been worse since World War II, and no improvement is in sight. Even with North Korea, once a pure client state, relations in recent years have ranged from cool to hostile.

Turning to Southeast Asia, the Russians remain of critical importance to the Vietnamese communists and, via them, to the Laotian communists. The reasons are obvious. Soviet aid is the primary source of support for governments in the deepest economic difficulties. Further, Soviet presence insures at least temporarily a buffer against excessive Chinese influence. And the Chinese are near-by, not only on the northern border, but also in Cambodia where they serve as the primary external source of aid and influence. Indochina, in sum, is now deeply involved in the Sino-Soviet cold war. From a Vietnamese standpoint, however, ties with the Soviet Union represent a marriage of convenience, not one based upon intimacy. Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, Soviet influence is quite minimal. And in South Asia, recent developments have not been promising for the Russians. Even before Mrs. Gandhi's electoral defeat, a turn away from the Soviet model had commenced. As long as relations with the United States and China remain minimal or hostile, some reliance on the Soviet Union may continue, irrespective of the particular Indian government in power, but the Indian quest, like that of many

other states of the region, is for a rough equidistance from the major powers.

In sum, the Soviet Union, despite increases in military power, remains very foreign to Asia — culturally, politically and in terms of the economic model which it presents. Its diplomacy may improve, but in the past, it has been remarkably heavy handed. A rigidity has characterized policies toward Japan, China, and other societies that augurs poorly for expanded or sustained influence. What alliance or special tie consummated by the Soviet Union with a state not contiguous to its borders has long flourished or even survived?

#### CHINA'S FUTURE CAPACITIES AND ROLE

Let us turn to China. With a landmass greatly exceeding that of any other Asian society and a population which our governmental specialists currently estimate at 950 million, China is a giant whose size and proximity, cultural as well as geographic, insures an influence upon the smaller states in its vicinity. The variables in determining the nature and extent of that influence start with the question of Chinese internal trends.

Clearly, the task of "modernizing" China is a prodigious one. Under even the most favorable conditions, it will take many decades, and there is some doubt as to whether conditions will be favorable. Can the recurrent political instability of the past be ended? Can the nation-building process proceed without further challenges and interruptions? Can the serious mistakes in economic planning — often induced by political considerations — now be terminated? No certain answers to these questions can be given, but it would indeed be a miracle if suddenly all political problems ceased and all economic decisions were correctly made and implemented. There has been too much false optimism about China and Chinese accomplishments among American observers in the past. It is ironic that the correctives have had to come largely from the Chinese leadership itself.

Let us assume, however, that the new, relatively pragmatic line being followed by China's current leaders continues to prevail for a considerable period of time, that factors of stability outweigh those of instability, enabling the nation-building process to unfold, and that the premium remains that of economic development to make China "a modern and powerful nation" by the end of the 20th century. Under such conditions, what will China's impact be upon the rest of Asia?

In my opinion, we can envisage a China that exercises, or seeks to exercise, ever-greater influence throughout the region. The leaders of the People's Republic of China have naturally disavowed hegemony here and elsewhere, even as they have accused the Soviet Union and the United States of seeking to control the world. But China has also made it clear that it considers Asia its logical sphere of influence, and even in a period when China has been economically backward, militarily weak, and politically divided, it has pursued an involvement in Asia in a variety of ways.

The cultivation of Japan, including the extensive application of people-to-people diplomacy in an effort to influence Japanese decision-making, has steadily increased and often been effective. The wooing of North Korea has been high on the Chinese agenda, and here, too, the Chinese have scored impressive gains. In Southeast Asia, normalization of relations with most of the governments has been accomplished. Nor has this prevented a continuance of the ties with the communist movements of the region. It may have startled some individuals to see a picture of Chairman Hua Kuo-feng smiling broadly and shaking hands with the Burmese White Flag Communist leader in the internationally circulated *Peking Review* even as undying friendship was being pledged to Burmese Premier Ne Win, but China keeps two paths open in Southeast Asia, awaiting events. It has no intention of abandoning the pro-Chinese communist movements of the region, although it will raise or lower its assistance to them as an appraisal of its own national interests and developments in the region determine.

Meanwhile, the overseas Chinese, numbering nearly twenty million in this region, constitute both an asset and a liability. To the extent that they feel a sense of Chinese nationalism — pride in the emergence of a more united, powerful China — and to the extent that they are alienated by the discriminatory policies of the governments under which they live, they are potential allies. But as is well known, since they generally have great influence over Southeast Asian commerce and industry, and represent a small affluent class living in a sea of poverty, they are also sources of local resentment that can influence adversely the course of Sino-Southeast Asian relations. On balance, moreover, the overseas Chinese who have reported on mainland conditions have not been impressed, particularly since 1965.

When all of these factors are taken into account, however, it can be seen that despite (or because of) its multiple weaknesses,

the People's Republic of China currently has considerably more influence in East Asia than does the Soviet Union. If one taps the sentiments of many of the Asian leaders, moreover, particularly those in Southeast Asia, one finds a combination of fear of, and respect for the Chinese position. In the long run, they firmly believe, China is destined to be the major power with the greatest influence in the region, and they want a continuance of countervailing external influences. The idea of a Sino-Japanese-American alliance is not in the least appealing.

#### JAPAN — CHANGE OR CONTINUITY?

I shall return shortly to other aspects of Chinese foreign policy conceptualization and practice, but at this point, let me turn to Japan, a nation with whom our economic, political and strategic interests are powerfully associated. Despite some rhetoric to the contrary, US-Japan relations have deteriorated recently, and serious problems lie ahead. For their part, the Japanese, like most other Asians with whom we have been associated in the past, feel that the United States has not engaged in adequate consultation in matters of policy affecting their vital interests. On another front, the United States feels that the Japanese are too complacent in seeking remedies for the massive trade imbalance that has once again made itself manifest in US-Japanese economic relations.

Nevertheless, the Japanese government remains committed to special ties with the United States, while hoping that its relations with both China and the Soviet Union can be upwardly mobile. Japanese leaders have disavowed the concept of "equidistance," even in their relations with China and Russia, but it is clear that Tokyo does not want to run the risk of alienating either of the communist giants by affiliating itself too closely or consistently with the other. As has been noted, the Soviet Union's current position in Japan is weak, because of the northern island and fisheries issues and a host of other concerns. But despite the hostility engendered by Soviet policies and attitudes, the Japanese have been reluctant to take any action that would seem to align it with China; hence the difficulties over the antihegemony clause in the Sino-Japanese treaty of friendship.

In sum, Japan is not interested in a Sino-Japanese-American alliance, one that might greatly exacerbate its already troubled relations with the Soviet Union — without improving its security. Its present predilection is for an increased independence of action

within the framework of close ties with the United States, and a flexible position vis-a-vis Peking and Moscow, with each decision dependent upon the issue at stake, but avoiding either the fact or the image of alignment. In dealing with the PRC and the USSR, Japan hopes that it can separate economics and politics, thereby participating in the modernization drives of both. A similar hope prevails with respect to other parts of the world, including the rest of Asia.

One can conceive of circumstances that might induce dramatic changes in Japanese foreign policy. A combination of the perceived Soviet threat on an expanded scale and the sustained decline of American credibility could lead Japan into rapid rearmament and a higher political-military posture, or conversely, into a reliance upon pacifist non-alignment of the early Nehru type. It would almost certainly produce a deep polarization in Japan between advocates of these two approaches, a polarization that would create deep fissures in the body politic and could render Japanese policies frozen in immobility. At present, indeed, a sufficient manifestation of both of the above trends has occurred to produce reverberations in Japanese policies, generally in the direction of considering a stepped-up pace of armaments. Yet, no basic changes are now enroute.

#### IMPLICATIONS FOR AMERICAN POLICY

When all of the facts are examined, I would submit that American interests are best served by a policy that avoids any sustained, predictable tilt toward either the People's Republic of China or the Soviet Union. Even if the policies undertaken amounted to no more than *de facto* alliance with China, the repercussions would be generally adverse for us and for other Asians. I hasten to add that this does not preclude certain positive interactions with China, any more than it should preclude similar interactions with Russia. Strategically, however, the American position should be one of considering each issue on its merits in our bilateral relations with the two communist states, taking into account our interests and those of nations associated with us. We have benefited greatly from being able to communicate with both the PRC and the USSR during a period when they have not been able to communicate effectively with each other. Alignment, *de jure* or *de facto*, jeopardizes our advantages.

Normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China, however, is not alliance and most of us would agree that if



it could be achieved without excessive cost to our credibility and to other critical American policies, it should be consummated. Therein lie the issues.

It may be well to begin by exploring our commitments under the Shanghai Communique, that joint declaration signed at the end of the Nixon visit in August 1972. In that communique, two positions were set forth: the Chinese view that there is but one China, and that this one China includes Taiwan; and the American view that the China-Taiwan issue should be settled peacefully. The United States agreed not to challenge the Chinese position — with the meaning of this commitment unclear. The Chinese were silent on the question of peaceful settlement.

Unfortunately, the Shanghai Communique's own credibility is marred by a patent falsehood, namely, that "all Chinese on both sides of the straits" accept the one-China thesis. If the communique had stated that the two governments on both sides of the straits so viewed the issue, that would merely have been a statement of fact. But both the Chinese and American negotiators knew that the statement put into the communique was false, ignoring the large number of Taiwanese and the growing number of mainland Chinese on Taiwan who do not accept this thesis. Thus, the new relation was launched on the basis of a deliberately ambiguous and partly false set of statements, presumably because it could not be launched on any other basis.

Ambiguity is not invariably a mistake, but neither is it necessarily helpful in producing and maintaining an understanding. Today, the PRC leaders insist that via the Shanghai Communique, the United States has committed itself to the eventual recognition of the People's Republic of China *and* the abandonment of Taiwan. Peking also insists that it has made no commitments to a peaceful settlement of the issue, and intends to make none, viewing the Taiwan issue as strictly an internal affair. The United States meets this clarity with continued ambiguity while it seeks to explore privately the possibility of some compromise on the critical issues.

#### THE ESSENCE OF THE TAIWAN ISSUE

Those issues relate specifically to the future of Taiwan, especially with respect to two concerns: the use of force and Taiwan's right to defense pending any peaceful settlement. These two interrelated questions lie at the heart of the Taiwan issue. They can neither be ignored nor treated as trivial. As is well

known, the PRC's three conditions for normalization are that the United States must break diplomatic relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan; remove all of its military forces and; abrogate the Mutual Security Treaty.

The so-called Japanese formula has no relevance to the current situation, as the Japanese themselves are the first to assert. Japan could take the actions which it took, namely, breaking relations with the Republic of China and establishing full diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China while continuing a wide range of economic and cultural relations with Taiwan, precisely because the American defense commitment to Taiwan continued. Japan, needless to say, had no security obligations to Taiwan whatsoever after relinquishing its control over the island at the close of World War II. Thus, the critical issue of a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question was not an issue in Sino-Japanese negotiations.

The reasons why the Japanese government does not want the United States to abandon Taiwan are not too difficult to perceive. Not only is the stability of Taiwan of economic importance to Japan, but the independence of Taiwan is of strategic importance as well. If Taiwan were to be incorporated as a part of the People's Republic of China, Peking would find the control of the Taiwan Straits essential to its control of Taiwan, and beyond Taiwan, its jurisdiction would stretch in various directions into the Western Pacific. Already, a dispute over control of islands between Okinawa and Taiwan involves Japan and the PRC. The prospect of an expanded China to the south, accompanying the near presence of the Soviet Union in the north, and with the possibility of a troubled Korean peninsula represents a worrisome picture.

#### TAIWAN'S UNCERTAIN FUTURE

Even if the United States were to relinquish all security obligations and commitments to Taiwan, one school of thought holds that Taiwan could and would survive as an independent entity for the foreseeable future and that, hence, the security of the Northeast Asian region would not be threatened.

The argument is that the People's Republic of China is neither prepared militarily to take Taiwan by force, nor willing to accept the political costs for such an action, knowing that it would deeply alienate the United States, Japan and many other states. They have further submitted that by doing away with all security commitments, the United States would create the climate whereby

the two Chinese governments could negotiate a peaceful settlement, thereby bringing an end to the civil war.

Such views, in my opinion, show an insufficient appreciation of the impact of any decision regarding Taiwan upon the rest of Asia as well as upon Taiwan itself. It is no secret that the disastrous end to the Indochina war, including the collapse of American efforts at "peace with honor" had a profound effect upon all Asians — associates, "neutrals" and adversaries. American credibility — including the willingness of the United States to maintain its commitments — continues to be widely questioned in this region and elsewhere, and not merely by former and present allies. One of Peking's primary concerns, as will be detailed later, is that the U.S. does not have the will and capacity to remain a major power in Asia and in the world. Peking's litmus-paper test, to be sure, is not Taiwan but American policies vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. However, if the United States unilaterally abandoned Taiwan, leaving it to fend for itself in terms of defense, this would not only be widely interpreted as presaging a broader American withdrawal from Asia, particularly in the light of recent Korean policies, but it would confirm some of the worst suspicions throughout Asia and many other regions concerning the reliability and credibility of the United States. Would this not ultimately affect the decisions made by Peking itself as to whether to retain or abandon its current "balance of power" foreign policy?

The thesis that the PRC would not attack Taiwan militarily at this point in time is probably correct. However, once "the American obstacle" were removed, Peking would be forced to fashion new, more militant policies regarding Taiwan. Its leaders could no longer rely upon the excuse that the U.S. presence precluded any progress. In short, the U.S. abandonment of Taiwan would put immediate pressure upon Peking to "do something."

Various possibilities exist short of full-scale military operations. One, of course, would be to proclaim and seek to enforce a naval blockade, or to intercept ships flying ROC flags. But the first steps would probably be of an economic and political nature. As is well known, the economy of Taiwan has been highly successful, but it has also been greatly dependent upon an atmosphere of confidence concerning Taiwan's political future. The flight of indigenous capital, together with the curtailment of foreign investment, could radically and rapidly alter the scene, and Peking would have the opportunity to encourage these

developments in a variety of ways if it saw fit. Indeed, the present situation may be sufficient to accelerate these trends.

On the political front, Taiwan also has its elements of fragility. Recent American policies, combined with broader events, have been discouraging to the Taiwan independence movement. On Taiwan itself, Chiang Ching-kuo has gradually constructed a base of support different from that of his father, increasingly relying upon younger elements, and including in political roles a small but growing number of Taiwanese. The PRC would almost certainly seek to plant its own political movement on the island, using the powerful argument that now that Taiwan had been abandoned by its sole protector, incorporation into the PRC was inescapable, and that those who made their accommodation to Peking early would be properly rewarded. Indeed, that appeal has already commenced. Note the following from a Fukien radio broadcast to Taiwan in March 1977:

After assuming office, the new U.S. President, Carter, declared that he would continue to adhere to the Shanghai Communiqué and normalize Sino-US relations. This has created panic within the Chiang gang, which fears it may be abandoned by the U.S. and come to a miserable end like the puppet cliques of Lon Nol and Nguyen Van Thieu.

The latter quotation speaks eloquently to the prospects for negotiations between Peking and Taiwan. Given the enormous disparity in size and power, in the absence of any external support, and with the position of the PRC permitting of no doubt, Taiwan authorities could only negotiate the terms of their surrender.

Nothing is inevitable in the world of politics, and it would be unwise to make any flat predictions about the fate of Taiwan in the event that American security guarantees were withdrawn or rendered non-credible. It seems doubtful, however, that Taiwan could long survive as an independent entity in the absence of meaningful security guarantees. In any case, its fate would be largely in the hands of those who governed in Peking. Such a situation would scarcely enhance our credibility in Asia or in the world, particularly if the denouement even remotely approached the painful events that occurred in Indochina at the end.

Consequently, it is understandable that most American citizens and policy-makers would like to have their cake and eat it too. Our people and our leaders want both normalization of

relations with the PRC and a continuance of meaningful ties with an independent Taiwan. Hence, elaborate arguments have been constructed to assert either that we can work out an acceptable compromise or that what appears to be abandonment will really not lead to Taiwan's demise. We have raised certain questions about the latter view and sought to place this problem in the broader context of Asia. Let us turn now to the former issue, using it to explore the basic attitudes of the PRC to the United States at this point in time.

#### THE FUNDAMENTALS OF PRC FOREIGN POLICY

A reading of Chairman Hua Kuo-feng's political report to the 11th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party on August 12, 1977 provides a remarkably comprehensive and clear exposition of the current Chinese attitude toward the United States, the Soviet Union and the world in general.

Quoting Lenin, Hua spoke to Sino-American-Soviet relations in the following passage:

The more powerful enemy [read the USSR] can be vanquished only by exerting the utmost effort, and most thoroughly, carefully, attentively and skillfully making use without fail of every, even the smallest, 'rift' among the enemies [read the USSR and the US], of every antagonism of interest among the bourgeoisie of the various countries and among the various groups or types of bourgeoisie within the various countries [read U.S., Japan, and West Europe], and also by taking advantage of every, even the smallest, opportunity of gaining a mass ally, even though this ally be temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable and conditional [read U.S.].

It would be difficult to find a more straightforward and succinct presentation of the tactics and strategy of contemporary Chinese foreign policy than is contained in the above passage. But Hua was even more explicit regarding the United States and the Soviet Union in certain other passages of his report. Note these themes:

Soviet-US contention extends to every corner of the world, but its focus is still Europe.

The Soviet Union and the United States are the source of a new world war, and Soviet social-imperialism in particular presents the greater danger.

The two hegemonic powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, are the biggest international exploiters and oppressors of today and the common enemies of the people of the world. The third world countries suffer the worst oppression and hence put up the strongest resistance; they are the main force combating imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism. The second world countries have a dual character; on the one hand, they oppress, exploit and control the third world countries, and on the other, they are controlled, threatened and bullied by both hegemonic powers in varying degrees. Chairman Mao's thesis differentiating the three worlds gives a correct orientation to the present international struggle and clearly defines the main revolutionary forces, the chief enemies, and the middle forces that can be won over and united, enabling the international proletariat to unite with all the forces that can be united to form the broadest united front in class struggles against the chief enemies on the world arena.

Making due allowances for its ideological cast, this represents a comprehensive presentation of the Chinese view. Moreover, it should not be regarded as mere rhetoric, since demonstrably, it provides the rationale for actual Chinese policies and attitudes — a mix of political culture and national interest as conceived by the leadership. Chinese leaders should be given credit for a degree of honesty and forthrightness in presenting their position that is often denied them. It is frequently said, "They don't really mean it," or "Pay attention not to what they say but what they do." In fact, they do mean it, and in general terms, the above words do mesh with current policies. Moreover, PRC foreign policies have not varied with the major political changes transpiring on the domestic front in recent years, contrary to the expectations of many Americans and Russians.

To summarize, the PRC takes the position that the world is divided into three parts: the two superpowers; the second world comprising essentially the national bourgeois states of West Europe and Japan; and the third world, built around the developing states. It identifies currently with the third world, the former "socialist camp" having been scuttled when the Soviet Union became a "fascist, social-imperialist state," and aspires to play the role of spokesman for the "peasant and proletarian" positions natural to this world.

The superpowers are both primary enemies of "the peoples of the world," but the Soviet Union is the principal threat because it is a rising power, whereas the United States is a declining power. To combat the Soviet Union, it is necessary to build the broadest possible united front, one encompassing not only the second and third worlds, but also including the United States, even though we are intended to be a temporary ally, in the manner of the alliance with Chiang Kai-shek during the Sino-Japanese War.

War is inevitable, according the PRC leaders, and its major locus will be Europe, its principal contestants the United States and the Soviet Union. Adequate preparation, however, may make it possible for the opponents of the Soviet Union to postpone the date of the war, or to win the conflict when it breaks out. Appeasement of Russia can only lead to disaster.

Under this strategic vision, the PRC encourages NATO and applauds an American presence in Europe. It is now also encouraging the rearmament of Japan, and the continuance of close American-Japanese security ties. Indeed, it favors a strengthening of the American position at points where confrontation with the Soviet Union appears most likely, and where the Chinese strategic reach cannot extend. Thus, there is no objection to a continued presence in the Philippines, or in Diego Garcia.

However, parallel interests stop considerably short of desiring an American presence everywhere, or of being willing to help the United States resolve crucial regional and global issues. A tragic error was made in assuming that the PRC would assist the United States in obtaining "peace with honor" in Indochina. As the prospects of communist victory brightened, Chinese aid to Hanoi increased during the final period of the war. Similarly, it is a mistake to assume, as some Americans do, that the PRC will be of assistance in compromising the Korean issue. On the contrary, Peking has signalled in every possible way its determination to stand by Kim Il-song, and its statements on Korea — and American policy in Korea — have been unrelentingly hostile to the U.S. position and that of South Korea. It has also castigated the Soviet Union for winking at the South Koreans on occasion, such as issuing visas to South Korean athletes.

In international conferences, moreover, PRC attacks upon the United States frequently employ the same "cold war" terminology that is applied to the Soviet Union. It is true that the overall decibel level of attack upon the United States is considerably less than that against the USSR. In a recent study which I made

measuring May 1976-April 1977 Chinese radio broadcasts on a scale of +3 to -3, the overall rating average of themes dealing with the United States was -1.6 whereas the rating of themes dealing with the USSR was -2.8. That is an accurate reflection of the precise difference in hostility in my opinion.

It should not be assumed, however, that the PRC is prepared to make significant concessions on the crucial issues pertaining to Taiwan. In the months since the advent of the Carter administration, PRC leaders have repeatedly stated that they will *not* provide any guarantees concerning the non-use of force. On the contrary, they have asserted that force may be necessary if the present attitudes of "the Chiang clique" persist. Nor is there any indication up to date that they would accept the continuance of American military assistance to Taiwan, even if it were agreed to abrogate the Mutual Security Treaty. Almost certainly, such aid would be attacked as interference in the internal affairs of another country, particularly if Taiwan had been legally accepted as a province of China. If the aid came indirectly, via a third source, the same charges would be made.

No one can dogmatically assert that the current positions of the People's Republic of China on the Taiwan issue are final and immutable. It will be recalled that no less a leader than Mao Tse-tung himself in his famous interviews with Edgar Snow in mid-1936, spoke of Taiwan in the following terms:

if the Koreans wish to break away from the chains of Japanese imperialism, we will extend them our enthusiastic help in their struggle for independence. The same thing applies for Formosa.

In a more contemporary setting, the PRC position regarding Taiwan does not jibe well with its insistence that the people of Timor should be supported in their quest for independence, despite the fact that Timorese are both ethnically Indonesian and encased geographically in the Indonesian region. Nor is Peking's ardent espousal of independence for Puerto Rico wholly consistent. But consistency is not the hallmark of many foreign policies, and we must assume that recent PRC pronouncements on the Taiwan issue are firm for this period.

This analysis would seem to preclude the unilateral approach to normalization advocated by some. It has been suggested that if China would remain silent, the United States could reiterate its



position on the non-use of force and defense rights of Taiwan via a Presidential declaration or a Congressional act. But the Chinese leaders have not remained silent; hence, any temporary silence now, even if they were willing — which currently seems unlikely — would scarcely be credible.

#### ECONOMIC PROSPECTS IN US-PRC RELATIONS

In the face of these problems and the fact that the United States enjoys greater contact with the PRC than many nations having full diplomatic relations, why has normalization been declared so urgent in some quarters? In its briefest form, the argument is that if there is not progress, there will be deterioration. In this connection, two issues of broad international significance have been raised, together with one issue pertaining to bilateral economic relations. Each warrants special attention. Starting with the economic question, it has been submitted that trade and other forms of economic intercourse can only be advanced in a sustained fashion in the aftermath of normalization. As noted earlier, we can assume that the PRC under its current leadership will turn outward, seeking to take advantage of the science and technology of the advanced world. Indeed, the desire of the Chinese to acquire specific knowledge is apparent in our scientific exchanges at present. The problem, from an American perspective, is in making this a two-way street.

A similar problem exists in the field of trade and other forms of economic intercourse. The old lure of 400, now 900 million customers is a powerful one, and, unquestionably, some increases in trade would follow normalization and the establishment of most favored nation treatment. Economic relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China, however, will not be a major factor in the economy of either nation in the foreseeable future, if ever. We may assume that the PRC will modify but not abandon its doctrine of self-reliance. Investment will be impossible and the problem of China's foreign reserves will remain serious, with her exports relatively limited. Its most logical trading partner will continue to be Japan for a great variety of reasons, starting with proximity and costs. China will diversify its trade in some degree, anxious to avoid the dependence upon a single source that proved to be so costly in the aftermath of the Sino-Soviet cleavage. From the United States, however, it will seek primarily the very high technology products which it cannot get elsewhere, and which in some cases will pose the same issues

of security as are posed by some products coveted by the Soviet Union. Once the political-security question has been settled, of course, these products can be sold under present conditions, as indeed in some cases is happening.

#### THE FUTURE OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Far more important is the question of how decisions concerning normalization may affect Sino-Soviet relations. A few years ago, it was asserted that if the United States did not normalize relations with the PRC prior to Mao's death, the chances were high that a post-Mao leadership would turn toward rapprochement, or at least toward a tactical detente with the Soviet Union. This thesis rested upon the premise that Mao himself was the chief architect of Sino-American detente, that significant opposition to this policy existed, particularly among the military, and that the logic behind a limited tactical detente between China and Russia was sufficiently powerful to carry the day, should normalization efforts falter.

In its timing at least, that thesis has proven to be incorrect. The post-Mao leadership up to date has been as fiercely anti-Soviet as Mao himself. But the issue persists, partly because there is a logical case to be made out for a shift in Sino-Soviet relations from a Chinese standpoint. Putting ourselves in the role of a Chinese spokesman for change, the following case could be presented:

We do not have to love the Russians, nor to trust them. However, the present level of tension is too high to serve our national interests. We must keep a huge force on the 4800 mile Sino-Soviet border, much of it inactive in productive terms during a period when we desperately need semi-skilled and skilled manpower. We are forced to consider rapid military modernization when our first need is to build a solid infrastructure in heavy industry, and approach military modernization more gradually.

Further, the present level of tension has created a torrent of public polemics damaging to both the Soviets and ourselves internationally, and badly disruptive of the international revolutionary movement. Everywhere, we must fight the Russians first of all in seeking access to that movement. Each of us, moreover, has problems with our minority peoples living on our borders, problems exacerbated by this feud.

Finally, the current policies make us heavily dependent upon the United States in the final analysis, and the U.S. will — its capacity to serve as the countervailing force to the Soviet Union — is in grave doubt.

Such an argument would not be submitted on behalf of a restoration of the alliance. Rather, it would be advanced in favor of a reduction of tension — some degree of normalization. It is also to be noted that it does not mention, let alone center upon the issue of Taiwan. To the extent that it involves the United States, it hinges upon the issue of American credibility.

Given the element of logic in this argument, it would be unwise to rule out completely some future efforts at limited detente between China and Russia. The question of whether this would be advantageous or disadvantageous to the United States and the rest of the world cannot be analyzed here, but my own view is that on balance, it would probably be disadvantageous. In any case, however, the tides are not running in the direction of even a tactical limited detente at present. Why?

First, it is easy to underestimate the deep emotional and racial antagonisms that affect both the elites and the masses of these two societies. In Russia, the specter of “the yellow peril” has a lengthy history, and it is by no means dead. Chinese xenophobia also runs deep, and given the profound cultural differences and recent experiences, it can easily be directed against the Russians.

This alone would not suffice, of course, but there are powerful impersonal factors in addition. Close relations between two major societies living cheek-by-jowl with each other have always been difficult to establish and maintain, and they have usually been dependent upon a shared perception of threat. The United States served in that role in the late 1940s and early 1950s, but it does not play that role today. Hence, the *raison d’etre* for close ties is gone. Moreover, the fact that the two societies claim to share a common ideology intensifies the struggle, since the issues of heresy and interference in each other’s internal affairs follow.

Finally, and most importantly, here are two empires moving toward each other at an accelerating rate, with no buffer state system — so critical to European detente — to

separate them. Both the USSR and the PRC are seeking to strengthen their frontiers with their own dominant race, and to develop these regions economically and militarily. Yet they are at different stages of development, with radically different cultural heritages, timings of revolution, and, hence, different senses of national interest. The capacity of the Soviet Union, moreover, to interact economically with the People's Republic of China at this point in time is very limited — both because of historic experience and because of innate capacity.

Thus, the chances against Sino-Soviet detente in any significant degree currently outweigh the chances of its achievement, in my opinion. Among the available options, continued hostility short of war appears the most likely. A Sino-Soviet war has a very low level of probability since both sides are aware of the costs and risks, and of the impossibility of winning such a war. There is, of course, the threat of Soviet intervention in the event of an internal political-military crisis in China, one in which one faction turns to the Russians for help. That is a threat that was clearly perceived by Mao and others, especially after the Lin Biao affair. A direct Soviet assault upon a unified Chinese leadership, however, has always had a low level of probability, and a full-fledged Chinese attack upon the Soviet Union is even less likely.

At the opposite end of the spectrum, a restoration of the old Sino-Soviet alliance can be considered virtually impossible. All alliances today are more porous, more flexible and permit a greater independence on the part of the participants than in the so-called "cold war" era. But neither the global conditions nor the bilateral circumstances are now conducive to close ties between Russia and China.

It is vitally important to realize, however, that one of the key variables in this picture is American foreign policy and, specifically, American global credibility. When Teng Hsiao-p'ing recently asserted that Secretary Vance had told the Chinese that American military power was greater than that of the Soviet Union, he added, "but we don't believe him." This is but one evidence among many that the Chinese are acutely aware of the fact that their "balance of power" policy depends upon the United States. In appreciating this fact, I would emphasize, it is neither necessary nor desirable for the United States to reenter the cold war with the Soviet Union, nor to accept the Chinese contention

that an American-Soviet war is inevitable. An important distinction must be made between playing Peking's game of allowing ourselves to be drawn into confrontation with Russia, so that China can sit on the mountain top watching two tigers fight, and maintaining an economic, political and military posture that assures all states of our will and capacities regarding those commitments and policies which we believe to be in our interests.

#### A SINO-AMERICAN CONFLICT?

The final issue that surrounds the complex question of normalization relates to the thesis that if the Taiwan problem is not "settled" now, it will breed the circumstances of a future Sino-American war. The argument is that ten to fifteen years hence, a militarily sufficient PRC will be prepared to take the risk of confrontation with the United States to "liberate" Taiwan.

In my view, this is a misreading of both the past and the future. If China's developmental problems remain as formidable as has been indicated earlier, and its relations with the Soviet Union as complex as has been suggested, it will not be prone to risk war with a nation that for the conceivable future will be vastly superior to it in military and economic terms. Since such a conflict would also antagonize the Japanese who by that time may be playing a much larger role in China's economic development, it would be the height of folly.

Only a miscalculation of U.S. commitments and intentions could lead to conflict. Unfortunately, this risk could rise. In some circles, it is now being asserted that the current commitments to Taiwan are not meaningful because the American people would not support involvement in any war to defend Taiwan. If we are to measure the validity of our commitments on the basis of presumed or actual public opinion in a completely abstract situation, in the absence of any incident or clearly perceived threat, no American commitments will seem credible. Yet in the event of crisis, public and official reaction may be quite different. And the danger of miscalculation provides a powerful argument against U.S. ambiguity with respect to our Taiwan policy, since the two Asian wars in which we have been involved in recent years have both been the products in considerable measure of communist miscalculation for which we bear considerable responsibility.

#### ON NEGOTIATIONS AND CONSULTATION

There is another danger which the United States must confront in an international context, a danger well illustrated by

recent developments in US-PRC relations. We live in an age of intensive, protracted negotiations — with allies and associates, with “neutrals” and Third World forces, and with erstwhile adversaries. Yet we appear to have neither a strategy of negotiations suitable to varying circumstances, nor a mode of consultation satisfactory to our allies and associates. Throughout Asia at present, there is widespread dissatisfaction among those with whom we are most closely associated, including the Japanese, with the manner in which we consult on matters of common interest. The fault does not lie exclusively on one side, but in the development of the diplomacy of the future, few issues are of more critical importance.

In our negotiations, particularly with adversaries, two concepts should be central: reciprocity and accountability. If detente and a movement toward resolving or reducing our differences with Russia and China are to be made workable in the long term — and acceptable to the American people — these two concepts must prevail. Unilateralism is not a viable basis upon which to reach basic agreements involving both principles and modes of procedure. In the end, unreciprocated concessions will boomerang, a fact of which those on the other side of the table should be made aware.

Admittedly, the art of sustained negotiation is a complex one to acquire in a society as open politically as ours. The opposition, the media, and many other forces combine on occasion to take matters like secrecy and the timing of concessions into their own hands. But one can only view with some apprehension the recent course of Sino-American negotiations. On the American side, it was decided to attempt a “low posture” approach. Thus, the importance of improvements in US-PRC relations was stressed, all unfavorable comments about the PRC, including the much heralded human rights issue, were waived at official levels, and all favorable references to Taiwan at these same levels were omitted. The effort seemed to be to avoid anything that might displease or give offense to Peking, and in the process, to suggest that the United States was prepared to make very considerable concessions in order to attain normalization rapidly. Concomitantly, a list of “possible modes of normalization” was prepared and presented to the Chinese during the recent Vance trip to Peking. No public indication of official American plans or thoughts was given, except the oft-repeated assertion that normalization was highly desirable. The story spread widely, however, that given the priorities that had to be accorded Panama

and other foreign policy issues, and the need to soften up American public and Congressional opinion, normalization, while inevitable, would be postponed for a time.

On the Chinese side, meanwhile, almost all of the signals had been those of firmness. As noted earlier, PRC spokesmen at the highest levels reiterated that they had no intention of agreeing to the non-use of force in connection with Taiwan, since it was a purely internal problem. At the conclusion of the Vance trip, moreover, while the Secretary in carefully prepared statements suggested that progress had been made, Teng Hsiao-p'ing later asserted bluntly that the trip had been a failure in substantive terms, with no results achieved and a retrogression from the American position espoused by Ford and Kissinger (a view later challenged by President Ford). Teng also revealed some of the concrete proposals made by the Americans, including that of exchanging the current diplomatic mission-liaison mission structure. The only ray of hope furnished by the Chinese Vice-Premier was the suggestion that China would be prepared to take into consideration the fact that the Taiwan issue presented "special conditions." Is this an indication of a willingness to reach an explicit agreement on peaceful settlement and related essentials or is it merely akin to Hanoi's oft-proclaimed assertion that once the United States accepted the basic principles of the North Vietnamese position, it would help Washington save face in Indochina?

In this particular scenario, the Chinese must be given credit again for forthrightness and apparent honesty in expressing their position, holding to it, and evaluating the results in terms of it. Even if one understands some of the reasons for the American negotiatory stance, the United States at present appears to be on the defensive, uncertain of its basic principles, and hence unpredictable. Here again lies one of the major concerns of Asian governments with whom we are associated today. A major power cannot afford to be unpredictable on matters of vital concern to others. Unpredictability and the question of American credibility constitute the key issues that are worrisome not only to our allies but also to our opponents. It is my opinion that a great deal of study needs to go into the question of our negotiation-consultation strategy. This is not to suggest that a single strategy will suffice with relation to all parties and all issues. Up to date, however, it is transparently clear that we have not given this matter the sustained consideration it deserves, despite the fact that our success or failure in the late twentieth century hinges upon it.

## SUMMARY

In conclusion, I would like to reiterate a few basic themes which I have sought to set forth in this survey. In the world today, our political, economic and social institutions are currently lagging behind the extraordinarily rapid changes that are taking place in our societies. As a result, this is a dangerous, if exciting, period. In the most basic sense, there is no overarching order at the international level. "Multipolarism" is merely a term to cover the fact that there has been a rapid dispersal of power in many forms. But quasi-anarchy prevails throughout the international arena, and as one result, we are all heavily dependent upon traditional "balance of power" policies to keep the peace.

This includes the People's Republic of China. Hence, American credibility is of central concern to Peking, especially in the context of problems and policies relating to the USSR. Our relation with the PRC is destined to be one that contains elements of both cooperation and confrontation, as in the case of our relations with the USSR. It would be most unwise to assume that an alliance with Peking, *de jure* or *de facto*, is possible or desirable. On some issues, we have parallel interests, notably in our concern over Soviet expansion. But on many issues, we do not have parallel interests, as a study of Chinese views makes abundantly clear. Indeed, the PRC does not hesitate to pursue a cold war with the United States on some fronts even as it supports the American position and cultivates the American tie on others.

The future of Sino-Soviet relations cannot be predicted with certainty, but either war or alliance seem most improbable, and detente on any meaningful scale now seems less likely than continued hostility short of war. In any case, however, it is the issue of American credibility rather than that of Taiwan that is likely to be the most crucial variable in so far as the United States is concerned.

In our approach to normalization, therefore, we should adhere to the principles of reciprocity and accountability, making certain that our basic credibility is not damaged in pursuit of a desirable goal. Our responsibility to insure against the forcible annexation of Taiwan constitutes a moral imperative and a political necessity. Unilateralism or so-called tacit agreements will not suffice. Not only will American credibility be widely damaged throughout Asia, but such an approach may also be conducive ultimately to worse rather than better relations with the PRC. Normalization, therefore, should be preceded by an explicit



agreement between the U.S. and the PRC on peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue, one that takes into account the interests of the people on Taiwan.

Finally, in a broader context but one relevant to US-PRC relations, we need to spend a great deal more time in considering our negotiation-consultation strategies. They are less than adequate at present, and that is disturbing, particularly at a time when both negotiation and consultation are so critical in determining the ultimate success or failure of American foreign policy.



## Chapter II

### PEKING'S ATTITUDE TOWARD TAIWAN

KING C. CHEN\*

Deputy Prime Minister Teng Hsiao-ping of the People's Republic of China (PRC), in his interview with directors of the Associated Press in Peking on September 6, 1977, claimed that former President Gerald R. Ford had "promised" in December 1975 that if he was reelected he would resolve the Taiwan problem and establish full relations with Peking in the same way as the Japanese. Teng also disclosed that China had rejected the reverse-liaison-and-embassy proposal of Secretary of State Vance during his August 1977 visit to Peking. The discussions with Secretary Vance, Teng commented, represented a retrogression from the Ford-Kissinger proposals.

On the following day (September 7), former President Ford virtually denied Teng's statement on his "promise." He said that he did suggest the so-called Japanese formula as "a possibility" for normalization, but added that "any change toward normalization must be predicated on the peaceful solution of the Taiwan-People's Republic of China situation."

Despite their differences, the above two statements clearly express one common essential issue: Taiwan (Republic of China) is a central problem in the Peking-Washington normalization process. As President Jimmy Carter stated on May 12, 1977, the Taiwan issue was one of the "obstacles" to the normalization of relations with China, but the United States did not want to see Taiwan punished or attacked. Secretary of State Vance's "reverse-liaison-and-embassy" proposal was apparently formulated under such consideration. In this context, it is in the interest of Sino-American rapprochement to probe into Peking's real attitude toward Taiwan. The purpose of this article, therefore, is to

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examine as closely as possible Peking's political position on the island,<sup>1</sup> and its implications in the process of normalization.

Undoubtedly, there are several approaches to the study of Peking's attitude. On the basis of a China-centered approach, four elements can be employed to serve as basic factors for our examination. Despite the vagueness of their meanings, these elements are competing and complementing forces in formulating Peking's position. None of the four dominates the subject, but to rule out any of them is to ignore a significant aspect of Peking's stand.

#### **Four Elements to Observe Peking's Attitude**

The first element is Chinese nationalism. After having suffered the humiliation of foreign encroachment for a century, China's desire to reunify and rebuild it as a modern power is extremely strong. Such a sentiment has been expressed so abundantly by major political figures in the past that it does not need any elaboration here. However, the Sino-Indian conflicts in 1962 and Sino-Soviet clashes in 1969 demonstrated the PRC's attitude toward unsettled territories. Peking's demand for the reunification of Taiwan with China has stemmed from the same sentiment and motivation.

The second element is ideological perspective. Without exception, Peking clothes the problems of Taiwan in ideological terms. It accused the U.S. "imperialists" of "occupying Taiwan" for two decades until President Nixon's visit to China in 1972, employed the theory of "class struggle" to judge Taiwan's society, and interpreted Taiwan's political, economic, and educational systems by using Communist ideological jargon.

A third element is strategic value and energy interests. Knowing the strategic position of Taiwan and the naval facilities in the Pescadores, the Peking leaders stressed the definite necessity of keeping these islands out of the hands of unfriendly powers — especially the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the vast,

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1. This is a political study rather than a legal judgment of the status of Taiwan. For legal considerations of Taiwan's status, see, among others, Hungdah Chiu, "China, the United States, and the Question of Taiwan," in Hungdah Chiu, ed., *China and the Question of Taiwan, Documents and Analysis* (New York: Praeger, 1973), pp. 112-191; Lung-chu Chen and M. W. Reisman, "Who Owns Taiwan: A Search for International Title," in Yung-Hwan Jo, ed., *Taiwan's Future* (Tempe, Arizona: Center for Asian Studies, Arizona State University, 1974), pp. 170-239; and Frank P. Morello, *The International Legal Status of Formosa* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966).

potentially energy-rich offshore areas surrounding Taiwan, including the Tiao Yu Tai (Senkaku) Islands, have attracted Peking's close attention, significantly enhancing the value of Taiwan.

The fourth element is factional politics. Despite nationalist sentiment, a similar ideological outlook, and common national interests, Chinese political factions have assumed different attitudes toward Taiwan in their power rivalry. The pragmatists have been generally moderate and tolerant; the radicals militant. Such differences are particularly apparent when the rivalry is in high gear. The struggle between the competing factions in 1976 prior to the arrest of the "Gang of Four" is a case in point.

The expression of Peking's attitude takes several forms. In inspiration it employs nationalist sentiment and Communist ideology, while in operation it adopts united front tactics and combines tolerance with militancy. It works with domestic and foreign channels, both at state-to-state and people-to-people levels.

### **Peking's Taiwan Unit<sup>2</sup>**


It should be first pointed out that after the "reopening" of China in 1971, Peking seems to have organized a special, informal and unpublicized office to handle Taiwan affairs. This office must have arranged numerous meetings and interviews in which the Peking leaders expressed their attitudes. From the data I have collected, the structure of the unit can be tentatively drawn as follows:

Brief biographical notes may be helpful: Liao Ch'eng-chih is a Party Central Committee member and a veteran of Japanese and Overseas Chinese affairs; Lo Ch'ing-ch'ang is a Party Central Committee member, Deputy Secretary-General of the State Council and Minister of Intelligence of the PLA; Wang Hai-jung is Deputy Foreign Minister; Kuo Ta-kai is a member of the NCNA and formerly deputy director of the Information Department in the Foreign Ministry; Ts'ai Hsiao is a Party Central Committee

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2. This "unit" is drawn up by the author, based on the sources in note 4 and interviews with State Department officials on November 5 and 19, 1976. On December 24, 1977, the director of the Investigation Bureau of the Justice Ministry in Taiwan (Taiwan's FBI) reported that in the past year the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council in Peking had respectively established "The Taiwan Office" and "The Taiwan Unit", and that branch offices had also been formed in Fukien and Kwangtung Provinces as well as in Hong Kong and at the PRC's Embassy in Japan. *Central Daily News*, December 25, 1977, p. 2. This report, albeit highly significant, remains to be confirmed.

member and is from Taiwan; Lin Li-yun is a Party Central Committee member, an interpreter, and a Taiwan Chinese from Japan.



In this group, the important figure is Lo Ch'ing-ch'ang, who is probably in charge of this informal unit. This observation is made on the basis of his presence at almost all meetings with persons relating to Taiwan. His double capacity as Deputy Secretary-General of the State Council and Intelligence Minister of the PLA indicates the necessity and significance of political and military coordination on Taiwan.

Where does the Taiwan unit rank among the government's agencies? How important is its role in the decision-making process? These questions cannot be answered in full at present. But preliminary findings suggest that the unit is probably located in the General Office of the State Council with roughly a cabinet ranking but without a cabinet status. Unlike the Commission of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs in Taipei, it is not a "window-dressing" agency, nor a decision-making unit. But it apparently has a function of collecting information, developing plans, and submitting recommendations for policy deliberation.

### **The Shanghai Communique: Clarity and Ambiguity**

The Shanghai Communique, a result of Nixon's visit to China in 1972, brought the Washington-Peking-Taiwan relationship to a new stage. On the Taiwan question, the Communique is a

document of both clarity and ambiguity: clarity, because both China and the United States hold the same position that all U.S. forces and military installations will be withdrawn from Taiwan; ambiguity, because both sides have not agreed on how the Taiwan question should be settled.

The clarity is evident in the U.S. troop withdrawal from Taiwan since 1972. The ambiguity is complicated by three non-agreements (not disagreements). First, while the U.S. has reaffirmed its interest in a "peaceful settlement" of Taiwan by the Chinese themselves, the Chinese insist that "the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere." Second, the U.S. does not "challenge" China's unilaterally declared position of its opposition to "two Chinas," "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments," and other devices,<sup>3</sup> but this position is neither an agreement nor a disagreement. Third, there is no mention, let alone agreement, on the US-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty. By keeping silent on this issue, the United States may have deliberately left it unsettled for the foreseeable future.

In an attempt to eliminate the ambiguity and to quicken the pace of the normalization process, Peking set forth three conditions: withdrawal of U.S. troops from Taiwan, severance of US-Taiwan diplomatic relations, and abrogation of the Mutual Defense Treaty. Yet, as of December 1977, the ambiguity of these issues remains unchanged.

### Attitude As Expressed by Chou En-lai and His Associates

On numerous occasions Peking has invited a number of United States officials, legislators, foreign friends, journalists, and overseas Chinese to visit China. Through meetings, interviews, and statements, Peking had made known its attitude toward Taiwan. Apart from governmental communiques, Chou En-lai and his associates have elaborated their views on Taiwan in 20 statements to various visitors, especially the Taiwan Chinese.<sup>4</sup> For the sake of simplicity, I have summarized and

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3. The English version differs significantly from the Chinese one. The Chinese text, "Pu T'i-ch'u li," literally means "not to raise *different* viewpoint (argument)."

4. Chou's associates include Teng Hsiao-ping, Chiao Kuan-hua, Lo Ch'ing-ch'ang, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Li Hsien-nien, Yu Chan, and Keng Piao. In the 22 published sources on their talks that I have collected, I found that, due to similar accounts written by different persons from one group, they have actually held 20 interviews relating to Taiwan. These sources are: (1) Seymour Topping in *The New*

reorganized their viewpoints on the following ten major issues, and discussed them in order of importance.

(1) *"One China" (People's Republic of China) and "one legal government" (the Peking government)*. This principle is unchangeable. Under this principle, Peking firmly rules out the creation of "two Chinas," "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments," an "independent Taiwan," or an "undetermined status of Taiwan." The settlement of Taiwan, accordingly, is China's domestic affair. The creation of the "liaison office" in Washington should not be interpreted as a compromise with Taiwan. Rather, it was established to facilitate a future settlement on the island.

(2) *No "self-determination" or a "Far Eastern Switzerland" for Taiwan*. "Self-determination" is for those nations or areas whose political status is unsettled. Taiwan has already been

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*York Times (NYT)*, June 3, 1971, pp. 1-2; (2) The Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, *China: Inside the People's Republic* (New York: Bantam Books, 1972), pp. 347-352 (an excerpt is in *NYT*, July 29, 1971, p. 6); (3) James Reston in *NYT*, August 10, 1971, p. 14; (4) William Hinton, "Chou En-lai," *New China*, January 1976, pp. 39-43. (5) Joseph J. Lee, "Peking's View of Taiwan: An Interview with Chou En-lai," in Yung-Hwan Jo, ed., *Taiwan's Future* (Tempe, Arizona: Center for Asian Studies, Arizona State University, 1974), pp. 65-70; (6) Sanford Lee, "China Offers to Talk with Taiwan," *The Toronto Star*, October 19, 1972, p. 32; (7) Ts'ai K'an, "Chou En-lai Meets with Taiwan Chinese," *Ch'i-shih Nien-tai* (The Seventies) monthly, December 1972, pp. 38-39; (8) Parris Chang in *Hearings* before the Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy Research and Development, 94th Congress, Parts I and II (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 278; (9) Yu Yu, "Chou En-lai's Conversations on Taiwan," *Ch'i-shih Nien-tai* (The Seventies), April 1973, pp. 30-31; (10) Ch'u Yen, "Conversations of Ch'iao Kuan-hua and Lo Ch'ing-ch'ang," *Ch'i-shih Nien-tai* (The Seventies), October 1973, pp. 63-65; (11) Fan Lan, et al., "Teng Hsiao-ping on the Chinese Situation and the Taiwan Question," *Ch'i-shih Nien-tai* (The Seventies), December 1974, pp. 15-17; (12) Mike Mansfield, *China: A Quarter Century After the Founding of the People's Republic* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 21-24; (13) Murrey Marder in *The Washington Post*, August 3, 1976, p. A3; (14) Daniel Southerland in *The Christian Science Monitor*, November 16, 1976, p. 3; (15) *Po-ch'eng Ch'ing-miao* (Berkeley Newsletter), November 1975, pp. 14-15; (16) Teng Hsiao-Ping's talks with Cyrus R. Vance, October 11, 1975, in *Working Papers* (published by The Rockefeller Foundation, New York, October 1976), pp. 76-82; (17) Keng Piao's speech at the Institute of Diplomacy in Peking on August 24, 1976, in *Mei-chou Fei-ch'ing Tung-hsin* (The Chinese Communist Affairs Weekly, Taipei), No. 503, November 26, 1976, pp. 15-17; (18) Li Hsien-nien's interview, *The Sunday Times* (London), March 27, 1977; (19) Li Hsien-nien's interview, *NYT*, August 30, 1977; (20) Teng Hsiao-p'ing's interview, *NYT*, September 7, 1977; (21) Yu Chan's interview, *The Wall Street Journal*, October 3, 1977; and (22) Li Hsien-nien's interview, *WSJ*, October 4, 1977. All quotations and viewpoints in this section are from the above cited 22 published materials.



returned to the motherland. Its status has been settled. There is, therefore, no need for "self-determination," let alone China's "protection" (an imperialist gimmick) of a "self-determined" Taiwan. The "Switzerland formula" is not possible because Taiwan cannot become an independent nation in the Far East. In this context, Peking is not yet in a position to extend an invitation to Peng Ming-min, a leader of the Taiwan Independence Movement, to visit China.

(3) *High autonomous status and long process of social transformation.* Whether Taiwan will be a province or an autonomous region after "liberation" is a matter for future decision. Peking is flexible. But the island is very likely to have an autonomous status like that of Tibet prior to 1959. And it will require a long process of social transformation to integrate Taiwan into the Chinese political and social system. What is important, Chou En-lai emphasized, is that the Taiwan Chinese must be their own masters, managing their own affairs. All the people in the PRC are equal, it is claimed, and Han chauvinism will never be allowed to exist.

(4) *Gradual transition of the economic system.* Taiwan has large investments of foreign capital from the United States and Japan; such foreign capital deforms Taiwan's socioeconomic structure. The economic system is a capitalist one under the exploiting and repressive Kuomintang government, and a humiliation to the Taiwan people. After "liberation," this humiliation must be wiped out. The withdrawal of foreign capital will be made up by government subsidies so as not to create an unemployment problem and economic difficulties. There will be no drastic economic measures, and there will be a long and gradual transition from private to public ownership.

(5) *High living standard on Taiwan.* After "liberation," the Chinese government will not lower Taiwan's living standard, which is now higher than the mainland's. Such a discrepancy is permissible because there are differences of living standard on the mainland, such as in Shanghai and other cities. With the principle of self-reliance, every province, district, city, or commune pursues its own social and economic construction. They all seek to improve the quality of their lives by relying on their own economic and human resources.

(6) *Peaceful and nonpeaceful liberation of Taiwan.* Generally the question of whether "liberation" will be peaceful or nonpeaceful depends on three conditions: (a) the achievement of the socialist reconstruction in People's China; (b) the favorable

development of the international situation; and (c) the readiness and collaboration of the people of Taiwan. The first two are now favorable, but the third is yet to develop. Peaceful liberation is Peking's first choice. If peaceful means will not work, however, Peking will employ nonpeaceful means, including armed blockade and attacks. To avoid bloodshed, Peking offers negotiations with delegates from Taiwan, governmental or private.

(7) *Soviet interest in Taiwan.* The Soviet Union is competing for hegemony in Asia with the United States. To this end, Moscow intends to gain access to Taiwan. The Russians tried to explore the possibility of using the naval facilities in the Pescadores, but were rejected by Chiang Kai-shek. This rejection will not end Moscow's interest in the island, but Peking will not allow the Soviet Union to gain what it wants from Taiwan.

(8) *Recruitment of Taiwan Chinese.* Peking is enthusiastic about recruiting Taiwan Chinese as cadres to serve the people and government. Professionals in foreign countries are also welcome to return to China. But this plan requires a few more years of preparation: China has to prepare the professional and academic facilities, and the professional people have to become ideologically and psychologically ready in order to reduce the difficulties of adjustment after they return.

(9) *Quemoy and Matsu.* Peking wants to possess these islands, but it may not seize them without Taiwan. This is a complex question, according to Chou En-lai. The bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu in 1958, for instance, was undertaken under a tacit and complex understanding: Peking understood that the US-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty did not cover the islands, but the PRC had no plan to occupy them; Taiwan understood Peking would attack but not seize the islands. Peking wanted the bombardment to demonstrate the continuity of the civil war, while Taiwan needed it to support its claim to the mainland. The implication is that so long as the two island groups remain in Taiwan's hands, Taiwan is in a difficult position to declare independence.

(10) *Tiao Yu Tai (Senkaku).* The Chinese government has repeatedly issued statements to the effect that Tiao Yu Tai is Chinese territory, and it will not change this position. When the Japanese surveyed that area, China made no protests; but if Japan should undertake oil or gas drilling, China will stop it. In terms of nationalism and energy interest, Tiao Yu Tai is as important as any other offshore island to China.

### Anniversary Meetings for the February 28 Incident

One of the several ways Peking seeks to "win over the hearts" (in Mao's words) of the Taiwan Chinese is the anniversary meeting for the February 28 Incident (1947), which was first held in 1973. The meeting, sponsored by the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, is based on united front principles.<sup>5</sup> It has established a pattern: it is a sit-and-talk meeting (Tso-t'an hui) which indicates its ceremonial and study nature; there are 110-138 participants, of whom approximately 46 percent are Taiwan Chinese; and its components include party leaders, military personnel, administrators, nationality leaders, professors, writers, youths, women, and former Kuomintang generals, diplomats, and administrators. Liao Ch'eng-chih is the dominant figure, and Ts'ai Hsiao and Lin Li-yun are also quite active.<sup>6</sup>

Each year, the participants reiterate the same themes: Taiwan must be liberated, the motherland must be united, and the "Taiwan Independence Movement" or "two-China" device is doomed to failure. They also discussed the three liberation conditions which always came out with an expected conclusion: the *excellent* situation in the socialist motherland, the *favorable* international situation, and the *deteriorating* condition on Taiwan.

Peking utilizes the meeting to convey two significant messages. First, Liao Ch'eng-chih has repeatedly claimed that the February 28 Incident was inspired by Mao's call in early 1947 for

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5. By sponsoring the annual meeting, the Political Consultative Conference has resurrected its old function as a united front organization. From its establishment in September 1949, the Conference was designed and had functioned as a united front organization. After the People's Congress was convened in September 1954, its power as a state organ was taken over by the Congress; but it remained a "united-front organization for uniting all nationalities, democratic classes, democratic parties and groups, people's bodies, overseas Chinese and other patriotic democrats . . . under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party." Editorial of *Jen-min Jih-pao (JMJP)*, December 22, 1954.

6. *JMJP*, March 1, 1973; March 1, 1974; March 1 and 2, 1975; February 29, 1976; and March 1 and 2, 1977. Other participants from Taiwan were Chen Yi-sung (member of the People's Congress Standing Committee), Chiang Chung-kuang (professor), Chen Ting-mao (engineer), Tien Fu-ta (Kaoshan nationality, Democratic Self-Government League), Li Chun-ching (Democratic Self-Government League), Yeh Chi-tung, Tsai Tzu-min, Wu Ke-tai, and Chen Ping-chi (all participants in the February 28 uprising); Huang Chi-chun and Chen Lien-sheng (students); and Ko Lien-ying (Kaoshan nationality).

the creation of a "new high tide of the Chinese revolution."<sup>7</sup> By taking credit for the incident, the CCP contrives to establish the legitimacy and continuity of its leadership between the incident and any future political change on Taiwan. Second, Peking has offered peace talks with Taiwan. Such an offer was first made in 1973 by Fu Tso-yi, a former Kuomintang general. In subsequent meetings, the offer has been reiterated with the emphasis that Taiwan cannot permanently rely on the U.S. and that the Taiwan Strait is no longer an obstacle to liberation — a hint of the use of cross-Strait missiles or other weapons. In applying coercion to back up persuasion, Peking displays its tactics of negotiation from strength.

### **The Unification Campaign and Invitation to China**

The campaign for the unification of Taiwan with China is a nationalistic drive, designed to promote a peaceful settlement of the island. The drive started indirectly from the "Tiao Yu Tai protection" movement, which was originally a patriotic, nonpartisan protest. In January and April 1971, thousands of Chinese students participated in protest marches in New York, Washington, and San Francisco against Japan's claim to the Tiao Yu Tai islands. It was united and powerful for two reasons: the Chinese considered the islands historically Chinese territory, and the target was Japan — an aggressor in the recent past. Soon after, the drive split into pro-Peking and pro-Taiwan groups. Aided by Nixon's "opening" to China, the former group grew into a unit campaigning for unification.

Peking encouraged and invited the "Pao Tiao" (protection of Tiao Yu Tai) people to visit China, and appealed to the overseas Chinese for support to the cause of unification. The drive gained momentum. Numerous Chinese and English papers and periodicals promoting the drive appeared in colleges in the United States. The movement called for (1) U.S. troop withdrawal from Taiwan, the abrogation of the US-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty, and U.S. recognition of the Peking government as the sole legal government of China; (2) a Chinese settlement of the Taiwan question; (3) abolishment of the Taiwan government in a year; and (4) peaceful return of Taiwan to the PRC. To counteract this overseas campaign (mainly in the United States, Japan, and

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7. Mao Tse-tung, "Greet the New High Tide of the Chinese Revolution," in *Selected Works*, Vol. IV (Peking, 1961), pp. 119-127. This was an inner-Party directive of February 1, 1947 from Mao to the Central Committee of the Party.

Hong Kong), Taiwan firmly asserted that the real obstacle to unification is the CCP, which would have to be liquidated before unification could be achieved.<sup>8</sup> In a shift, both Peking and Taipei now courted the splintered "Taiwan Independence Movement" for support.<sup>9</sup>

There are approximately 60,000 Chinese in Japan, 50% of whom were born on Taiwan. Realizing the importance of the ethnic and cultural ties between the Chinese in Japan and Taiwan, Peking exchanged visits with Taiwan Chinese groups from Japan. Among all the visits, the Liao Ch'eng-chih mission in April 1973 truly reflected Peking's new efforts. The mission, which consisted of 55 members for a 33-day visit, was the largest political and goodwill group Peking has sent to Japan since 1971. Its components included deputies of the People's Congress, members of the Political Consultative Conference, Party Central Committee members, youths, peasant and worker cadres, writers, educators, women, and Taiwan-born and Japan-educated people. The mission visited more than 17 cities and spent half of its time with the overseas Chinese. Liao and his members told the overseas Chinese that they should seek every opportunity to engage in propaganda activities toward Taiwan and that they were all welcome to visit the mainland.<sup>10</sup> It was an extremely impressive whirlwind-style mission.

Sports diplomacy was also employed. In addition to several Taiwan ping-pong teams in 1972-1974, the Athletic Delegation of Taiwan was invited to participate in the Third National Games in Peking in the fall of 1975. The "Taiwan" delegation came from six countries, and consisted of 279 athletes and physical cultural workers. It was the largest and most stimulating Taiwan sports team that had visited China. The "one China" concept was "an important issue" at the Games.<sup>11</sup>

To promote the unification drive further, Peking treated defectors from Taiwan with great publicity. All of the six known

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8. *Chung-yang Jih-pao* (Taipei), January 4, February 1, 8, November 25, and December 10, 1972.

9. *NYT*, January 31, 1973, p. 13. For the splintered Taiwan Independence movement, consult Hung-mao Tien, "Taiwan in Transition: Prospects for Socio-Political Change," *The China Quarterly*, No. 64 (December 1975), pp. 615-644.

10. *Ta Kung Pao* (Hong Kong), April 21; May 3, 14, 1973 (the world renowned mathematician, Hua Lo-Keng, was also with the mission).

11. *New China News Agency* (in English), October 22, 1975; *China*, September 1976, pp. 36-37.

defectors since 1972 were received warmly.<sup>12</sup> Moreover, Peking launched psychological warfare by pardoning and releasing the remaining 293 Nationalist "prisoners of war" in March 1975<sup>13</sup> and the 144 captured and detained secret agents from Taiwan in September of the same year. Although Peking interpreted such an act as a continuation of its POW policy, it was apparently designed to win some "hearts" in Taiwan.

### Delay-Settlement and Factional Politics

If Peking's leaders had counted on President Nixon's "strong desire" to normalize relations with China and to "settle" the Taiwan issue during his second term, they must have been greatly disappointed. As of December 1977, a Taiwan settlement had not only been delayed, but American ties with Taiwan had been somewhat expanded in the military, economic, diplomatic, and cultural fields. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan had increased from \$196 million in fiscal year 1974 to \$293 million in 1976. Such sales increases included a highly advanced radar air defense system, Hawk ground-to-air missiles, and F-5E jet interceptors (from 120 to 180).<sup>14</sup> American trade with Taiwan increased from \$1.5 billion in 1971 to approximately \$4.5 billion in 1976, while trade with Peking dropped from \$934 million in 1974 to \$336 million in 1976. Eight American banks have opened branches in Taiwan, and American oil companies — Amoco, Gulf, Clinton, Continental, and others — have obtained concessions from Taiwan for oil and gas exploration and have begun operations in waters surrounding Taiwan. These companies are planning the construction of five to ten production platforms in the Taiwan Strait at a cost of about \$150 million each. In addition to Leonard Unger's new ambassadorship to Taipei in 1974, five new Taiwan consulates were established in Atlanta, Portland, Kansas City, Guam, and American Samoa. Missions of "people's diplomacy" (cultural

12. The defectors were Sung Wei-pin (Diplomat, March 4, 1973); Chao Ming-che (air pilot, April 20, 1973); Wu Mou-huo (Lieutenant, April 2, 1974); K'uang Hui-sheng (Lieutenant, May 4, 1974); Yang Ming-yi (Lt. Colonel, November 15, 1975); and Li Yi (former Lt. General, December 12, 1975).

13. Peking had previously pardoned and released 296 POWs: (1) December 4, 1959, Tu Lu-ming and 32 others; (2) November 28, 1960, Fan Han-chieh and 49 others; (3) November 25, 1961, Liao Yao-hsiang and 67 others; (4) April 9, 1963, Kang Tse and 34 others; (5) December 12, 1964, Wang Ling-chi and 52 others; and (6) April 16, 1966, Fang Chin and 56 others.

14. *Chung-yang Jih-pao*, June 29, and 30, 1976; *NYT*, August 4, 1976, pp. 1 and 3.

groups) have also actively increased their mutual visits between Taiwan and the United States.

Another development is the Soviet Union's continuing interest in Taiwan. On May 12, 1973, a Soviet fleet from Vladivostok passed through the Taiwan Strait to the Indian Ocean. Two weeks later, another Soviet fleet sailed along the Taiwan east coast to the East China Sea. In the fall of that year, Victor Louis, a well-known journalist from the Soviet Union, reportedly revisited Taiwan. In July 1976, rumors spread in Hong Kong that Moscow once again wanted to negotiate with Taiwan on the Pescadores.

All of the above events were regarded by Peking as unfavorable developments caused by the delay of a settlement of the Taiwan issue. Some Chinese became impatient, and the delay became a factor in Chinese politics. It is no longer a secret that the pragmatists and radicals expressed different views toward Taiwan. The pragmatists, led by Chou En-lai, had long said that China must be patient on the Taiwan question. China "can wait five years, ten years, or one hundred years" for the final return of Taiwan.<sup>15</sup> The pragmatists put first things first, and Taiwan is not to be "liberated" immediately.<sup>16</sup> Keng Piao, head of the Central Committee's International Liaison Department, stated in a secret speech in August 1976 that defense against the Soviet Union was Peking's most important problem and all other issues were secondary.<sup>17</sup>

The radicals, led by the "Gang of Four," were aggressive and impatient. Beginning with their opposition to the "reopening" of China, they criticized the pragmatists all the way.<sup>18</sup> They took

15. Teng Hsiao-ping's talks with Cyrus R. Vance, in *Working Papers*, pp. 81-82.

16. Charles H. Percy, et al., *The United States and China: A Report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 10-11; quoted in "Schlesinger on China," editorial in *NYT*, October 18, 1976, p. 28; Daniel Southerland, "Mansfield: Sino-Soviet Rift to Stay," *The Christian Science Monitor*, November 16, 1976, p. 3.

17. Keng Piao's speech of August 24, 1976.

18. For instance, Chou En-lai apparently was compelled by the radicals to explain why a compromise with the United States was necessary and different from that with the Soviet Union. See Chou's report to the Tenth Party Congress, *Peking Review*, Nos. 35 and 36 (September 7, 1973), p. 23. Also in August 1974, the radicals bitterly criticized those national betrayers who advocate "total Westernization" and ignore antiimperialism and antirevisionism. See Chen Chin, "Respect Confucianism, Study Classics, Worship the West, and Betray the Country," *Hung*

every opportunity to express their impatient attitude on the military liberation of Taiwan, and even utilized the criticize-Lin-Piao-and-Confucius movement to oppose Chou En-lai.<sup>19</sup>

A few examples will support this observation. On September 6, 1975, Chang Chun-chiao told the Athletic Delegation of Taiwan that military means should be used to back up a peaceful settlement of Taiwan.<sup>20</sup> In talking to Senator Hugh Scott's party in July 1976, three months before his arrest, Chang appeared to be extremely militant and aggressive. He insisted that peaceful unification was impossible and that Taiwan must be "liberated by force."<sup>21</sup> On that occasion, Chang's audience included both U.S. visitors and Chinese political and military personnel. In arguing for his tough stand in front of both the Chinese and Americans, he acted as if he were the government's spokesman.

The radicals, moreover, allegedly tried to seize control of military and party affairs in Fukien, a key province facing Taiwan. Broadcasts from there in November 1976 charged that the Gang of Four had extended their sinister hands to Fukien, instructing a handful of people to practice revisionism and splitism and to engage in conspiracies, and that the Gang had also incited bourgeois factionalism and attempted to overthrow leading cadres in the party, government, and army and to seize leadership.<sup>22</sup> The provincial party leader, Liao Chih-kao, a close associate of Teng Hsiao-ping, had reportedly been physically attacked several times before Mao's death by the Gang of Four's followers. It was also reported that the radicals and their followers had staged military maneuvers in July 1976 along the Fukien coast, which involved naval, air, and ground forces and extended much farther into the Taiwan Strait than the PLA had previously

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*Ch'i*, No. 8, 1974, pp. 33-39. See similar criticisms in "Persist in the Philosophy of Struggle, Oppose the Way of the Golden Mean," *Xuexi Yu Pipan* (Study and Criticism), No. 5 (May 20, 1974); and Tsuan Feng, "On Capitalist Readers," *ibid.*, No. 5 (May 14, 1976).

19. "Gang of Four's Plots in the Movement to Criticize Lin Piao and Confucius," *Peking Review*, No. 16 (April 15, 1977), p. 29. Some of the China watchers who had previously misinterpreted this particular point must have been surprised by Peking's new charge under Hua Kuo-feng's leadership.

20. *Po-ch'eng Ch'ing-miao*, pp. 14-15.

21. Interviews and conversations with members of the Scott party. A similar account was reported in *The Washington Post* and *NYT*, both dated August 3, 1976. Also Hugh Scott's report, *The United States and China* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, September 1976), p. 3.

22. Fukien Provincial Service in Mandarin, 0900 GMT, November 14, 1976. *JMJP*, December 4, 1976, p. 4, also carried a similar report from Fuchow.



gone. During the maneuvers, the commander of the Fukien Military region General Pi Ting-chun, who had delayed his response to Chiang Ch'ing's request for support, was killed in a helicopter crash. But wall posters in Fukien have charged that the helicopter accident was engineered by the radicals' followers one day after the death in Peking of General Pi's father-in-law, General Chu Teh, who was also the "father" of the PLA.<sup>23</sup> Fukien was one of the several provinces and regions that faced serious troubles after the arrest of the "Gang of Four," prompting Hua Kuo-feng to make a special effort to reorganize the province. If these reports were reliable, then the radicals did try, albeit unsuccessfully, to build up party and military bases in Fukien which could have posed a serious threat to Taiwan.

### The Ranking of the Taiwan Issue

In spite of the fact that the radical faction has been defeated, Peking's fundamental position on Taiwan has not changed. Peking upholds its territorial rights and sovereignty over the island and maintains that the settlement of Taiwan is a domestic issue in which no other country has the right to interfere. And yet, how high (or low) does the Taiwan issue rank among Peking's issue-policy priorities? From the data I have collected, the following ranking would seem to apply:

1. Soviet pressure;
2. Economic development/modernization;
3. Taiwan-normalization;
4. Japanese cooperation;
5. Internal stability and unity;
6. Relations with Second and Third World countries; and
7. Taiwan-liberation.<sup>24</sup>

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23. *NYT*, November 26, 1976, p. A3; *CYJP*, November 22, 1976; February 16, March 10 and 19, 1977.

24. After this ranking order was first drawn in late November 1976, the author saw on December 17, 1976 the text of Keng Piao's speech of August 24, 1976 which substantiated, surprisingly, the order of priority. Some other available information after mid-December 1976 has also supported this ranking. Consult "The Kunming Documents" in *Chinese Law and Government*, Spring 1975; Ts'ai K'an, "Chou En-lai Meets"; "Chou En-lai's Conversations"; Charles H. Percy, et al., *The United States and China*; "Schlesinger on China," editorial in the *NYT*, October 18, 1976; *The Christian Science Monitor*, November 16, 1976, p. 3; Teng Hsiao-ping's talks in *Working Papers*; Keng Piao's speech; Chou En-lai's secret speech on the international situation in early March of 1973, in *Fei-ch'ing Yueh-pao* (Chinese

This tentative list is self-explanatory, and does not need any elaboration except, perhaps, a word on the Soviet Union containment policy against China. Peking is apprehensive that Soviet containment (encirclement) is closing in upon the PRC. The Soviet Union has tried hard to gain footholds in Outer Mongolia, Japan, Indochina, and India, and is applying a growing pressure on China. Although Peking has calculated, as Chou En-lai reported in 1973, that the Soviet Union would not wage a major war with China at present,<sup>25</sup> Peking is very much concerned about the weakness of these nations in dealing with Russia. In the Chinese interest, Peking urged other Asian nations to resist Soviet overtures and endorsed the continued stationing of U.S. troops in certain areas. Meanwhile, China is trying by every possible means to strengthen its national defense, including the four unprecedented conferences on national defense in early February 1977. In sum, Peking is making a strenuous effort to cope with the Soviet threat.

It should be pointed out that although Peking fully realizes that it is not possible to "liberate" Taiwan at the present time, the normalization of Sino-American relations as a counter to the Soviet Union is in the best interests of China. But Taiwan is one of the major obstacles to normalization, as President Carter has stated. If Peking wants to achieve a speedy normalization, its need to "resolve" this obstacle may prompt Peking to apply more pressure on Washington in the near future.

### Concluding Observations

The four elements discussed at the outset of the article have led us to see the issue from different perspectives. First, nationalism has played a dominant role in Peking's persistent claim that Taiwan is an integral part of China. Needless to say, the other three elements have also contributed to enforcing this official stand. Despite America's pressure for a peaceful settlement, the unification campaign goes on unabated. Owing to the PRC's limited capabilities and the international environment, Peking will continue to postpone the "liberation" of Taiwan, but would not tolerate the creation of a "two-China" situation.

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Communist Affairs Monthly, Taipei), December 1976, pp. 93-96; *NYT*, November 30, 1976, and February 21, 1977; Hsinhua (Peking), February 6, 1977; *The Sunday Times* (London), March 27, 1977; and *NYT*, September 7, 1977.

25. Chou En-lai's secret speech of March 1973.

Second, while Peking's public accusations of the U.S. "imperialists' occupation" of Taiwan has sharply declined, its denunciation of Taiwan has increased, *e.g.*, attacks on Taiwan's "rich-poor" society, "dictatorial" politics, "capitalist" economic system, "bourgeois" education, and "poisonous" culture. The PRC identifies Taiwan as a preliberation area, waiting for eventual Marxist-Leninist rule.

Third, strategic and energy factors have given an added value to Taiwan, and tend to reinforce Peking's attitude toward the island. Together with the sentiment of nationalism, these factors have generated a dynamic force in Chinese politics as demonstrated over the Tiao Yu Tai issue and in the Paracel Island operation (Chinese military occupation of the island after wiping out a South Vietnamese force there in 1974). As the superpowers' competition in sea power continues and the world effort to search for energy doubles, Taiwan's importance to Peking will increase.

Fourth, the factional conflict between the pragmatists and radicals over Taiwan became acute in 1976. The surprising, unsuccessful attempt of the radicals to gain power in Fukien in that year escalated the issue from debate to military-political action. Looking back, we are able to learn that factional politics over Taiwan had run much deeper than the outsiders had observed.

Peking has never ruled out a military liberation of Taiwan. Should the situation develop in such a way as to require Peking to take military action, the proposal of "liberating Taiwan by force" will not remain a slogan or an academic issue, but will become a realistic problem. There are two essential questions if Peking is to take Taiwan by force. First, under what circumstances will the PRC employ armed force? And second, what is the Chinese capability for such a military operation?

To answer the first question, it seems that under the following three circumstances the People's Republic will wage a Taiwan war.

(1) Taiwan's declaration of independence. If this should occur, it is highly likely that Peking would resort to force in an attempt to settle the issue once and for all. (2) The application by the U.S. of the "Japanese formula" *i.e.*, complete withdrawal of U.S. troops, break-up of US-Taiwan diplomatic ties, abrogation of the US-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty, but continuation of trade and cultural relations). If this formula is put into force, Peking would adopt a "talk-talk-fight-fight" strategy. Peking would first offer peace talks; if rejected, it would in due course

apply an economic blockade and then military pressure against Taiwan. (3) The application of the "Japanese formula" combined with Soviet access to Taiwan. If the Soviet Union, against all the odds to be sure, should succeed in gaining a naval base in the Pescadores *immediately* after the execution of the "Japanese formula," a new situation for Taiwan as well as for East Asia would be created which could either escalate the Peking-Moscow conflict or bring about a limited Peking-Moscow rapprochement. The conflict situation might further draw Peking's attention away from Taiwan; but the limited rapprochement, again extremely unlikely, might result in a Moscow-Peking deal to dump Taiwan — an act similar to the U.S. acceptance of the "Japanese formula." The subsequent development is predictable: Taiwan would face military pressure and/or economic blockade by the PRC. Perhaps the only effective deterrent to Peking's military action under such conditions would be the development of a nuclear capability by Taiwan. At present, however, such a deterrent runs contrary to Taiwan's nonnuclear development policy and to U.S. efforts directed at the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

On the second question of Chinese military capability, there are two major considerations — strategic capability and military strength. The continuance of strong Soviet military pressure in the north will undoubtedly strategically limit Peking's ability to launch a military operation against Taiwan. As long as Sino-Soviet tensions remain unchanged, a war between the Soviet Union and the PRC can never be ruled out. And a two-war strategy simultaneously against Russia and Taiwan is very unlikely to be followed by Peking.

China also has only limited military capability against Taiwan. Even if Taiwan lacks nuclear weapons or outside assistance, an invasion would not be a simple operation. While it is clear that the PLA could take Quemoy and Matsu islands without too much difficulty, Taiwan is a different matter. The PRC does not yet have the capability of taking the island in a short period of time and, according to one estimate, the PLA could not land more than three divisions of assault troops on Taiwan.<sup>26</sup> In any event, should such an unfortunate war break out, the PLA would face a fierce resistance from the well-equipped and well-

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26. Brian Crozier, "The Art of Survival," *National Review*, December 6, 1974, p. 1402. Also see *NYT*, December 1, 1976, for the PLA's general strength.

trained Taiwan army; the casualties on both sides would be extremely high.

From the above discussions, it is clear that Peking's attitude toward Taiwan and its related problems have serious implications for the process of normalization. If Peking and Washington cannot agree on a "formula" in the very near future, normalization will continue to be a dilemma for both powers. Although Keng Piao had said in his August 1976 speech that Peking would, for the time being, "allow the U.S. to guard" Taiwan for China,<sup>27</sup> he also indicated that normalization would come before the "liberation of Taiwan." Judging from Teng Hsiao-p'ing's statement of September 6, 1977 that Peking's patience could not last forever, there would seem to be a sense of gradually increasing urgency on this issue.

As far as the U.S. is concerned, acceptance of Peking's three conditions would most likely lead Peking to commence an armed blockade of Taiwan and even an armed conflict, as Teng has clearly stated. Li Hsien-nien put it even more bluntly: "There are such a heap of counterrevolutionaries on Taiwan that it cannot be managed without a fight."<sup>28</sup> Such a situation would certainly run contrary to the principle of "peaceful settlement," let alone freedom and human rights of the people on Taiwan, to which Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter have repeatedly committed themselves.

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27. Keng Piao's speech, pp. 16-17.

28. *The Wall Street Journal*, October 4, 1977, p. 10.



**Chapter III**  
**NORMALIZATION AND SOME PRACTICAL AND**  
**LEGAL PROBLEMS CONCERNING**  
**TAIWAN**

HUNGDAH CHIU

This chapter discusses some practical and legal problems relating to Taiwan that are involved in the US government's movement toward normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China. Despite the existence of a voluminous literature on the question of normalization, some important problems concerning Taiwan have not yet been adequately explored, namely, (1) whether the 1972 Shanghai Communique, which is the basis of current US-PRC relations, commits the United States to accept the PRC's three conditions for normalization of relations; (2) the legal status of Taiwan and an evaluation of the PRC's claim to Taiwan in the light of principles of modern international law and practice; (3) the impact of normalization on the Republic of China; and (4) possible options for the ROC on Taiwan in response to a US move toward the normalization of relations with the PRC.

On February 27, 1972, when President Nixon concluded his visit to the PRC, a joint communique was issued at Shanghai in which both countries, while still disagreeing on many issues, stated that "progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries." Since then, some China specialists in the United States have argued for the speedy normalization of relations with the PRC under the latter's three conditions, namely, that the US abrogate its security treaty with the ROC, remove all troops from Taiwan, and sever diplomatic relations with the ROC. Various specialists have even argued that in the Shanghai Communique, the United States has already pledged to take these steps, although the validity of such an interpretation of the Communique appears to be questionable.

So far as relations between the ROC and the US are concerned, the Shanghai Communiqué is a document of both clarity and ambiguity: clarity, because the PRC and US both maintain that all US forces should ultimately be withdrawn from Taiwan; ambiguity, because the two sides did not agree on how the Taiwan question should be settled. The PRC insisted that the "liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere." On the other hand, the United States "affirm(ed) its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves." Both statements are silent as to the US-ROC security treaty and US-ROC diplomatic relations.

President Nixon explained the US position before he went to the PRC in the following terms.<sup>1</sup>

"In my address announcing my trip to Peking, and since then, I have emphasized that our new dialogue with the PRC would not be at the expense of friends . . . with the Republic of China, *we shall maintain our friendship, our diplomatic ties, and our defense commitment.*

This position was affirmed by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger at a press conference held on February 27, 1972, after the issuance of the Shanghai Communiqué. The pertinent colloquy is as follows.<sup>2</sup>

*Question.* Why did not the United States government reaffirm its treaty commitment to Taiwan, as the President and you have done on numerous occasions?

*Dr. Kissinger.* Let me . . . state in response to this and any related question, and let me do it once and not repeat it. We stated our basic position with respect to this issue in the President's world report (of February 9, 1972), in which we say that this treaty will be maintained. Nothing has changed in that position . . . the position of the world report stands and has been unaltered."

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<sup>1</sup> "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s, The Emerging Structure of Peace, A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon" (February 9, 1972), in *Department of State Bulletin*, March 13, 1972, p. 330. Emphasis added.

<sup>2</sup> "President Nixon's Visit to the PRC, News Conference of Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Green" (Shanghai, February 27, 1972), in *ibid.*, March 20, 1972, p. 428.



Since the issuance of the Shanghai Communique, the United States has given 50 to 60 assurances to the ROC government that the treaty commitment will be kept, which further confirms the conclusion that the United States made no commitment in the Shanghai Communique to terminate diplomatic relations and the security treaty with Taiwan.

Some commentators have argued, however, that there was a tacit, implicit pledge in the Shanghai Communique, or by President Nixon or Secretary of State Kissinger, to accept the three conditions. This raises two important questions. (1) Has the US government clearly explained this implication to the American people and its American allies? (2) Does the US President or the Secretary of State have the constitutional authority to commit the United States to such a secret agreement? In other words, would such an agreement be binding? My view is that it would not be.

## II

The PRC considers Taiwan to be a part of China, and insists that the "liberation" of Taiwan is an "internal affair" which is not subject to any outside "interference." The United States, on the other hand, considers Taiwan's status as "undetermined," and has so far insisted on a "peaceful settlement" of the Taiwan "question." It is therefore of crucial importance to analyze the legal status of Taiwan. If Taiwan is, as the PRC claims, a part of China, then there is no legal ground for the United States to insist on the "peaceful settlement" of the Taiwan question in its dealings with the PRC.

Although Chinese settlement in Taiwan can be traced back to the sixth century, the Chinese did not set up an administration there until 1661, when Cheng Ch'eng-kung (Koxinga), a general of the defunct Ming dynasty (1368-1644), captured the island from the Dutch and set up a government. General Cheng and later his son, Cheng Ching, used Taiwan as a base to restore the Ming dynasty. In 1683, Cheng's grandson surrendered Taiwan to the Ch'ing Empire (1644-1911), which then administered the island as a part of the mainland's Fukien Province. Taiwan was made a separate province in 1886. Nine years later, in 1895, after China's defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), the island was ceded through the Treaty of Shimonoseki to Japan.

On December 9, 1941, the ROC government, then on the main-

land, issued a formal declaration of war against Japan, and declared "that all treaties, conventions, agreements, and contracts regarding relations between China and Japan are and remain null and void." At the Cairo Conference in November 1943, President Chiang Kai-shek, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Prime Minister Winston Churchill signed a joint communique (November 26) stating, in part, that "all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa (Taiwan), and the Pescadores (Penghu), shall be returned to the Republic of China." On July 26, 1945, the heads of government of the United States, the Republic of China, and the United Kingdom declared in the Potsdam Proclamation that "the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out." Japan signed the Instrument of Surrender, and thereby accepted the provisions of the Potsdam Proclamation, on September 2, 1945. In October, the ROC took over Taiwan from the Japanese, and soon restored it to its status as a province of the ROC. On December 8, 1949, the Nationalist government moved its capital "provisionally" to Taipei.

Despite the fact that the ROC began to exercise jurisdiction over Taiwan from October 25, 1945, technically the question of sovereignty was not resolved until the early 1950s. In international law and practice, the transfer of territories between states occurs through a treaty or by a unilateral renunciation of territorial sovereignty by the transferor and the establishment of *de facto* control by the transferee over the territory concerned. So far as Taiwan is concerned, this was not done until the San Francisco peace treaty with Japan, signed on September 8, 1951. The Japanese peace treaty provides in Article 2 that "Japan renounces all rights, titles and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores." Because the victorious powers could not agree on which government of China—the PRC or ROC—should be invited to participate in the peace conference, it was decided not to invite either of them. On the other hand, Japan signed a bilateral peace treaty with the ROC on April 28, 1952, which in Article 2 provides: "It is recognized that under Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the City of San Francisco in the United States of America on September 8, 1951. Japan has renounced all right, title and claim to Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores)."

Because neither the San Francisco peace treaty nor the Japan-ROC peace treaty explicitly provides for the return of Taiwan to

China, the question of the legal status of Taiwan has become a complex and controversial legal issue. The US position, as stated by the late Secretary of State John Foster Dulles at a press conference held on December 1, 1954, is "that technical sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores has never been settled," and that "the future title is not determined by the Japanese peace treaty (signed at San Francisco), nor is it determined by the peace treaty which was concluded between the Republic of China and Japan."<sup>3</sup> Some Western scholars have argued, however, that the ROC could in fact acquire lawful territorial sovereignty over Taiwan. For instance, Professor D. P. O'Connell of Australia, a well-known authority on international law, wrote that after the Japanese renunciation of the island, it was "doubtful . . . whether there is any international law doctrine opposed to the conclusion that China (could) appropriate the *terra derelicta* (the abandoned land) of Formosa by converting the belligerent occupation into definite sovereignty."<sup>4</sup> Professor O'Connell refers vaguely to China without specifying whether he means the ROC or the PRC; but, because the PRC has no physical control over Taiwan, it cannot be argued that Peking could acquire sovereignty over Taiwan through the theory suggested by Professor O'Connell.

Similarly, Arthur H. Dean, now Honorary President of the American Society of International Law, has also argued: "Since Japan renounced all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores . . . Nationalist China may have already acquired legal title to Formosa and the Pescadores by occupation or possibly by subjugation . . . Until the coming into force of the Japanese peace treaty on April 28, 1952, there was a formal obstacle to Nationalist China's acquiring legal title to Formosa by occupation, in that technical sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores remained in Japan. There were, accordingly, not *terrae nullius* capable of being acquired by occupation. However, when Japan renounced all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores, this obstacle was removed."<sup>5</sup> This interpretation of the legal status of Taiwan is confirmed by several Japanese court decisions.

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<sup>3</sup> See Whiteman, *Digest of International Law*, vol. 4, p. 564.

<sup>4</sup> D. P. O'Connell, "The Status of Formosa and the Chinese Recognition Problem," *American Journal of International Law*, April 1956, p. 415.

<sup>5</sup> Arthur H. Dean, "International Law and Current Problems in the Far East," *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law*, 1955, cited in Whiteman, *Digest of International Law*, vol. 2, p. 1230.

For instance, in *Japan v. Lai Chin Jung*, decided by the Tokyo High Court on December 24, 1956, it was stated that "Formosa and the Pescadores came to belong to the Republic of China, at any rate on August 5, 1952, when the (peace) treaty between Japan and the Republic of China came into force."<sup>6</sup>

### III

Now let us turn to the PRC's claim to Taiwan. While the legal arguments summarized above would support the ROC's claim to Taiwan, the same arguments would not support the PRC's claim to Taiwan, for several reasons. In the first place, the PRC has denied the validity of both Japanese peace treaties mentioned above. On August 15, 1951, before the San Francisco treaty was signed, Premier Chou En-lai denounced the proposed treaty as "illegal, and therefore null and void." On May 5, 1952, after the treaty entered into force, Chou again repudiated it as "completely illegal." Peking can hardly claim any benefit from a document which it considers to be "illegal and void." Moreover, after Japan's renunciation of its claim to Taiwan, the PRC could not acquire title over the island through the international law principle of occupation, because it had no physical control over the island. Nor could the PRC act through the ROC occupation to claim title over Taiwan because it considers the ROC government to be an "illegal group" or even "bandits." Clearly, a government can no more claim benefits through a regime which it does not recognize as legal than it can through a document which it has declared illegal and void.

Some PRC writers have argued that because Taiwan was originally Chinese territory, a peace treaty is not necessary to transfer title back to China, especially since the Treaty of Shimonoseki ceding Taiwan to Japan was abrogated as a result of the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937.<sup>7</sup> International practice, however, does not support the Chinese position. The provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, for example, were originally French territory, but were ceded to Germany in 1871. Subsequently, they were returned to France through the Treaty of Versailles signed between the Allied and Associated

<sup>6</sup> Cited in *Materials on Succession of States*, UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER. B/14, 1967, p. 70.

<sup>7</sup> See, for example, Shao Chin-fu, "The Absurd Theory of 'Two Chinas' and Principles of International Law," in *Kuo-chi wen-i yen-chiu* (Studies in International Problems) (Peking), no. 2, 1959, cited in Hungdah Chiu, ed., *China and the Question of Taiwan, Documents and Analysis* (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 138.

Powers (including France) and Germany on June 28, 1919. In other words, French sovereignty over its former territory did not automatically revert after World War I, but required the formal treaty mechanism. There does not appear to be any precedent or principle of international law supporting the PRC position that on October 25, 1945, Taiwan was restored to China *de jure* and *de facto*.

If this is correct, then the PRC's claim is primarily based on the theory of historical irredentism. PRC writers and officials have frequently argued that Taiwan is historically Chinese; and that during the Japanese occupation (1895-1945), the people of Taiwan longed for reunification with China. But while this is an undoubted historical fact, it can hardly support the PRC's claim to Taiwan today. In the first place, during the period of Japanese occupation, China was run by a government which permitted a free enterprise economy, and society was relatively free. If the people of Taiwan had known at the time that mainland China would become the totalitarian, highly regimented society it is today, it is unlikely that they would have longed so fervently for reunification. The fact that very few people from Taiwan participated in the Communist movement in China during the Japanese occupation period seems to support this point. And today, it seems abundantly clear that the vast majority of the people on Taiwan do not want to be united with the PRC.

Second, according to Edgar Snow, who was a close friend, Mao Tse-tung himself did not include Taiwan among China's "lost territories" to be regained from Japan. In an interview at Yen-an on July 16, 1936, Mao said: "If the Koreans wish to break away from the chains of Japanese imperialism, we will extend them our enthusiastic help in their struggle for independence. The same thing applies for Formosa."<sup>8</sup> Third, the doctrine of self-determination is now an accepted principle of international law, and one that has not been opposed by the PRC. This principle would certainly overrule any historical claim of the PRC toward Taiwan, since the great majority of the people of Taiwan now clearly oppose unification with the PRC.

In the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, the United States declared:

The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and Taiwan is

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<sup>8</sup> Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China* (New York: Grove Press, 1961), p. 96.

a part of China. The United States government does not challenge that position.

Some people have argued that the United States has thereby accepted the PRC's claim to Taiwan in the Shanghai Communique. But this is certainly not true. The phrase "does not challenge" is not equivalent to a recognition of the PRC claim. This interpretation was also confirmed by a high official of the US government. Soon after the issuance of the Shanghai Communique, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Marshall Green denied that it represented any change in the position held by the United States since 1950, namely, that the status of Taiwan was as yet undetermined.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, it was disclosed recently that at the time of negotiating the Shanghai Communique, then Secretary of State Kissinger wanted to accept the PRC's position on Taiwan by stating in the Communique that the United States "accepts" rather than "does not challenge" the belief of "all Chinese" in one China. But he was rebuffed in that attempt, possibly by President Nixon.<sup>10</sup>

A question closely related to the legal status of Taiwan is the ROC's claim to the mainland of China. If the ROC continued to make an *unconditional* claim to sovereignty over the mainland now controlled by the PRC, then, despite the special legal status of Taiwan, there would be no reason to question the PRC for making a similarly *unconditional* claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. Since its removal to Taiwan, however, the ROC has gradually imposed important limitations on its claim to the mainland. In the first place, treaties which were formerly applicable to all of China were tacitly revised to limit their application to Taiwan. For instance, the 1946 treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation between the United States and the Republic of China has not been applicable to mainland China since the early 1950s.<sup>11</sup> Similarly, new treaties or agreements concluded since 1950 have all been limited in their application to the Taiwan area. For example, the 1954 mutual defense treaty with the United States provides in Article VI: "For the purposes of Articles II and V, the terms

<sup>9</sup> "Transcript of ('Meet the Press') TV Interview with (Marshall) Green," *Mainichi Daily News*, March 29, 1972.

<sup>10</sup> See Stanley Karnow, "Our Next Move on China," *New York Times Magazine*, August 14, 1977, p. 34.

<sup>11</sup> See *Treaties in Force*, 1973, p. 52.

‘territorial’ and ‘territories’ shall mean in respect of the Republic of China, Taiwan and the Pescadores.”

Second, the ROC has pledged, in an exchange of notes accompanying the 1954 mutual defense treaty, not to use force against the mainland without the consent of the United States. Third, in a joint communique issued by President Chiang Kai-shek and US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on October 23, 1958, the ROC publicly made a more general pledge not to use force against the mainland. It states:<sup>12</sup>

The government of the Republic of China considers that the restoration of freedom to its people on the mainland is its sacred mission. It believes that the foundation of this mission resides in the minds and the hearts of the Chinese people, and that the principal means of successfully achieving its mission is the implementation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s three people’s principles (nationalism, democracy, and social well-being), and not the use of force.

This pledge of the nonuse of force to achieve national unification was confirmed recently by a statement of the ROC Foreign Minister, Shen Chang-huan, on July 1, 1977, in which he said:

It has been the consistent position of the government of the Republic of China to carry out its responsibility of delivering our 800 million compatriots from Communist tyranny by political means, while the Chinese Communists have never given up their design to “liberate” Taiwan by force. The “peaceful settlement” theme being harped on by the Chinese Communists is but an attempt on their part to forcibly impose their tyrannical rule on the 16 million Chinese on Taiwan.

In view of the above analysis, it seems clear that the ROC has, in fact, suspended its claim to the Chinese mainland by renouncing the use of force to achieve unification. The PRC, however, still insists on the use of force to “liberate” Taiwan—a territory to which it does not

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<sup>12</sup> *American Foreign Policy, Current Documents, 1958*, p. 1185.

have a clear legal title. Such "liberation" by force is prohibited by international law, and by the Charter of the United Nations, as an attempt to vindicate a claim to territory by the use of force.

#### IV

The normalization of relations between the United States and the PRC would have an important political and economic impact on the ROC. The extent of this impact would appear to depend on (1) the pattern of US-ROC relations after normalization; and (2) the ROC's response to so drastic a diplomatic setback.

Before discussing the implications of alternative patterns of US-ROC relations on the future of the Republic of China, it is necessary to give a brief description of the peculiar features of the ROC economic and political situation. Since its removal to Taiwan in late 1949, the ROC government's ability to maintain political stability has surprised many observers. This stability has been maintained primarily because of the ROC's government's ability to sustain steady and impressive economic growth for almost three decades, and because of the increasingly equitable distribution of the fruits of economic development. The ROC's economy is highly export-oriented; at present,<sup>13</sup> it is the only country in the world which exports more than half of its GNP. Direct foreign investment and technological inflow are indispensable elements of the economic viability of Taiwan. Foreign investment in Taiwan now amounts only to US \$1.5 billion, and *in theory* could be replaced by domestic investment. In practice, however, the importance of foreign investment lies, not in its amount, but in its psychological impact on domestic investors. Without foreign investment, domestic investors would not feel confident of their own investments there; and if foreign investment slowed down, then domestic investment would also slow down. Similarly, if foreign investment began to withdraw from Taiwan, a flight of domestic capital would almost certainly ensue.

Past experience indicates that foreign direct investment in Taiwan has apparently been very sensitive to political events. As Yuan-li Wu, former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in charge of international security planning, and K. C. Yeh, Senior Economist at the Rand Corporation, point out in a recent study:<sup>13</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Yuan-li Wu and K. C. Yeh, "Economic Impact of Alternative US-ROC Relations," *International Trade Law Journal*, Fall 1977, pp. 152, 156.



The rate of US investment in Taiwan dropped in 1971 and 1972, probably as a result of the ROC's international setbacks during those years and doubt about its future status. Between 1972 and 1973, there was a sharp increase in new US investment in Taiwan, which seemed to reflect some recovery of confidence on the part of US investors. However, the increase was smaller in real terms if price increases are discounted. Investments fell again in 1974 because of the general recession and postponement of investment plans by many firms.

The flow of direct investment from Japan, including investments by "overseas Chinese" resident in Japan, rose steadily during 1965-70, immediately after the establishment of the export processing zones. The rate of flow fell in 1972, reflecting the same concern felt by US investors. Following Japan's transfer of diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Peking in 1972, another decline of new Japanese investment in Taiwan occurred in 1974 and 1975, although the cause of the decline is again somewhat ambiguous because it coincided with the recession.

In theory, there are five possible patterns of alternative US-ROC relations after the normalization of US relations with the PRC. The first is that the US chooses to maintain full diplomatic relations with the ROC. This pattern, if carried out, would have minimum adverse impact on the ROC. The Taiwan government and people might not like such a Two Chinas approach, but they would be realistic enough to know that it was the best deal they could get under the circumstances.

The second pattern which the US might choose for its relations with the ROC after normalization would be to maintain official relations with the ROC through a liaison office, and also to continue treaty relations (including the mutual security treaty) with it. While this is a less desirable alternative to the ROC government and people, it would probably have no serious adverse economic and political impact on the ROC. Even if there were some adverse effects, the ROC should have the ability to overcome them.

The third alternative form of US-ROC relations would be to maintain official relations through liaison offices, but to replace the security treaty by a Congressional resolution or a Presidential declara-

tion. Presumably, under such a pattern, other US-ROC treaties would also be replaced by unilateral US domestic legislation. This approach would have a significantly adverse impact on the ROC, both in political and economic terms. From the ROC's point of view, if a security treaty formally signed and ratified by the two countries and made public to the world could be so easily terminated, it would be clear that a mere Congressional resolution enacted unilaterally could be terminated even more easily. The validity of a Presidential declaration is even more dubious. In 1975, the Department of State publicly declared that any declarative commitment made by the President toward a foreign country has no legally binding force. The Department of State even indicated that it does not keep records of exactly how many commitments are made by successive Presidents, or of their terms.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, even if the President did issue a declaration committing the US to defend Taiwan, he could not be prevented from cancelling the commitment at any time if he later changed his mind, regardless of the reason. It is also highly unlikely that such a commitment would be binding on a subsequent President.

Under such circumstances, it is likely that the people in Taiwan, and foreign investors as well, would take a wait-and-see attitude toward the future. Economic development would therefore slow down, causing serious social problems and eventual political instability.

The fourth pattern is similar to the third, except that the liaison office would be replaced by a consular office. The effect of this pattern on the ROC would be similar to the third one; but since the status of a consular office is lower than an official liaison office, the adverse consequences would be more serious. The fifth pattern is the so-called Japan formula; that is, the United States would accept the three conditions of the PRC, and maintain only an "unofficial office" in Taiwan. Some China specialists have suggested that if the United States does apply the Japan formula, then it should also take additional measures to guarantee the stability of Taiwan. Specifically, they recommend that the United States guarantee the continuation of arms sales, Overseas Private Investment Corporation investment guarantees, and Export-Import Bank loans. They also suggest that the security treaty could be replaced by a unilateral Presidential declaration or Congressional resolution.

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<sup>14</sup> See "A President's Word Not Legally Binding," *Sun* (Baltimore), July 9, 1975.

But even with these additions to the Japanese formula, this pattern of US-ROC relations, if adopted, would have severely damaging effects on the ROC, for several reasons. First, if and when the United States terminates diplomatic relations with the ROC, most of the remaining 23 states that continue to recognize the ROC would probably follow suit, thus weakening fundamentally the ROC's international status. Second, by maintaining only an "unofficial office" in Taiwan, the United States would at least tacitly be recognizing the PRC's territorial claim to Taiwan. Thus, if the PRC chose in the future to interfere with US economic, trade, and financial relations with the ROC, or with arms sales to that government, the United States would be in a poor legal position to resist the PRC action. Third, as stated above, the ROC government and people would have little confidence in a Presidential declaration or Congressional resolution to defend Taiwan. It is clear that if the security treaty were terminated, domestic investors would take a wait-and-see attitude toward the future, and there would certainly be some capital flight from Taiwan. Fourth, foreign investors would be increasingly reluctant to invest in Taiwan, at least for a considerable period of time; and some foreign investment in Taiwan might also be gradually withdrawn.

In short, if the Japanese formula (even with the suggested additions) were adopted as the pattern of US-ROC relations after normalization, economic stagnation or depression, social unrest, and political instability in Taiwan would be the inevitable result. Under such circumstances, radical groups might come to power and demand that the government take drastic measures, such as manufacturing nuclear weapons, declaring independence, or leasing a naval base to the Soviet Union, in an effort to retrieve the situation, and thereby greatly disturbing the stability of East Asia. These options are discussed below.

## V

US-ROC relations in the political, economic, cultural, and other fields have been very close; and so far as possible, the ROC would like to maintain them, despite its disappointment over the US move toward closer relations with the PRC. Only if the ROC came to feel that the United States was going to sell it down the river, either immediately or in the long run, would the Taiwan government be prepared to consider secondary options. For example, some China specialists have suggested

that the PRC will be unable over the foreseeable future to launch a military attack on Taiwan, and that, therefore, the ROC should not be worried about the abrogation of the security treaty. They also argue that the United States should at least tacitly recognize the PRC's claim to Taiwan in order to make Peking happy, especially since the PRC is unlikely to take over Taiwan for a long time to come. Some even go so far as to suggest that in any proposed Presidential declaration or Congressional resolution concerning the security of Taiwan, the document should not mention Taiwan specifically, but should only refer vaguely to "stability" or "peace" in the Western Pacific so as not to offend the PRC.

From the ROC's point of view, all these suggestions are a plain and simple sellout of Taiwan. If the PRC's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan were even tacitly recognized, the United States could scarcely provide military assistance to Taiwan in case of a PRC attack, because such assistance would then be intervention in Chinese internal affairs. But without outside military assistance and perhaps even nuclear weapons, it would be extraordinarily difficult for a small nation of 17 million to resist the onslaught of 900 million armed with such nuclear weapons and missiles. Under these circumstances, the continued existence of Taiwan would depend entirely—as in the case of Hong Kong—upon the toleration of the PRC, which could take the island at any time it wished.

The ROC also disagrees with the view of some China specialists that the internal difficulties of the PRC will forestall any military adventures against Taiwan. Despite the great difficulties of famine and economic dislocation resulting from Mao's Great Leap Forward in 1959-62, the PRC government under the leadership of the so-called "moderates" including Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, and Teng Hsiao-p'ing nevertheless launched an attack against India in 1962.

In view of the above analysis, if the ROC considered itself to have been in fact "abandoned" by the United States, it is possible that Taiwan might resort to secondary options to maintain its national survival. Before turning to these options, it is necessary to dispose of the possibility of a negotiated settlement between the ROC and the PRC.

When a PRC official talks about "negotiations" with the ROC, he

invariably refers to what Peking calls the "peaceful liberation," that is, the eventual reintegration, of Taiwan into the Communist-controlled mainland. This differs from the historic West German offer to enter into relations with East Germany, since that offer was preconditioned on West German recognition of the legitimacy of the German Democratic Republic within the territory under its control. Unless the PRC is willing to offer the ROC a solution to the Taiwan problem along the lines of the German model, whereby the PRC would recognize the legitimacy of the ROC, there can be no reason for the ROC to enter into negotiations with the PRC if Taiwan does not, in fact, want to surrender.

Some US scholars and PRC officials have suggested that Taiwan could be made an autonomous region within the PRC. This offer is equally unacceptable to the ROC for the simple reason that Peking's credibility in this connection has long been undermined by its dealings with Tibet. Tibet signed an agreement with the PRC in 1951, by the terms of which the PRC promised autonomous status to Tibet. But the Communists later sent a large occupation force to Tibet, settled many Han Chinese there, and finally massacred thousands upon thousands of Tibetans in the name of suppressing a "rebellion" in 1959. The atrocities committed by the PRC in Tibet were condemned by the International Commission of Jurists as constituting "genocide."<sup>15</sup>

Moreover, the internal situation in the ROC would also preclude its leaders from entering into negotiations with the PRC, unless the negotiations were based on the German model. The great majority of people on the island are Taiwanese-Chinese or Taiwan-born mainlanders. If the ROC leadership were to negotiate with the PRC for a so-called "peaceful liberation," almost all the population would interpret this as a sellout, and it could well provoke a widespread rebellion against the government. In view of this, any US attempt to pressure the ROC to negotiate with the PRC would probably be rejected, because any negotiation, in the ROC's view, would be seen as the equivalent of surrender or suicide. This is all the more so because US-arranged negotiations with the Communists in comparable situations in the past, such as in Vietnam and Laos, have rarely if ever been

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<sup>15</sup> See International Commission of Jurists, *The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law*, 1959.

successful; each ended in the surrender of the non-Communist side. The only partial exception is Korea, but this was because the United States continued to maintain substantial combat forces there after the signing of the armistice agreement, and also concluded a security treaty with the Republic of Korea.

Now let us turn to the secondary options available to the ROC in response to normalization. It is generally agreed that there are three such options: to declare independence, go nuclear, or seek a relationship with the Soviet Union. The reason why the word "secondary" is used here is that none of these options would be a happy one for the ROC to choose, although it may nevertheless resort to one or more of them if it eventually concludes that the United States is going to "abandon" it.

The first option would be to declare Taiwan an independent state. While it is unlikely that the present ROC leadership would adopt such a policy, since it would label them as "traitors" to Chinese history, this alternative should not be ruled out as an increasing number of Taiwanese-Chinese continue to move into the decisionmaking levels of the ROC government, and especially if the PRC increases its military, political, and economic pressure on Taiwan.

It is, moreover, entirely conceivable that even the present leadership might take a comparable but less drastic action within the framework of the present ROC constitutional structure, the implication of which would, however, be similar to a declaration of independence. For example, the ROC could conduct a plebiscite on the issue of negotiations with the PRC on "peaceful liberation or unification." In the present climate, the result would almost certainly be overwhelmingly against such a move; and under these circumstances, the United States would be placed in an embarrassing position if it seemed to be disregarding the validly expressed aspirations of the people of Taiwan for self-determination.

Another possible course of action within this option would have the ROC formally declare the suspension of its claim to sovereignty over the mainland and the limitation of its jurisdiction to the territory now under its effective control. Since all US treaties with the Republic of China since 1949 have been modified to apply only to the territory actually under ROC control, the proposed declaration would have no effect on the validity of existing treaty relations. On the other hand,

the ROC would probably strengthen its position with the American public, and thereby make it more difficult for the Washington government to abandon the ROC.

A second option for the ROC is to develop and deploy nuclear weapons. But while there is no doubt that the ROC has the technological know-how and industrial base for manufacturing nuclear weapons, the United States could retaliate by cutting off supplies of nuclear fuels for Taiwan's nuclear power plants. In order to cope with this eventuality, the ROC—after a sharp policy debate within the leadership—decided to establish diplomatic relations with the Republic of South Africa, which has rich uranium deposits. On the technical level, it is reported that the ROC also has close informal ties with Israel, although the two states do not maintain formal diplomatic relations.

The last option open to the ROC would be to enter into some kind of relationship with the Soviet Union. The strategic importance of the island of Taiwan does not require much elaboration. In this connection, it is perhaps sufficient to quote from a speech by the former PRC Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua, delivered at Tientsin on May 20, 1975.

From the geographic point of view, Taiwan is very important. Hence, the Soviet Union is watching this area and attempts to avail itself of an opportunity to set its foot on it. On the other hand, Taiwan is taking advantage of its important position to play political maneuvers between the United States, Soviet Union, and Japan.

Taiwan would be especially useful for the operation of the Soviet Navy in the western Pacific. A Soviet base on Taiwan would threaten the sea lanes to the south of Japan and the security of the Philippines. Similarly, PRC control over Taiwan would shift the strategic balance to the disadvantage of the Soviet Union. It is true that the Soviet leadership would have to consider the political costs involved in developing a closer relationship with the ROC. At present, moreover, the Taiwan government also publicly rules out any such possibility. But this policy is privately criticized by some intellectuals on the island; and there are signs that trade relations are already developing. Recently, the Taiwan

Garrison Command discovered that a Soviet bank in Singapore had issued letters of credit for trade with the ROC, and it immediately instructed ROC businessmen not to accept such letters of credit in the future. On the other hand, it has been reported by some travellers that goods made in Taiwan were appearing in the markets of East European countries, and even in the Soviet Union.

In projecting the ROC's possible choice of options in response to a US termination of diplomatic relations and the security treaty, one should bear in mind that, because of the ROC's different cultural background and experience in dealing with Communists, its identification of national interests and the choice of options open to it may not be the same as those envisaged by policymakers in this country. Some China specialists have suggested, for example, that if the PRC is willing to give a verbal or even written assurance that it would not use force against Taiwan, the United States should accept Peking's three conditions for establishing diplomatic relations. From the ROC's point of view, such an assurance would not have much value, because the ROC considers that the Communists would break their commitment whenever they become certain that there would be no forceful response from the United States. The Vietnam "peace" settlement is a vivid example of the dangers involved in accepting Communist assurances.

## VI

Since the United States began the process of normalizing relations with the PRC, many officials—from the President on down—have given assurances to the American public and the ROC that Washington will not "abandon" Taiwan. Unfortunately the actual conduct of these officials does not always lend credence to the sincerity of such assurances. For example, Henry Kissinger went to Peking in October 1971 at precisely the time that the United Nations was debating the Chinese representation question, thus sabotaging the efforts of the US delegation to save a seat for the ROC in the General Assembly. The Secretary of State refused to see the ROC Ambassador for three years, for fear of offending the PRC. Furthermore, it has been suggested that President Ford even "promised" to accept the three conditions of the PRC if he were re-elected President. Incidents such as these certainly strengthen the suspicions of the ROC that the US



Administration may well “abandon” it to the mercies of the PRC after normalization. If Washington is so afraid of offending the PRC even when it still has formal diplomatic and treaty relations with the ROC, then how can the ROC believe that, after the termination of such relations, the US Administration would stand up to help the ROC against PRC aggression. It is for this reason that any proposed post-diplomatic relations and post-security treaty arrangements for the ROC tend to be viewed by the latter as mere face-saving measures, or—worse—as political tricks to fool the American people and Congress.

Some China specialists have argued that the PRC will never bargain away its principles, but that it is flexible in making concrete arrangements to implement those principles. For this reason, they argue that the United States should first accept the three PRC conditions for normalization, and then work out the necessary “concrete arrangements” to preserve Taiwan’s security. The US Administration now appears to have accepted this advice in pursuing its policy of normalization.

But one can hardly agree with the underlying theory. To say that the PRC has always taken an uncompromising stand on its principles in international relations is certainly not true. During the Korean armistice negotiations in 1951-53, the Communist side (including the PRC through the so-called Chinese People’s Volunteers) originally insisted that the UN side repatriate all Chinese prisoners-of-war, despite the fact that 75 percent of the Chinese POWs refused to return to the PRC. Eventually, of course, the Communists gave up this demand, largely because of the strong stand taken by the UN side (in which the US played the dominant role).

Another case relates to the PRC’s relations with Chile. After the Allende government was overthrown by rightist elements in Chile, the PRC consistently refused to grant asylum to Chilean political refugees, most of whom were leftists. In fact, the PRC continued diplomatic relations with the new rightist government, and even granted military and economic aid to Chile, in apparent disregard of the alleged “principles” of Marxism, Leninism, and Socialist internationalism. The PRC’s so-called principles become immutable only when the other side believes them to be so. If the other side is firm and patient, then there is a good chance to persuade the PRC to change its allegedly immu-

table positions. Ever since 1955, the PRC insisted that it would not deal with the United States unless the Taiwan question were solved. In the early 1970s, however, it was willing to drop the Taiwan question for the moment in order to talk with the United States on other matters of mutual concern.

The assertion that the PRC is willing to be flexible in working out "concrete arrangements" to implement its principles, is similarly not true. As a matter of fact, by accepting the PRC's so-called principles, one has already placed himself in an unfavorable position. The PRC can reopen the issue at any time on the ground that a particular action taken under the "concrete arrangements" is in violation of the agreed principles. Moreover, the PRC's explicit or implicit consent to a given "concrete arrangement" does not mean that it has abandoned its long-term goal. In the PRC's view, such a compromise merely postpones the ultimate total solution, and leaves the issue to be reopened at an appropriate time to be chosen by the PRC.

In 1954, when the PRC concluded an agreement with India on trade and intercourse between India and Tibet and issued a joint communique on peaceful coexistence, Prime Minister Nehru wished to raise the Sino-Indian boundary question. Premier Chou En-lai assured Nehru that this would not be an obstacle to friendly relations between the two countries. But after the PRC consolidated its control in Tibet, it reopened the boundary issue by the use of force against India. Again, on September 10, 1955, the United States and the People's Republic of China concluded an "Agreed Announcement on Repatriation of Civilians," in which the PRC "recognizes that Americans in the PRC who desire to return to the United States are entitled to do so." Later, when the time came to implement the agreement, the PRC insisted that only those Americans who were not in Chinese prisons would be allowed to go home. It also demanded that the United States provide a list of all Chinese in this country in exchange for the PRC's providing a comparable list of all Americans in mainland China, although at the time there were fewer than 100 Americans in China, while there were more than 200,000 Chinese in the United States. These Chinese, who were overwhelmingly pro-ROC, were almost universally opposed to turning over their names to the PRC for fear of subjecting their relatives in mainland China to Communist pressure. This manipulation of "concrete arrangements" by the PRC to implement a principle

already agreed upon is apparently characteristic of Communist Chinese diplomacy.<sup>16</sup>

In dealing with the PRC on the issue of normalization, the United States should not always be on the defensive. Washington should take an aggressive approach by informing the PRC that under no circumstances will the United States compromise its fundamental principles of respect for human rights and self-determination. Most of all, the United States should realize that its present relations with the PRC are—to the Chinese Communists—nothing more than a liaison of convenience. The ultimate goal of PRC policy remains the elimination of so-called “American imperialism.”

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<sup>16</sup> See Kenneth T. Young, *Negotiating with the Chinese Communists, The United States Experience, 1953-1967* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968).



## Chapter IV

### NORMALIZATION AND SOME PRACTICAL AND LEGAL PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE UNITED STATES

EUGENE A. THEROUX

Since 1972, I have made eleven visits, aggregating several months, to the People's Republic of China. I have also visited the Republic of China. Some of my clients trade with the PRC, some with the ROC, and some with both. Out of admiration and affection for friends in both places and because I believe that law and trade can contribute to understanding and friendship, I intend to deal with the practical and legal implications of normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

I believe that the proper question now is not whether, but how, the United States and the PRC should achieve normal relations. Nevertheless, the PRC should understand that the issue is not a simple matter of U.S. acceptance of the three announced PRC conditions for normalization. For normalization to be politically possible, a satisfactory answer must be found to these difficult questions:

1. Where is the justification for the U.S., in effect, transforming a friendly national ally, to which we are tied by treaty, tradition and trade, unwillingly into a province of a state whose economic and political system is alien, offensive and hostile to our own?
2. How, if at all, can or should we help preserve, for the 17 million people in Taiwan, a chance to decide their future in an atmosphere free from coercion or intimidation?

The question of Taiwan, and its relationship to the mainland of China, must be left to the Chinese themselves. To be sure, we are involved in this question. But I believe this country should confine its negotiations with the PRC to the terms on which an exchange of ambassadors can occur between Washington and

Peking. In this process, neither side should expect the other to make unreciprocated concessions.

It is undeniable that the PRC Government exercises *de facto* political authority on the Chinese mainland. It is equally true that the ROC Government does likewise on the island of Taiwan. The ROC and the PRC each hold that the U.S. cannot maintain complete diplomatic recognition with one without requiring severance of relations with the other. In these circumstances, we have retained pre-existing diplomatic relations with the ROC while also establishing, to the extent possible, diplomatic relations with the PRC. The result is that the U.S. and the PRC maintain in each other's country diplomatic missions which are embassies in all but name. The ambiguities of this situation are, to some, intolerable; but whether because of or in spite of such circumstances, the interests of all three parties have not been badly served since 1972.

The burden is therefore upon those who favor change in the *status quo* to make a convincing case that it is in our national best interest to make such a change. In deciding the terms and timing of normalization we should be guided:

*First*, by an awareness of our limitations, seen against a century of frustration for all concerned, as a participant in Chinese disputes;

*Second*, by a recognition that our policy can have a profound effect:

- upon the future of 18 million people, and succeeding generations, on Taiwan; and
- upon the economic and military balances among other Pacific nations;

*Third*, we must be guided by a paramount commitment to our national interest, enlightened by a strong faith in the universality of our own values.

The American people are deeply concerned about the bullying of Soviet dissidents, and South African blacks; we are pledged to the existence of an Israeli State, and President Carter has expressed the national mood in calling attention to beleaguered political minorities wherever they may be.

In these circumstances, the United States must not be the handmaiden that delivers up the people on Taiwan, against their wishes, to an authority they may consider abhorrent and inimical to their lives, liberty and property. Any U.S. policy which

appeared to put in jeopardy the welfare and aspirations of 18 million people would be intolerable to the American people.

I agree with those in the People's Republic of China who have told me that the Taiwan problem is a Chinese problem. Consequently, the United States should encourage the two Chinese sides to resolve their differences by direct talks. Wherever they reside, the Chinese are resourceful negotiators. They are fully capable of finding peaceful means to define the relationship that is to exist between the island of Taiwan and the Chinese mainland. The US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty should not be an obstacle to progress in their negotiations, since the PRC has indicated its intention to resolve the Taiwan question peacefully. The PRC is not so weak or timid that it cannot conduct effective direct talks even though some form of U.S. diplomatic post is maintained in Taipei.

In the meantime, a way must be found to preserve to the greatest extent possible the economic prosperity, and physical security of Taiwan, and its active trade, commerce and friendly intercourse with the United States.

Independent of Chinese negotiations over Taiwan, the United States should seek all reasonable ways of advancing normal relations with the PRC. These could include relaxation of controls over certain advanced U.S. exports; settlement of the problem of U.S. claims and frozen Chinese assets; pursuit of an expanded program of scientific, academic and cultural exchanges; facilitation of trade promotion events and activities; selective U.S. reduction or elimination of tariffs over certain imports from the PRC; conclusion of agreements respecting air transport, shipping and communication systems, currency and banking accords; scientific and technical cooperation agreements; mutual efforts concerning international law enforcement; agreements for protection of intellectual property such as patents and copyrights; mechanisms for the resolution of commercial disputes; agreements to safeguard certain rights of private citizens traveling in the two countries; establishment of news bureaus in the two countries, and the like.

## PRACTICAL LEGAL PROBLEMS

### 1. US-ROC Agreements; Shanghai Communique

Since it was issued in February, 1972, the Shanghai Joint Communique has been invoked time and again by PRC spokesmen as evidence of a commitment on the part of the United States

eventually to recognize the PRC as the sole government of China. The Communique has likewise since been cited by the Ford and Carter Administrations as evidence of our desire and intention to normalize relations.

Though important as a joint statement of views (including opposing views), the Shanghai Communique has no more binding legal character than any press release issued by the Nixon party during that 1972 visit. By its terms it does not, as some believe, announce U.S. agreement that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China; the U.S. merely acknowledges and does not challenge the view that Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait hold to this view.

The call for implementation of the non-binding Shanghai Communique on terms requiring the U.S. side to abrogate certain legally binding agreements with the ROC is ironic. The Mutual Defense Treaty and the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the U.S. and the ROC, for example, are legally binding manifestations of the will of the American people as expressed through ratification by the Senate of the United States. Equally, the large number of other agreements identified by Professor Li in his testimony amount to an intricate tapestry of relationships which the people of this country, through their Executive and Legislative departments, have seen fit to establish with the ROC over a quarter century or more. There appears to be no principle of international law that withdrawal by one government of political recognition of another *ipso facto* either terminates or continues prior treaties or agreements between them. Any U.S. agreement to extend full diplomatic recognition to the PRC, therefore, would leave existing US-ROC agreements in an ambiguous legal status. Congress could resolve virtually all such ambiguities by legislation and, consequently, Congress and the Executive cannot fail to examine — in advance and with great care — which, and to what extent, existing agreements with the ROC may be explicitly terminated, continued or modified, and what changes in U.S. statutes and regulations may be required.

## 2. Human Rights

Those who press for unconditional normalization do so on the grounds that reunification on PRC terms is inevitable, that rectification of early U.S. foreign policy mistakes is overdue, that the ROC must understand that U.S. economic, political and military support cannot be perpetual; and that the ROC's claim to be the sole legitimate government of all China is wishful thinking.



It may be significant that no advocates of recognition of the PRC, de-recognition of the ROC and abrogation of the Mutual Defense Treaty seem to believe that normalization is likely to enhance the human rights or the standard of living of the residents of Taiwan. Most people appear to believe, on the contrary, that a curtailment of human rights on Taiwan would result from extension of PRC authority over the island. Our policy makers cannot be unmindful of this, nor of the fact that there may be a majority on Taiwan who would prefer to exist independently of the PRC.

### **3. Trade, Tariffs; Jackson Amendment**

Trade between the U.S. and the ROC in 1976 was about twelve times that of US-PRC trade. Projections for the current year are similar: about \$5 billion in total US-ROC trade against only \$350 million in U.S. trade with the PRC.

Presently the ROC benefits from most-favored-nation (MFN) tariffs on exports to the U.S., and on GSP treatment on many goods. Under the Trade Act of 1974, MFN is unavailable to the PRC in the absence of a bilateral trade agreement. The "Jackson Amendment" to the Trade Act denies certain trade benefits to countries interfering, *inter alia*, with the right of emigration. Former Secretary Kissinger once told the Senate Finance Committee that this law would "present massive difficulties" if it were to be applied to China.

Assuming U.S. normalization with the PRC, and de-recognition of the ROC, under what circumstances, if any, might U.S. trade benefits, unavailable to the PRC, be continued to Taiwan?

### **4. Consular Protection**

Recently, according to *The New York Times* of Tuesday, September 20, 1977, an American citizen was stabbed on Chang An Chieh, Peking's main thoroughfare. This points up not only a need for accords providing consular protection within the PRC, but also the question of the means and extent of legal redress for injury to person or property available to a U.S. national in the PRC after normalization.

The question of the personal security of foreign businessmen and officials in the Chinese People's Republic is the subject of a most interesting chapter, by Professor Cohen, in the book *Law and Politics in China's Foreign Trade*, published this year by the

University of Washington Press. This volume, by the way, is edited by Professor Li.

Noting that "in view of China's political relations with the rest of the world, even so basic a problem as the personal security of trade personnel cannot be taken for granted, either in China or abroad," Professor Cohen provides the following review of difficulties encountered by foreigners in China:

Shortly before its demise the "Committee of One Million against the Admission of Red China to the UN" brought to the United States one George Watt, a British employee of the Vickers-Zimmer Company. Watt had been released in mid-1970 after serving a three-year sentence in a Chinese prison following an espionage conviction. Although the committee failed in its effort to have Watt appear before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, which was holding hearings on China policy, it did manage to publicize his views in the American press. Watt's message concerning Sino-American relations was a simple one: "If any American businessmen contemplate profits out of the approaching détente," he said, "I will give them a flat prediction: They will encounter disaster and will be lucky to escape without imprisonment of their representatives."

Watt's experience was not an isolated one during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of 1966-69. For his participation in the same case another Vickers-Zimmer employee — a West German named Peter Deckart — was lucky enough to have been deported, rather than sentenced to prison. Other business representatives were reported to have been arrested; these included a Belgian banker and twelve Japanese trade representatives, as well as journalists and ship's officers from Great Britain and other countries.

In addition to those who were actually imprisoned, some personnel of foreign companies were subjected to other forms of harassment during the Cultural Revolution. For example, three British engineers, whose firm had sent them to Peking to supervise the installation of machinery, were kept under virtual house arrest for a number of weeks while the Chinese threatened to treat them as prisoners or hostages until a Chinese claim against their company was satisfactorily settled. Moreover, refusal to grant exit visas was commonplace. British banking personnel in Shanghai, for example,

had by mid-1968 been waiting a year to leave China, even though their replacements had already arrived.

Infringement upon the personal security of foreign businessmen did not originate with the Cultural Revolution, of course. During the early 1950s, while China was participating in the Korean War and conducting a series of campaigns to eliminate counterrevolutionary activity at home, some businessmen were convicted of espionage. In July 1970 the People's Republic provided a tragic reminder of that era by announcing the suicide a few months earlier of Hugh Redmond, an American who had been a businessman in Shanghai until he began serving a life sentence following his conviction in 1951. Not only did the newly established Communist government imprison certain foreign businessmen during the early 1950s, but it also denied exit permits to a large number of employees of foreign firms, as part of what the United Kingdom charged with a "deliberate policy of the Chinese Government to render it impossible for most British and foreign firms to remain in China and to force them to surrender their assets."

Harassment of foreign businessmen was muted from the mid-1950s until the Cultural Revolution, but still continued, and refusal to grant exit visas remained a principal sanction. An extreme case was that of a Belgian bank official in Shanghai, Frans Van Roosbroeck, whose bank had transferred \$30 million to the United States on behalf of Chinese depositors as the Communists were taking over China in 1949; from 1952 until his arrest in 1968, Van Roosbroeck was refused permission to leave China. In interviews several other representatives of foreign firms have reported that in the early 1960s the Chinese government made it clear that their freedom to leave the country was contingent upon their company's satisfactory compliance with its obligations under Chinese law as expounded by the local authorities.

While Professor Cohen states that these are "unpleasant but undeniable facts," he rightly emphasizes that the risks of business travel to China are apparently not perceived as severe enough to discourage the "tens of thousands" of foreign businessmen and company employees who have visited China since 1949. Over the last six years, hundreds of Americans have visited China, some for extended periods, without untoward incidents. Also, while there are presently no American businessmen held in China

against their will, there remain many who are unsuccessfully pressing the Chinese to grant them an entry visa. Nevertheless, Professor Cohen's research on this subject amounts to a disquieting reminder that, in his words:

foreign traders ought to be warned: although the risk of detention by the police may be small if they visit China during periods of stability, if relations between their country and China are not hostile, and if they avoid intelligence work, the procedures employed in those cases in which businessmen are detained will be nearly as abhorrent to them as earlier Chinese procedures were to their predecessors.

If experience is any guide, the detained person will be kept incommunicado for a period that may range from several weeks to several years. In this period the investigation proceeds, and the prisoner undergoes repeated interrogation, sometimes without adequate food and sleep and without even knowing the charges against him and the bases for them. During this time he will be unable to contact his family, friends, or government, nor will the authorities provide him with any independent source of assistance, such as the services of a local lawyer. Efforts of those on the outside to communicate with him will also be unsuccessful.

Consular access appears rarely to have been granted to foreign missions at the investigation stage. Indeed, in diplomatic correspondence with India in 1963-64, China insisted that international law imposes no obligation to afford consular access to detained aliens who are suspected of crime until after they have been sentenced; and it refused to permit representatives of the Indian government to visit an Indian national held on a charge of rape until all proceedings in the case, including appeal, had been completed. The PRC did not appear to be embarrassed at all by the fact that when India had detained Chinese nationals, the PRC had demanded consular access to them from the very beginning of their detention. This background must be taken into account when evaluating the significance of any agreement that the PRC may make with foreign governments to allow access to their detained nationals "in accordance with domestic laws and regulations" or "in accordance with international law."

### **5. Commercial Disputes**

Although the PRC maintains arbitration tribunals for the resolution of disputes in trade and maritime matters, U.S. claimants have never succeeded in bringing about a formal arbitration of a dispute with a PRC trade organization. While agreeable by contract to third-country situs for arbitration of commercial disputes, no PRC agency has yet allowed a foreign claimant to institute an arbitration abroad. I know of no case, either, where a foreigner has been able to initiate a claim in a Chinese People's Court. Law courts and arbitration tribunals are both available and utilized in the ROC when commercial disputes arise with foreigners. American lawyers and businessmen will want to know whether access to such tribunals on Taiwan will survive normalization, and to what extent the establishment of full US-PRC relations might give them access to China's dispute settlement agencies.

### **6. Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks**

The PRC provides for registration of foreign trademarks by applicants of countries with which it has a bilateral trademark agreement. Neither patent nor copyright protection exists in the PRC, and the PRC is not a member of either the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property or the Universal Copyright Convention. The ROC permits registration of patents and copyrights — but the status of such registration following normalization could become unclear. Although the ROC (like the PRC) does not belong to any international copyright convention, domestic legislation does permit application for copyright protection, and ROC law protects against the export of unauthorized reprints of copyrighted material.

### **7. Existing Commercial Agreements**

U.S. businessmen will wish to be advised, in advance of normalization, about the legal status of agreements they have with private firms in the ROC. Questions concerning rights, remedies, currency, exchange rates, insurance terms, the likelihood of performance by the ROC party, the status of companies, partnerships, joint ventures or other business entities formed in the ROC, among other issues, could be substantially affected by normalization.

### **8. Private Property of U.S. Persons in the ROC**

Americans with property in the ROC, with investments in ROC institutions, or with deposits in ROC banks, or creditors of ROC entities, will want early clarification by their Government of the implications of normalization.

### **9. ROC Property in the U.S.**

U.S. natural or legal persons with interests in ROC property in the U.S. are also entitled to information about the implications of normalization for such interests.

### **10. Boycott questions**

Some U.S. firms seeking to continue business with Taiwan after US-PRC normalization could discover that PRC pressure may be brought to seek to cause them to discontinue certain business with Taiwan. If so, would U.S. boycott laws be available to help American firms resist such pressure, or would the U.S. Government regard this as an internal Chinese matter?

### **11. Immigration**

What changes, if any, in U.S. immigration laws should be made upon the cessation of recognition of the ROC by the U.S.? This question goes not only to necessary adjustments in the Immigration and Nationality Act but, also, to preparation for possible political refugees from Taiwan.

### **12. Access to U.S. Courts**

Unrecognized governments and their nationals are, in certain circumstances, barred from bringing suit in U.S. courts. After US-PRC normalization, but during continued ROC administration of Taiwan, would plaintiffs from Taiwan be barred from U.S. courts?

### **13. Export Controls**

U.S. exporters will need to know whether and to what extent normalization may result in changes in the status of Taiwan insofar as U.S. export control regulations are concerned.

CONCLUSION

A central fact of normalization is that the process requires drastic change in fundamental legal obligations the U.S. and the ROC presently have to each other. How these changes are made will not only affect the fate of Taiwan, but will reflect our own attitudes toward the place of law in our foreign relations.





## Chapter V

### PUBLIC OPINION AND U.S. CHINA POLICY

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Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's trip to Peking last August underscored the fact that the process of normalization of relations between the US and the People's Republic of China (PRC), begun with the signing of the Shanghai Communique in 1972, is now at an impasse. On one side, Peking continues to insist on "three conditions," that the US break diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (ROC), abrogate the 1954 Security Treaty with Taiwan, and withdraw its military forces from the island. On the American side, the Carter administration, while hoping to pursue normalization, has shown that it is not prepared to accept the PRC's three conditions.

#### The Role of Public Opinion

The relatively cautious posture assumed by the Carter administration in relation to the issue of US-China relations is undoubtedly the product of a number of domestic and international factors. These include assessments of our global strategic and security interests, the triangular balance of power relations between the US, the Soviet Union and China, our economic interests in Asia, relations with allies, and domestic reaction to foreign policy issues such as troop withdrawal from Korea, deployment of the B-1 bomber, and the Panama Canal Treaty.<sup>1</sup> In

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\* The authors wish to thank the Faculty Development Support Fund at Brown University for a research grant which covered the administrative costs of their opinion survey project. They are particularly appreciative of the generous encouragement and moral support given to them by Provost Merton Stoltz and Dean Maurice Glicksman of Brown University. Needless to say, the authors alone are responsible for the analysis and conclusions which appear in this report.

1. For some excellent analyses of various aspects of US-China relations related to the problem of normalization, see Ralph N. Clough, Robert B. Oxnam, and William Watts. *The United States and China: American Perceptions and Future Alternatives* (Washington, D. C.: Potomac Associates, 1977); Victor H. Li,

particular, public opinion on political issues is generally assumed to play an influential role in the formulation and implementation of policy. This assumption rests on the notion that in a democratic political system such as ours, policy-makers, desirous of remaining in office, must remain attuned to public opinion and act in ways which will maximize popular support for their policies.<sup>2</sup> It has been written that, in the realm of foreign policy, for instance, "Public opinion plays so important a role that it must be treated as a matter of the first importance. The public opinion operation in the State Department should be accorded full status for two reasons: First, appraisal of public opinion is essential to the formulation of foreign policy . . . Second, cultivation of public opinion is vital to the execution of any foreign policy."<sup>3</sup>

It is this kind of assessment of the role of public opinion which has encouraged such survey research organizations as Gallup's and Harris' to carry out numerous public opinion surveys over the past few years on the issue of US-China relations. The accompanying tables summarize longitudinal data on various aspects of the issue in the past decade.<sup>4</sup> These surveys reveal some patterns and trends of opinions which are worth noting.

(1) Since the Nixon breakthrough of 1972, the image of the PRC in the US has improved significantly, but still only roughly one out of four Americans has a positive view toward the PRC. In contrast, Taiwan appears to be much more favorably perceived in the eyes of the American public, with over one half of the public registering a favorable attitude toward it.

(2) The majority of Americans appears to be ready to establish diplomatic relations with Peking by extending recognition to the PRC. But, paradoxically, an even larger majority thinks that we should continue to maintain our diplomatic ties with Taiwan at the same time. The overwhelming majority of the public also opposes Peking's demand that we break our formal ties

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*De-recognizing Taiwan* (Washington, D. C.: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1977); A. Doak Barnett, *China Policy* (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977); James C. Hsiung, "US Relations with China in the Post-Kissingerian Era," a paper presented at a Conference of the Asian American Assembly for Policy Research, April 29, 1977.

2. See, for example, Lester Markel, et al., *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1949); Robert S. Erikson and Norman R. Luttbeg, *American Public Opinion* (New York: John Wiley, 1973).

3. Markel, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

4. Poll data discussed in this section are taken primarily from *Gallup Report*, *The Harris Survey*, *The Harris Survey Yearbook*, *Current Opinion*, *Outreacher* (a Foreign Policy Association publication).

with Taiwan as a precondition for "normalizing" relations with the PRC.

(3) Over two thirds of the American public favors policies which will eventually lead Taiwan toward independence and consequently stabilize the status of Taiwan as a political entity separate from the PRC.

(4) The American public is divided widely on the issue of whether the US should commit its troops and/or military supplies to defend Taiwan, if the island is attacked. Since the mid-1970's, however, the American people's willingness to support Taiwan with military means in the event of Communist attack appears to have been slightly on the rise.

There is clearly a rough association between public opinion trends as shown in the data just considered and the policy positions of the US government. But the nature of the association is not at all clear. One may, on one hand, be tempted to conclude that public opinion has considerable influence on policy-makers. But one might just as easily argue that it is public opinion that is influenced by shifts in policy, rather than the other way around.<sup>5</sup> There are, in fact, very sound reasons for policy-makers not to be markedly influenced by mass public opinion. Survey data have consistently demonstrated that the general mass public is usually ill-informed about and generally apathetic to public issues, particularly in the area of foreign policy, which is, for the most part, remote from the public's daily concerns. Their knowledge of the basic facts about foreign governments and the intricacies of international politics is, by and large, superficial and limited. It has been well documented that as many as 80% of the mass public rarely follow foreign news and that they usually lack coherent background knowledge of major international issues.<sup>6</sup>

Take the recent survey of American attitudes toward China and Taiwan conducted in April 1977 by the Gallup Organization for the Potomac Associates, for example. This survey reveals that as many as 56% of the citizens polled were unable to answer or respond correctly to such a fundamental question as whether or not the government in Taiwan is Communist. It should also be noted that one third of the

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5. For a discussion of the issue in general, see James N. Rosenau, *National Leadership and Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

6. Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950); John G. Reilly, ed., *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy*, (Chicago: Council on Foreign Relations, 1975); and Erikson and Luttbeg, *op. cit.*

respondents did not even know if the PRC had a Communist government.<sup>7</sup> This level of ignorance and misinformation is truly shocking, in view of the fact that since the Kissinger breakthrough and the two subsequent American presidential visits to Peking, major events in China and Taiwan have received fairly broad coverage in the mass media. Findings such as these clearly raise serious questions about the value and usefulness of using public opinion for policy analysis or policy prediction. If the mass public is so uninformed or misinformed of the rudiments, the opinions they offer can be nothing but haphazard guesses or random thoughts based on false assumptions.

### Attitudes of the Opinion Leaders

What, then, are alternative strategies for the study of public opinion? One constructive alternative seems to be to shift from the study of the opinions of the general public to those of the "opinion leaders."<sup>8</sup> The term "opinion leaders" refers to a relatively small group of individuals who have demonstrated leadership in their respective fields of activity and who occupy formal positions of strategic importance in political communications, which enable them to transmit their opinions downward to the general public as well as upward to the policy-makers. Particularly important among this group are political leaders holding high public offices and top executives and communications specialists controlling the mass media. This "opinion elite", by virtue of the formal offices they hold, enjoy special access to institutional and professional as well as personal channels of political communications. They are, in general, well informed about major issues and developments in society, have a stake in the outcome of public policies, and are sensitive to the needs and demands of their constituents. Major studies have demonstrated that it is these active and articulate leaders who, by the skillful use of their organizational resources and personal leadership, ultimately shape the tone and trends in the opinions of the mass public, and who also play a decisive role in setting the parameters of public policy for the decision-makers.<sup>9</sup>

Prompted by considerations such as these, several of us who are associated with research activities on China at Brown University decided to undertake a survey of the attitudes of

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7. Clough, et al., *op. cit.* p. 29.

8. The same argument has been made in Rosenau, *op. cit.*

9. *Ibid.*, and Erikson and Luttbeg, *op. cit.*

“opinion leaders” toward the issue of US-China normalization and Taiwan. For the purpose of this study, eleven groups of political and mass media leaders at the national and the local level were selected as “opinion leaders” to be surveyed by a written questionnaire (see the listing below for the composition of the sample). Questionnaires were sent to 1,801 individuals altogether who occupy formal leadership positions in their respective organizations. Leaders within the Carter Administration were excluded from the sample because they represent policy-makers rather than simply opinion leaders.

The survey was administered during the months of July and August, 1977, just before Secretary Vance’s widely publicized trip to Peking, when public debates between proponents and opponents of normalization had carefully articulated the issues and policy options. This timing assured that the questionnaires would reach the participants at a time when they had on hand a wide range of facts and policy arguments required for informed and well articulated responses to the questions raised in the survey. At the time of preparation of this essay, a total of 780 questionnaires have been returned, of which 47 declined to answer for a variety of reasons. The relatively high return rate of 41% (733 valid responses) is probably attributable to the strong interests and concerns of the respondents pertaining to the issue.<sup>10</sup> The following is a succinct summary highlighting the findings on major questions at issue.

The overall profile of the survey shows that the American opinion leaders are deeply concerned about the prospect of normalization with the PRC and the future of Taiwan. They take a surprisingly strong stand in favor of continued support of Taiwan and ensuring the island’s peace and security. Problems associated with the normalization question are viewed by the opinion leaders basically as a non-partisan issue. The overwhelming majority of nine out of ten opinion leaders are opposed to accepting the PRC’s “three conditions” as the basis for normalization. These strong sentiments of opposition are expressed in unequivocal terms by the Democrats, Republicans and independents alike (91, 97 and 92% respectively).<sup>11</sup> While endorsing the

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10. In general, a return of 25% is considered to be a high response for written questionnaire polls. See, Rosenau, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

11. Opinion cleavages along the lines of party, sector and organizational affiliation will be analyzed in greater detail in the future. Aggregate data generally show little significance in party affiliation, but a sector-by-sector study reveals that in some organizations, party cleavages are significant.

principle of normalization, nearly 90% of the opinion leaders polled expressed their support for President Carter's declared stand that the "peaceful life" and the "independence and freedom" of the people in Taiwan should not be jeopardized. As revealed in their responses to Questions 4 and 5, the opinion leaders' support for Taiwan seems to be based on pragmatic considerations of Taiwan's capacity to survive on its own and of possible damage to our national interests in Asia.

A substantial majority of the opinion leaders surveyed (67%) believes that in the event of a US decision to disengage from Taiwan politically and militarily, Taiwan would not be able to withstand economic and/or military pressure from the PRC without outside support. An even larger proportion (72%) of the respondents thinks that unilateral disengagement of the US from Taiwan without firm and formal provisions to guarantee the island's security would cause serious alarm, and damage our leadership position and the credibility of our policy in Asia, especially in the eyes of our close allies like Japan and the Philippines. A solid plurality of the opinion elite (45 to 26%) is bothered by the prospect that derecognition of Taiwan without credible security assurances by the US may prompt Taiwan to take drastic action out of desperation, such as seeking military protection from the Soviet Union and/or developing nuclear weapons. A strong desire to see the Taiwan problem resolved once and for all and to see peace prevail in that region is clearly revealed in responses to Question 3. In a ratio of 3 to 1, American opinion leaders express the view that if the government and people of Taiwan declare themselves an independent state formally separate from the PRC, the US should continue to honor diplomatic ties with it, and maintain its treaty obligations as they are currently in force.

Our survey also sought to discern the opinion leaders' attitudes toward specific minimum policy options that the US should take in each area of the "three preconditions," that is, diplomatic representation, military ties and treaty relations. The table below summarizes our findings.

As far as our diplomatic ties and treaty relations with Taiwan are concerned, over one half of the opinion leaders (approximately 56%) believe that the US should not alter its current relationship, and the maintenance of the status quo should be our minimum negotiating position. On the question of military ties, however, the support is less certain, since only 40% of the respondents thinks that we should keep things as they are. In contrast to the broad

support for the maintenance of the status quo, only a tiny minority of the opinion leaders (4 to 6%) are prepared to give in to the position demanded by Peking, a position which would allow the US to maintain only "unofficial" ties with Taiwan in all three areas. It is significant to note, however, that a substantial number of the leaders polled (ranging from 38 to 52%) calls for flexibility and accommodation in negotiations to the extent that the essence of the security and peace of Taiwan can be guaranteed. Such sentiments are particularly strong in the realm of military ties, probably due to the general desire to minimize chances of US military entanglement abroad. It is worth noting, however, that among those who favor some adjustment and accommodation, the overwhelming majority (ranging from 69 to 76%) thinks that Washington should insist on the higher, rather than the lower, option of establishing a liaison office in Taipei instead of a consular office, maintaining formal security guarantees for Taiwan instead of giving informal assurances, and honoring all current economic and cultural treaties with the island instead of just selective agreements.

A comparison of our findings with those of Gallup, Harris, and other polls, which were discussed earlier, reveals one major difference. The opinion leaders' support for Taiwan is uniformly higher than the level of support given by the general public in virtually all the issue areas. Unfortunately, our questionnaire was not designed to probe in depth reasons for the respondents' choice of specific policy alternatives, due to the practical necessity of keeping the questionnaire reasonably short and concise. As a result, there is no systematic data to explain why the opinion leaders take such a strong pro-Taiwan stand. Approximately twenty unsolicited letters from respondents and about an equal number of telephone conversations with respondents provided some useful information for explaining the phenomena.

(1) All opinion leaders, regardless of their political persuasion or policy stance, are well informed in terms of the facts, issues, and policy options involved. They show a uniformly high level of personal interest and concern over the dilemma of normalization, and also assign great importance to the issue of Taiwan in US policy in Asia.

(2) The majority of the opinion leaders expressed regret over the fact that the process of normalization has been stalled. Without exception, though, they put the blame on the lack of progress on Peking's insistence on the "three conditions." Few leaders showed any firm confidence in the prospect that sufficient

strategic and economic benefits could be derived from a US-PRC rapprochement to justify acceptance of the "three conditions."

(3) In contrast, almost all the opinion leaders strongly emphasized the extensive role that the US has played in the last three decades in Taiwan's economic development, international trade and investments, and national defense. They stressed the concrete economic and strategic interests we have there as well as the moral obligations to the people in Taiwan we have incurred over the years. Some were quite critical of certain aspects of politics in Taiwan, but nearly everyone seemed to agree that it is not right to "abandon" friends or allies in times of need and crisis. There is strong consensus, however, that continued US support should be strictly restricted to the defense of the island from external threat or attack, and should absolutely not be given for offensive activities directed against the PRC.

### Summary and Conclusion

Despite some apparent similarities in form and content, the opinions of the general mass public and those of the opinion leaders are qualitatively different in nature and strength, especially in the area of foreign policy. The former, being highly uninformed and apathetic, are more easily subject to persuasion and manipulation. Lacking informed judgment, mass public opinion at best reflects the quality of political communications and leadership exercised by national policymakers. In contrast, the attitudes of the opinion leaders derive their strength from articulate judgments based on factual knowledge as well as the value orientations of that opinion elite. They are in general more stable and persistent. By virtue of the political offices and organizational positions they control, opinion leaders are in a strategic position to exert enormous influence on both the general public and on policy-makers, if they choose to do so. It is the articulate attitudes of the opinion elite, and not those of the mass public, that play a decisive role in ultimately affecting the nature and direction of foreign policy.

The strong stance in support of Taiwan expressed by the American opinion leaders surveyed stems clearly from their careful calculation of pragmatic interests as well as personal convictions. They are strongly committed to the stability and security of Taiwan, but they are not necessarily against "normalization" with the PRC. Thus, it is misleading to label the group as "opponents" of normalization. They seem to have reached the



firm conclusion that to normalize relations on the basis of the "three conditions" as demanded by Peking or in line with the "Japanese formula" involves too many uncertainties and risks for Taiwan, and is therefore not acceptable. The China policy which emerges from our survey is as follows: Washington should insist on the maintenance of all our current ties with and commitments to Taiwan as our principal negotiating position. However, if that position cannot succeed, our minimum fall-back position should be the reduction of our diplomatic representation in Taipei to the level of liaison office and the withdrawal of all US troops from Taiwan, while all other bilateral ties with Taiwan (security, economic and cultural) currently in force should be maintained. In view of this strong policy recommendation, the prospect for further progress in normalization would not be bright, unless Peking can be persuaded to modify its currently "non-negotiable" conditions.

From the perspective of American domestic politics, the fact that the opinion leaders are taking a stronger pro-Taiwan stand than the general public has significant practical implications for the Carter Administration. To begin with, the informed opinions and articulate judgments of the opinion leaders are, by nature, rather difficult to change. They cannot be remolded easily through public education or persuasion. Secondly, should a discrepancy emerge between the China policy ultimately adopted by the Administration and the judgment of the opinion elite, a major political controversy may erupt. Under such circumstances the opinion leaders may attempt to mobilize their organizational and leadership resources to compete against the President for public support of their own policy stand.<sup>12</sup> Such a clash may turn out to be politically costly to the President's various foreign and domestic programs. Finally, since any formula for normalization short of creating credible guarantees for the peace and security of Taiwan is bound to create vehement opposition from the opinion leaders, the challenging task at hand for the Carter Administration is now unmistakably clear: arriving at a formula which can achieve the dual objective of normalization with China and

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12. In recent months, for example, the organization known as Friends of Free China, under the leadership of such persons as John McCormack, Henry Luce III, Ronald Reagan and Barry Goldwater, has been playing an active role in mobilizing the public to support Taiwan. Many legislative leaders at the state and national levels have also sent messages to the Administration urging continued ties with Taiwan. The American public has also been encouraged by these leaders to write to President Carter to express its concerns over the issue.

protection for Taiwan, and conducting negotiations with Peking which allow for flexibility and mutual accommodation. Any ambiguous formula which lacks credible safeguards for Taiwan and which relies merely on the good will and promises of Peking will not satisfy opinion leaders and will not result in public support of such a policy.

#### Scalometer Ratings of China and Taiwan\*

Date	China (PRC)		Taiwan (ROC)	
	Favorable %	Unfavorable %	Favorable %	Unfavorable %
1967	5	91		
1972	23	71	53	38
1973	49	43		
1975	28	58	48	39
1976	20	73	55	34
1977	26	52	56	18

\* Data are all taken from Gallup polls. The 1975 poll was conducted by the Gallup Organization for the Chinese Information Service, and the 1977 poll for Potomac Associates. The "no opinion" responses are not shown here but obviously amount to the remaining percentage of respondents in each case.

## Diplomatic Ties With China &amp; Taiwan\*

Date	Establish Ties with China (PRC)		Continue Ties with Taiwan (ROC)		Derecognize Taiwan for Normalization with China		Source
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	
1971	%	%	%	%	%	%	Harris
1975	55	20	70	14	10	70	Gallup
1976	61	23			26	51	FPA
1977 (April)	64	18	68	19	33	53	FPA
1977 (April)	62	21	61	22	28	47	PA
1977 (August)	56	23	64	12	8	65	Gallup

\* It should be noted that wording for each question asked is not identical, but the contents are roughly comparable. Data from the Foreign Policy Association (FPA) polls are based on ballots cast by its study groups across the nation. The Potomac Associates (PA) poll was conducted by the Gallup Organization. The "no opinion" responses are not shown here but obviously amount to the remaining percentage of respondents in each case.

## Support Policies Leading Taiwan Toward Independence\*

Date	Favor	Oppose	Source
	%	%	
1976	69	15	FPA
1977 (April)	63	18	FPA
1977 (August)	75	11	Brown

## Provide Military Aid To Taiwan If Attacked\*

Date	Yes	No	Source
	%	%	
1971	41	45	PA
1973	27	54	Harris
1974	17	59	Harris
1975 (April)	35	54	Gallup
1975 (October)	47	31	Gallup
1977 (April)	43	40	FPA
1977 (April)	36	40	PA

\* The wording of the questions varies, but the contents are roughly comparable. The Brown data are from our own survey. The "no opinion" responses are not shown here but obviously amount to the remaining percentage of respondents in each case.

## Survey Sample Statistics

Organizational Category	Leadership Position	Participants	No. of Respondents	% of Respondents
U.S. Senate	Senator	100	31	31
U.S. House of Representatives	Representative	435	97	22
Democratic National Committee	Member	252	102	40
Republican National Committee	Member	112	68	61
State Governorships	Governor	50	16	32
State Legislative Leaders	President Pro Tempore and House Speaker	99 <sup>1</sup>	49	50
State Democratic Party Chairmen	Chairman	51 <sup>2</sup>	33	65
State Republican Party Chairmen	Chairman	51 <sup>3</sup>	28	55
Newspapers	Publisher and Editor	342 <sup>4</sup>	159	46
TV Stations	Executive Officer and News Director	308 <sup>5</sup>	150	49
Total		1801	733	41

<sup>1</sup> One state, Nebraska, has a unicameral state legislature with no Senate.

<sup>2</sup> Fifty states plus the District of Columbia.

<sup>3</sup> Fifty states plus the District of Columbia.

<sup>4</sup> Participating were 155 publishers and 187 editors (342 total) out of the 235 newspapers with a 1976 circulation of 50,000 or more. There were eighty publisher and 48 editor positions (or their equivalents) with these newspapers which were either vacant or nonexistent. Figures are from the 1976-1977 *SRDS Newspaper Circulation Analysis*.

<sup>5</sup> Participating were 163 executive officers and 145 news directors (308 total) out of the 174 TV stations which covered the top 50 percent of each of the 1976 Nielson Retail Index territory grouping markets. There were 11 executive officer and 29 news director positions (or their equivalents) with these TV stations which were either vacant or nonexistent. Figures are from the 1977 *Broadcast Yearbook*.

**Brown Survey of Opinion Leaders' Attitudes Toward  
US-China Normalization & Taiwan\***

Question	Favor %	Oppose %	No Opinion %
1. Accept the PRC's "3 demands" as the precondition for normalization	5	93	2
2. Pursue normalization without jeopardizing the "independence and freedom" of Taiwan	89	7	4
3. Continue to honor our diplomatic ties and defense treaty with Taiwan if it declares independence	75	11	14
	Agree %	Disagree %	No Opinion %
4. Taiwan can survive the PRC's economic and military pressure without outside aid	8	67	25
5. Unilateral U.S. disengagement from Taiwan would hurt our leadership and credibility in Asia	72	23	5
6. U.S. derecognition and disengagement from Taiwan may prompt Taiwan to seek Soviet aid and/or develop nuclear weapons	45	26	29

\* Conducted July-August, 1977. Data are based on returns from 733 respondents. Detailed information on the survey participants is given in the preceding table.

**Brown Survey On Minimum Policy Options  
That The US Should Take\***

Policy Options	Choice
	%
I. <i>Diplomatic Representations in Taiwan</i>	
I-A Maintain the present embassy	55
I-B Reduce representation to a liaison office	28
I-C Reduce representation to a consular office	11
I-D Reduce representation to an "unofficial" office	4
I-E No opinion	2
II. <i>Military Ties with Taiwan</i>	
II-A Maintain current security commitments and military presence	40
II-B Reduce commitments to formal security guarantees and provide military aid	36
II-C Reduce commitments to informal security assurances and provide arms sales	16
II-D Reduce commitments to arms sales only	6
II-E No opinion	2
III. <i>Treaty Relations with Taiwan</i>	
III-A Maintain all treaties (military, economic and cultural) currently in force	56
III-B Reduce relations to economic and cultural treaties only (concerning loans, nuclear fuel, investment guarantees, most-favored-nation tariff status, etc.)	29
III-C Reduce relations to selective economic and cultural agreements	9
III-D Reduce relations to trade relations only with no special or preferential arrangements	4
III-E No opinion	3

\* See the explanatory note for the preceding table.





## Chapter VI

### U.S. RELATIONS WITH CHINA IN THE POST-KISSINGERIAN ERA: A SENSIBLE POLICY FOR THE 1980s

JAMES C. HSIUNG\*

This chapter sets forth recommendations for United States policy toward China in the 1980s, which will affect our relations with not only the Chinese on the mainland but Taiwan as well. However, we can neither start from the premise that "normalization" of relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) has already taken place, nor that it has not. We therefore have to look into the 1980s from the perspective of present reality. I believe that Asian-Americans have a duty as well as a right to state their views and recommendations on an important part of U.S. foreign policy which is so dear to our hearts.

We accept the premise that "normalization" is a set policy. We are also mindful of the sentiments of the majority of the American public as revealed in a Gallup poll in 1977: While 56% of those polled favored "establishing diplomatic relations with mainland China," 64% favored "continuing relations with Nationalist China (Republic of China)." In this essay, however, we do raise the question: How do we get there from here? In other words, we have to address some basic questions such as: (a) How does China fit into the larger picture of American foreign policy? (b) What are the conditions we should be prepared to accept, and what minimum goals do we hope to achieve? (c) What strategy should we adopt, and what prior steps must be taken in negotiating with the Chinese? and (d) What should we do with respect to the 17 million people in Taiwan and to the future of the island?

#### U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Kissingerian Era

Current discussions on the question of U.S.-China relations focus on the bilateral level or on the context of the Sino-U.S.-Soviet tangle,

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\* This paper is a slightly revised version of a paper presented to the Asian American Assembly for Policy Research at the City College of New York in April 1977.

viewing China either as a possible counterweight against the Soviet Union or as an independent agent. But no foreign policy issue, no matter how important, can be properly analyzed without first being related to the ontology of the country's overall foreign policy needs in a given time period. To approach China as an entity in a bilateral or even triangular relationship is to compartmentalize knowledge and to blind us to the larger whole without which the parts have no true meaning.

We live in an era following the Nixon-Kissingerian opening to China and, more important, an era bequeathed with the Kissingerian legacy on the whole spectrum of American foreign policy. To put things in proper perspective, we must first of all take stock of what the Kissingerian legacy is, what some of its achievements and pitfalls are, and consequently what we should or should not do in the future. Only then can we set out to address the China question and ascertain how U.S. foreign policy interests can be advanced in our relations with that country.

By the Kissingerian "legacy" we mean what Henry A. Kissinger, first as America's chief foreign-policy adviser to the President and then as the Secretary of State, did or attempted to do in reshaping U.S. foreign policy. In this evaluation we are looking for a guide for the future.

The Kissingerian legacy probably can be best appraised by the tasks that Kissinger set for himself, which, as one commentator put it, were almost as monumental as those that Metternich and Castlereagh had undertaken. President Nixon and Kissinger took command of the foreign policy scene in Washington in 1969, at a time when the Cold War had come to an end and the new era required a drastically different scenario. Containment of Communism was to be abolished and replaced by the search for a stable structure of peace. This would be a structure in which mutual "reward" for good behavior between the superpowers (for not rocking the nuclear boat) would increasingly supplant "punishment" (nuclear massive retaliation) that had been the central concept in earlier strategic thinking. Peace would be a spin-off from this mutually rewarding system of interdependence, according to this plan. Confrontations would give way to negotiations in order to bring about a new detente with the Soviet Union. A snowballing effect of detente was anticipated so that the erstwhile zero-sum game, in which the foe's gain would be our loss, would become a mixed-sum game.

It was hoped that, as the two nuclear giants crossed swords in a military stand-off, constructive energies could be directed to building a new structure of interdependence in economic and other spheres. Ideally, when this new order was firmly established, the two superpowers would be involved in a deepening relationship in trade, resource exchange, and scientific and cultural cooperation to such an extent

that any attempt by one superpower to hurt the other would boomerang through the workings of the bonds of interdependence.

China was both a rationale and an "instrument" for U.S. efforts to initiate a detente. It was an instrument in the sense that U.S. rapprochement with Peking could be (and was) used to lure the Soviet Union into moderation. This part of the Kissingerian scenario was not lost on the Soviets, nor on the general public. It did produce the desired effect up to a point. What was often not realized, however, is the fact that China was a rationale for the detente policy itself. China's acquisition of an increasing nuclear capability by 1969 had called into question most prevailing deterrence calculations based on the previous dyadic assumptions. The entry of a third nuclear "spoiler" posed a number of questions. First, no longer was it possible to identify, with the same automatic certainty as before, the origin of a nuclear first-strike. A corollary to this nuclear anonymity problem was the danger of a catalytic war, triggered by an initial attack launched by a third power but simulated as coming from another source. Even when both these problems were resolved—and they were not irresolvable given time and the facility of satellite surveillance—another problem was more serious—i.e., what is known as the victor's inheritance. This meant that even if in a bilateral nuclear exchange one of the countries emerged as the victor, it would still have lost vis-a-vis the third power, whose nuclear arsenal remained intact.

This no-win situation greatly impaired the value of the prevailing strategic thinking on nuclear deterrence premised on the concept of "punishment." It gave a convincing reason why the concept of "reward" must be made an alternative pillar of the new age of detente. The entry of China into the world's nuclear club was, therefore, a rationale unto itself for the detente, although few people ever realized this.

So much for Kissinger's tasks and rationales for his detente scenario. How successful was he in implementing what he had set out to do? In the first place, while containment as a policy was abolished, the structure of peace he sought remains to be built from the flimsy foundation that was laid. The degree of interdependence required for the concept of mutual reward to work, as a self-enlightened guarantee of peace, would still take years to materialize. The defect in the Kissingerian blueprint of peace in this respect is that it fell into a tautology. It set out to build, bit by bit, an increasingly mutually dependent relationship between the superpowers (and with China) so that ultimately they would be so bound to each other, as in marriage, that they would not seek to hurt each other if it meant self-hurting as well. But, on the other hand, it proceeded to structure U.S.-Soviet relations as though the marriage was already in existence.

Because of the magnitude of the tasks Kissinger sought to accomplish, the diplomatic style he employed, with President Nixon's full

backing, was one of total concentration of initiatives and decision-making in the hands of the President and his chief foreign-policy adviser. Domestically this style caused strains and cleavages, while externally it resulted in the notorious lack of consultation with our allies when major policy shifts were made. The Japanese, who suffered the "Nixon shocks" in the sudden U.S. shift on China, reacted by recognizing the PRC just about half a year after President Nixon's trip to China in 1972. Japan has since been pursuing a foreign policy more independent of the U.S. than at any time since the end of World War II. In another respect, the OPEC nations took up the nonconsulting style of conducting international relations by announcing in 1973, without prior warning, an oil boycott against the oil-importing industrial West, the effects of which are still being felt today.

The snowballing effect of detente did not occur as its architect expected. In fact, neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union stopped seeking unilateral advantages by exploiting the other side's political weakness as it emerged. In the first place, Washington gleefully exploited the Sino-Soviet conflict to its own advantage. In the Middle East, the U.S. cashed in on Soviet setbacks as Moscow's relations with Egypt deteriorated after 1974. The Soviets, for their part, had a field day in Angola when Kissinger had his hands tied by Congressional refusal to get involved for fear of another Vietnam.

Kissingerian detente has not changed, nor will it change, Soviet over-all strategy, let alone transform the Soviet regime. Detente, we have learned from experience, will work only if and when the structure of interdependence has already come into existence, or at least when both superpowers share, with the same degree of conviction, a perceived common destiny. Much less will detente work by manipulating one of the two Communist giants against the other, as it will undercut the very conceptual foundation of detente, namely, mutual reward for good behavior, i.e., not rocking the boat. The same holds true if either the Soviet Union or China should attempt to play the other against the U.S. in return.

The conscious exploitation of the real or potential conflicts between the other two of the three principal actors in the U.S.-PRC-Soviet triangle would run afoul of the mutual reward maxim in the Kissingerian model. Yet this exploitation was what actually took place. The opening to China was a Kissingerian tactic to coerce the Soviets into detente with the U.S., taking advantage of the competitive nature of Sino-Soviet relations. Then in 1974 the U.S. turned around and tilted toward the Soviet Union, as though to placate the Soviets at the expense of the Chinese, by choosing Vladivostok for the Ford-Brezhnev meeting. Vladivostok is part of the territory that the Chinese claim was forcibly grabbed from them by the Tsarist government. This choice by the Soviets and the acceptance by the United States as the site for the annual ritual of detente summitry could have only ominous implications for the Chinese.

Just as the preoccupation with coercing the Soviets into greater moderation (such as accepting the SALT I agreements) had caused the U.S. to grant initial concessions to Peking, the resultant U.S.-Soviet detente at times also complicated China's relations with the United States. The prospect of bi-superpower "collusion" was seized upon as an ostensible reason for opposing rapprochement with Washington by leaders such as Lin Piao from 1969 through 1971 and the Chiang Ching group until its purge in October 1976. U.S. enthusiasts for detente with China have sanguinely focused on the impasse over Taiwan as the reason for the lack of progress in the "normalization" of relations with Peking, conveniently forgetting that the U.S. attempt to exploit Sino-Soviet animosity was at least one source of Chinese annoyance with the U.S. after 1975. As we shall argue later, the Chinese leaders attach far less importance to the Taiwan question than to the potency of the Soviet threat to China. The euphoria of SALT I and the honeymoon atmosphere generated in its wake between Washington and Moscow conceivably aroused greater concern for the Chinese than the non-settlement of the Taiwan question in U.S.-China relations.

The policy of first tilting to one and then the other of the two Communist giants was clearly Kissinger's personal choice, if not brain-child, as it fitted so well with his epical interest in balance of power. The tilting has not worked for the U.S., but has alternately alienated the Soviets (hence, the SALT II impasse) and the Chinese (trade reductions with the U.S. in 1975-1976 and a return to militant rhetoric in 1976). The tilting game has served Japan well for two important reasons, neither of which is found in the U.S. case. First, Japan as a sub-superpower has tilted defensively, that is, tried not to offend either Moscow or Peking to the point of losing either's good will. Secondly, for cultural, ethnic, and geographic reasons, Japan has consistently leaned slightly toward China, despite its avowed "equidistance" policy. The superpower role of the U.S. does not allow it to play a mere defensive game. Instead, the U.S. must take the initiative to find solutions to the Korean question, Japan's continued security, peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific basin, global power equilibrium, counteracting Soviet nuclear ascendancy, etc. Unlike Japan, the United States cannot consistently side with Peking, which not only seeks the "return" of Taiwan, but wants us to be a quasi-ally against the Soviet Union. The United States cannot lose its flexibility and cannot be so cornered because of our preoccupation with the bigger obstacle posed by Moscow to U.S. global interests. The lack of progress on "normalization" is but an indication of the limits of what the tilting game can do for the United States.

From this evaluation of the Kissingerian legacy, a few clues for what we should or should not do in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy become clear. First, we should not expect the world to jump from the demise of the Cold War era, which spawned the now discarded containment policy, to a "stable structure of peace" within the span of a few

years. Such a new structure by Kissinger's own account has to depend on a common code of conduct accepted by states of opposing ideologies, so no instant leaps should be expected. We should think in terms of what conditions prevail in the interim, over a long process of mutual adjustments. In shaping our foreign policy, we should take intermediate measures, not final and definitive steps purported to lead to perpetual peace. Similarly, in our China policy, we should not look for once-and-for-all solutions, but should adopt a step-by-step approach.

Second, in the conduct of foreign policy, we must not fail to consult our allies, especially on important issues affecting our mutual interests. In our future relations with China, we must do more consulting than before with our European and Asian allies, particularly Japan. We must also maintain our credibility as an ally while seeking better relations with our adversaries.

Third, we should not expect that any action on our part, either through coercion or concessions, will significantly alter Soviet or Chinese overall strategy and policy goals. We have to realize that both the Soviet Union and the PRC, like the U.S., are sufficiently strong and determined to pursue an independent foreign policy of their own. Tactical shifts may be induced but, as we have learned from the Kissingerian record, basic policy transformation by outside inducements (even the sacrifice of Taiwan) is most unlikely. Exploitation of Sino-Soviet animosity may actually boomerang and should not be carried too far. If any have lingering doubts on this, one need only conjecture what will happen if either China or the Soviet Union should attempt to change our own basic policy through manipulating our bilateral relations with the other Communist country.

Fourth, after Kissinger, amoral realism should be reviewed. We should not pretend, any more than in strategic disarmament, that if we disarm ourselves morally first, our foes will do likewise. The kind of snowballing effect anticipated from detente was based on the conviction that nations in ideological disagreement were rational enough to pursue what Kissinger perceived to be mutual practical interests. The same assumption regarding the self-evident truth of practical interests explained Kissinger's initial failures to consult allies and to rally domestic support through persuasion. In our future policy toward China, as in our foreign policy in general, we should make no such assumptions. Amoral realism must be carefully avoided.

### *Sino-U.S. Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy*

We have already stressed that foreign policy is a coherent web and that no single issue can be comprehended in isolation. The question of Sino-U.S. relations will be discussed here in conjunction with a few important related issues facing the United States, even assuming that recognition of Peking is no longer in question: (a) the extent to which

we will take our Asian and European allies into our confidence in dealings with China; (b) the posture we should take in regard to the U.S.-China-Soviet triangular relationship; (c) the obstacles that impede or thwart any significant expansion in Sino-U.S. trade and other relations; (d) the quid pro quo which the United States expects and should insist on from the PRC, and conversely what we should not expect; and (e) the future of Taiwan and present U.S. commitments to its security.

Both our European and Asian allies, and especially Japan, have serious concerns over what the U.S. will do regarding its relations with China. For them any action by the U.S. that will either lead to a significant shift in the existing balance in Soviet troop deployment in Europe and Asia or will create an unduly sharp competition in trade and technology sales to China will upset their interests. For Japan, any precipitous U.S. move in regard to the PRC and Taiwan that will affect the stability in the Asia-Pacific region will be grave cause for alarm. On the other hand, America's ability to deal with Moscow and Peking will be strengthened by a sound U.S.-Japan partnership. Japan, for its part, wants to continue its "special relations" with the U.S. because these ties strengthen its hands in maintaining a balance with China and the Soviet Union. There is considerable harmony between U.S. and Japanese policies toward the two Communist countries.

Japan has thus far leaned slightly toward China although it has been playing a tilting game between the two powerful Communist neighbors. Its relations with China over time will probably be closer than those with the Soviet Union both because of greater cultural affinity, geographic proximity, and widespread domestic fear and distrust of the Soviet Union, and because of Moscow's ineptitude and insensitivity in its dealings with Tokyo. Japan's speedy recognition of the PRC in 1972, which in part was a symbolic protest to the "Nixon shocks," has opened new avenues for Japan in its foreign policy repertory, but Tokyo has also been able to restore relations with Washington to the level enjoyed before the falling out of Premier Sato and President Nixon. Tokyo seems to enjoy the benefits of its full diplomatic relations with Peking, and to have a special interest of sorts in the current state of U.S.-China relations. Partly for this reason and partly because Tokyo believes a continued U.S. military presence is necessary for the stability of the Asia-Pacific area, Japan is openly negative toward a U.S. duplication of the so-called Japanese formula used in its "normalization" of relations with China (and hence the future of Taiwan).

Under the Japanese formula, Japan was able to switch its recognition from the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan to the PRC and to maintain "private" commercial relations with the former. The Japanese are on record that this formula could work only because Japan had no defense commitments to Taiwan and, more important, the U.S. was shoring up the defenses of South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. Japan

seems desirous of maintaining some sort of an equilibrium, if not strict balance, between Taiwan and China. Looking forward to its own foreign policy needs in the 1980s, the U.S. must take these calculations and sensibilities of our allies under serious consideration. Foreign policy, of course, should not be made by listening to our allies only, but it would be less than wise if anything we do to accommodate to our foes should upset our relations with our allies.

On the question of the posture to be taken with respect to China and the Soviet Union, we have to consider the likely trend in Sino-Soviet affairs. Opinions are divided on whether the existing feud between the two Communist giants will continue now that Mao is dead, or whether a detente between them is likely to develop. In evaluating the Kissingerian legacy, we already noted the reason why the alternate tilting to Moscow and Peking had not worked for us. Theoretically, a U.S. policy of actively supporting Peking against Moscow could conceivably make the latter more accommodating to us in an effort to keep Sino-U.S. relations from becoming stronger than those between Washington and Moscow. The various kinds of support we can give to Peking, as has been suggested in scholarly discussions, include granting it preferential trade status (denied to Moscow), selling China military-related technology and weapons, supporting China's position in the Sino-Soviet conflict, and cooperating diplomatically with China against Moscow on a wider spectrum of issues. However, as long as the overall Sino-Soviet hostility continues at its present level, U.S. intervention in the form of active support to the PRC would most likely provoke reactive measures from Moscow which may not have desirable consequences for the United States. An intensification in Sino-Soviet and Soviet-U.S. rivalry could result, thus reducing the chances of further agreements on arms limitation or cooperation in potential trouble spots such as Korea. This will be a high-risk policy for the United States since our relations with Moscow thus far are more crucial than our relations with Peking.

"Tilting" may be adroitly played to our advantage only when Sino-Soviet relations are improving but have not yet reached the rapprochement stage. The irony in this is that once Sino-Soviet relations have improved, there will be no physical reason for us to intervene because there will be no room for manipulation and, furthermore, the uncertainty of another round of disequilibrium may not necessarily be to our benefit.

In any event, the most sensible posture for the U.S. to take in its policy toward China, as it relates to U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union, is to maintain an honest openness and neutrality regarding Sino-Soviet rivalry. Barring unforeseen circumstances that will tip the existing strategic balance in the international system, the United States will be best advised to maintain an evenhanded policy toward both Communist countries. But evenhandedness does not mean the auto-



matic application of certain preset standards of equidistance, since the Chinese and the Soviets have different developmental needs and possess different capabilities.

Looking at the triangle in another way, it may not be a disaster for the U.S. to see the present power configuration continue for some time—i.e., two superpowers with a weaker China that feels threatened by Soviet power. In this situation, China is likely to be more friendly to the United States, whereas we need only to worry about the Soviet competition. Once China has reached parity or near-parity with the Soviet Union, however, the Soviet threat will of course diminish, both physically and in the perception of the Chinese leadership. China will then no longer be expected to be as closely disposed to the U.S. as it is now. The U.S. will have to face the reality of not one, but two Communist superpowers. The task for us will be even more onerous if either or both Communist superpowers feel confident enough to pursue an uncooperative course toward the United States. An evenhanded policy by the U.S. that will not disturb the existing power balance, at the present stage, is probably the best thing to do.

Among the obstacles to wider Sino-U.S. trade and other relations, not all are of U.S. making and hence not all are capable of solution by Washington. The Taiwan question is one of the obstacles, but not the only one and not even an insurmountable one. Other obstacles include the frozen assets/claims issue, the lack of direct commercial banking relations between the two countries, and Peking's own closed mentality, which manifests itself in many ways.

The total amount of Chinese assets frozen in the U.S. since 1949 under the Treasury's Foreign Assets Control Regulations is estimated at \$70–75 million (the figure obviously does not cover the scattered assets bequeathed by Chinese-American decedents to legatees in mainland China, which have been blocked by the same regulations.) On the other hand, the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission has approved 378 awards in the total amount of \$196,309,559.33 to American claimants whose properties in China were seized by the PRC authorities. While the frozen Chinese assets and outstanding American claims against Peking are expected to be resolved eventually, the PRC seems to hold off a settlement until the "normalization" problem has been resolved in a manner satisfactory to them.

The stalemate in the claims/frozen assets issue has forestalled the establishment of direct commercial banking links with China, since any Chinese assets found on American soil before the outstanding private American claims are satisfied are open to attachment procedures. These restrictions on broader commercial relations between the two countries cannot be resolved by unilateral action. On the other hand, at least two restrictions—the prohibition of Eximbank financing and the lack of most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment for Chinese sales to this country—are tied to the Jackson-Vanik amendment barring

credits and MFN to countries that restrict the freedom of immigration, and hence theoretically can be removed by U.S. action. However, since the Jackson-Vanik amendment applies to the Soviet Union as well as the PRC, we should not consider unilaterally freeing the Chinese from its constraints without first examining the desirability of this obvious break with an even-handed policy and the reaction the break would provoke from the Soviets.

Peking's closed mentality still haunts visitors from the West, who are restricted to a 15-mile radius from the heart of the Chinese capital. Bilateral cultural and scientific exchanges with the U.S. have thus far been one-sided, with few return trips by Chinese counterparts. Chinese leaders are reluctant to seek long-term loans abroad, or give assurances on nonmilitary use of advanced technological equipment, or to permit American inspection within China of such equipment. Part of this closed mentality is due to China's limited exposure to the external world, and part is a result of China's inward-looking policy of self-sufficiency and self-reliance. Until this obstacle is removed or mitigated, it will affect efforts at expanding Sino-U.S. relations at various levels.

We turn to the question of a quid pro quo. On the surface, a reasonable expectation would be that a rough measure of reciprocity should reign in the bilateral relations between the U.S. and China. On closer examination, reciprocity may have to be defined quite flexibly because the two countries have drastic cultural, political, and economic differences. The U.S. should not, in the name of reciprocity, for instance, return ideological invectives for the harsh Chinese rhetoric denouncing America as an imperialist power. On the other hand, the Chinese may feel that their relations with us since 1971 have resulted in trade surpluses in our favor (at an 8 to 1 ratio) and other benefits for the United States, whereas the things they purchased, including technology, could have been obtained from Japan, West Germany, and elsewhere.

China's total foreign trade volume, about \$15 billion a year, has been deliberately maintained at about 7% of its GNP. This compares to 7% for the Soviet Union, 10% for the United States, and 22% for Japan. It is unlikely that China's foreign trade capability will drastically change in volume. Though transfer of certain kinds of trade with other countries to the United States is possible, we should not anticipate any substantive gains from a "normalization" with the PRC. If normalization is to materialize, it is not because of any immediate substantive returns, but rather because it is dictated by the *principle* that all nations on earth must open their diplomatic doors to others and endeavor together to coexist in peace, at no one's expense. If one looks for gains as a rationale for improving relations with Peking, one has to remember that U.S. trade with Taiwan in 1976 stood at \$4.8 billion—thirteen times the \$350-million trade between the U.S. and the PRC for the same year—and that it makes good business sense not to upset

our existing ties with Taiwan. This principle also dictates that we not sacrifice Taiwan to gain favor with Peking.

If we justify everything we do on the ground of the benefits it brings, then we cannot blame the Chinese for calculating in the same way. If we offer inducements to the Chinese because we need them on our side in dealing with the Soviets, then we cannot blame the Chinese for having an appetite for more unilateral inducements, including concessions on Taiwan. Peking deliberately turned away from the U.S. market in 1975–1976 to other industrial countries to signal its displeasure over the lack of progress on “normalization.” This move was a logical consequence of the competitive nature of the game played by the U.S. with China and the Soviet Union.

The point here is that we should not be alarmed by the lack of reciprocity, or appreciation thereof, for what we have done for the Chinese. We should instead be prepared to redress the balance in our approach to the Chinese. Rather than overemphasizing material gains, even in the name of mutuality, we should tell the Chinese that we understand their interests and expectations, but we have a certain minimum of our own, and that we will accommodate them the best we can but they must also accept our minimum needs and demands. Without going into detail, our minimum demands should include the following:

- (1) That the PRC pledge to cooperate in the limitation and reduction of strategic armaments; and to respect human rights domestically;
- (2) That Peking not individually or in concert engage in activities that will jeopardize the existing stability and strategic equilibrium in the Asia-Pacific region;
- (3) That disputes with neighboring countries (including territorial claims) be settled by peaceful means; and
- (4) That the PRC refrain from seeking to change the status quo in the Taiwan area by the threat or use of force, and pledge to honor an agreement to accept a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question, to be worked out by the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

While gains and their calculations can never be ruled out (nor should they be completely ruled out) from policy formulation, the point here is that we should give *principle* (including morality) an equal chance of being made an anchor of U.S. foreign policy and the cornerstone of U.S.-China relations.

The Taiwan question is inextricably related to our China policy. Since we cannot speculate when “normalization” with Peking is to be resolved, we have to discuss the Taiwan question as we see it today. The Carter Administration is still groping for a way to resolve the dilemma from the President’s dual campaign commitment to normalize relations with Peking and to insure the security of the people in

Taiwan. This is all the more reason why the Taiwan question must be part of our scenario for future relations with the PRC. Essentially, the Taiwan issue complicates our recognition of the PRC. Even discounting our continued recognition of Taiwan, there is another problem arising from our acceptance in the Shanghai communique of Taiwan being part of "China." Whichever regime we recognize as the government of China will therefore have legal title to the island. The discrepancy between legal title and political reality will begin to haunt us after the U.S. switch in recognition. Because we have committed ourselves to the security of the people of Taiwan, we must take measures so that our withdrawal of recognition from the ROC will not result in the immediate political, military, and economic collapse of the island, since this would have far-reaching effects on the Asia-Pacific basin.

When the U.S. switches its recognition to Peking, three cardinal questions arise in regard to Taiwan. First, Taiwan becomes an unrecognized entity, even though it continues its separate existence as before. In U.S. practice and legislation, an unrecognized regime is usually assumed to possess an "unfriendly" character and hence is not entitled to certain amenities or privileges enjoyed by recognized (i.e., "friendly") countries. Second, with the withdrawal of recognition, the status of the existing treaties between the ROC and the United States is in doubt, throwing the bilateral relations into legal and practical chaos. Third, as Peking is recognized as the sole legal government of China, and as Taiwan is part of the China which Peking now legally represents, Taiwan becomes a possession, dominion, or protectorate of "China," which then falls under the heading of "Communist countries" under U.S. domestic law. Under the Trading with the Enemy Act and other legislation, a Taiwan so labeled will cease to enjoy certain rights and privileges it now enjoys, such as weapons sales, OPIC insurance, etc., unless otherwise provided for by new legislation. Remedial measures must therefore precede a "normalization," which involves a switch in U.S. recognition to Peking.

To the people of Taiwan, our talks of "normalization" of relations with Peking have direct consequences for their survival. To Peking, Taiwan is important, but the degree of importance has varied with the internal political (partisan) shifts over time. At the peak of radical activism during the Cultural Revolution, the Taiwan question seemed a crucial obstacle to any improvement in China's relations with the United States. Again, in the summer of 1976, during Senator Hugh Scott's visit in China, then Vice Premier Chang Ch'un-ch'iao (now purged as one of the "gang of four") intimated a possible violent military solution to the question. These instances of radical rhetoric notwithstanding, the fact is that Peking did not let the Taiwan issue stand in the way of Nixon's visit to China in 1971, nor the inauguration of a new era of detente in Sino-U.S. relations.

Among the policy issues commanding Peking's attention, the Tai-

wan question probably has never ranked first in priority. Official confirmation that the threat of the Soviet Union far outweighs the Taiwan impasse was given in an extremely important speech by Keng Piao, Director of the International Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. In a speech on August 24, 1976 (known to the outside only recently), Keng Piao stressed Peking's policy of shelving its differences with the U.S. in order to cope with the far more serious threats of Soviet aggression. The dispute with the United States over Taiwan, he stated, was only a secondary issue. "Even if Chinese-United States relations were normalized," he declared, "it would still be impossible to liberate Taiwan immediately."

Most noteworthy here is Peking's acceptance of the separability of "normalization" of relations with the U.S. and the future settlement of the Taiwan issue. It means that Peking is unlikely to let the Taiwan issue stand in the way of normalizing relations with Washington, and is willing to accept the continued separate existence of Taiwan—pending future settlement—even after full diplomatic relations have been established. Earlier some Chinese leaders had demanded three conditions for "normalization"—U.S. recognition of the PRC, termination of the U.S. defense treaty with Taiwan, and withdrawal of remaining U.S. forces from the island. The omission of conditions in Keng Piao's speech (though not in recent Chinese official statements for external consumption after the purge of the "gang of four") probably reveals to us what may be considered Peking's bottom price for "normalization." Why should the U.S. offer more than the Chinese have asked for?

There are different opinions in the U.S. on what to do with Taiwan in the event of "normalization" of relations between this country and the PRC. Conservatives are opposed to any hasty drive that would "sell out" our Taiwan ally. Liberal moderates favor recognition of Peking but want to assure Taiwan's security. Liberals on the left prefer to leave Taiwan's future to its own ability to survive while we proceed to switch recognition to the PRC. The radical left, of course, insists that Taiwan must be "returned" to the PRC as part of the normalization agreement between Washington and Peking. A majority of the American public, however, is opposed to abandoning Taiwan in the event of "normalization" with Peking, according to 1975 opinion polls.

In view of Peking's explicit willingness to separate the Taiwan question from the "normalization" question, one cannot but wonder what is the ulterior motive of those who insist that the Taiwan issue must be resolved (i.e., abolishing our security commitments) before full diplomatic relations can be established between Washington and Peking. We find the argument disturbing for yet another reason. Those who have attempted to have us abandon Taiwan have consistently ignored or downgraded the island's importance. Taiwan has extensive ties with the United States and its importance cannot be dwarfed by the sheer size of mainland China. The island's trade with the United

States in 1976, as we pointed out before, was thirteen times U.S. trade with the PRC for the same year. As of December 1975, Taiwan had loans and guarantees outstanding in the amount of more than \$1.7 billion, making it the largest customer of the Eximbank after Brazil. There are now thirteen U.S. banks represented on the island. Total U.S. investment in various industries in Taiwan was \$476 million as of July 1976. There was a maximum contract value of OPIC (Overseas Private Insurance Corporation) insurance totalling \$132 million. Taiwan's security, therefore, has tremendous value for these and other U.S. interests on the island.

Moreover, in an age when ground-based missiles are targetable by satellite reconnaissance and vulnerable to enemy first-strike destruction, the growing reliance on submerged missile submarines has driven the superpowers to scramble for the control of the sea. Even little Diego Garcia has attained strategic value to the United States. How much more valuable is Taiwan—once dubbed the “13,000-square-mile unsinkable carrier”—linking the East and the South China Seas and the Western Pacific? Taiwan in friendly hands is vital to the U.S. interest of retaining a balance of power in that region because it is a trump card the United States has over Peking for cooperative behavior. In considering Taiwan's future, furthermore, one should never summarily discount the possibility of its opting to go nuclear and/or to court a relationship with the Soviet Union. Either option or a combination of both would have disastrous consequences, and for that reason Japan is worried over the eventuality of a U.S. abandonment of Taiwan.

### *U.S. Strategy of “Normalization”*

In pondering what the process of “normalizing” relations with the PRC entails for the United States, four questions come to mind. First, what is “normalization” *for*? Diplomatic recognition per se is, of course, not the only issue. The United States recognizes Cuba, but that says nothing about the state of relations existing between the two countries. “Normalization,” therefore, has to mean something beyond recognition—i.e., the inauguration of full diplomatic relations and the expansion of commercial and other relations. The next question is: What are the *obstacles*? We have already noted that Taiwan is only one of the obstacles, but not the only one. Paradoxically, the Taiwan question can await a future settlement quite separately from the establishment of diplomatic relations, and Peking has already indicated its willingness to accept this separate approach. The other obstacles, such as the frozen assets/claims issue, the restrictions imposed by the Jackson-Vanik amendment, and the closed mentality of the Chinese leadership must be resolved first before much expansion of relations is possible. The third question is: What is *in it* for the U.S. when “normalization” takes place? We have already pointed out that very little in terms of quid

pro quo can be expected, at least in the foreseeable future. The final question concerns our *strategy*, or a scenario of the steps the U.S. must take in preparation for "normalization," which we shall now discuss.

Three things stand out in regard to strategy. First, what kind of formula should we adopt, among the vast spectrum of alternatives, in handling the status of Taiwan upon our switch in recognition to Peking? Second, how specific or how ambiguous an agreement on "normalization" should we work out with the Chinese? And third, to what length should the U.S. go in domestic law to redefine its relations with Taiwan after withdrawal of recognition?

*What formula?* The "two Germanies" formula, although desirable to Taiwan, will most probably violate the letter and spirit of the Shanghai communique—in which the U.S. acquiesced in the notion that only "one China" exists—so it will be futile to expect Peking to accept it. The "Philippine formula" of complete break in diplomatic and other relations with Taiwan once the PRC is recognized will not be in U.S. interests. The "Japanese formula" will not be sufficient to accommodate U.S. commitments to the security of Taiwan. The Japanese can maintain "private" relations with the ROC because Japan has had no defense commitments or military ties with the island. Besides, the Japanese have always counted on a continued U.S. role in guaranteeing peace and stability in the region. Another way is to reduce our relations with Taiwan after withdrawal of recognition to the consular level. But this will leave the U.S. ill-equipped to handle the kind of relations we wish to maintain, let alone to cope with any deterioration that might have destabilizing effects in the region.

To assure us the greatest possible flexibility and not to foreclose our options, the best possible formula—and this we can properly call the "American formula"—will be to switch our Embassy from Taipei to Peking and the Liaison Officer from Peking to Taipei, and at the same time continue consular relations as currently maintained between the U.S. and the ROC (Taiwan). Since this formula does not foreclose any future settlement of the Taiwan question for the PRC, and since the Liaison Office arrangement is currently in use between Washington and Peking, there is no compelling reason why the "American formula" (or, for that matter, "Chinese formula"?) in reverse will not be acceptable to Peking's leaders.

*Agreement with Peking:* On the question of how specific an agreement we should work out with the Chinese regarding "normalization," we should neither doggedly push for specificity beyond our capacity of foreseeing the likely outcomes from the future course of events, nor insist on unduly vague language that will leave too many things dangling. To be fair to both sides, the agreement should be at least no less specific than the Shanghai communique, but probably not much

more specific, considering the highly delicate issues at stake. The use of unilateral declarations by either side stating its differences can be repeated, as in the Shanghai communique, when they are found to be irreconcilable and when it is deemed unwise to conceal them.

In addition to leaving the future of Taiwan to a settlement by the "Chinese themselves," as stated by the U.S. in the Shanghai document, the new agreement should contain an understanding on peace and stability in Korea and in the Asia-Pacific region. The tenets in the Pacific Doctrine proclaimed by President Ford on December 7, 1975, can provide a basis for such an understanding. In addition, the principle of self-determination and respect for human rights should be included in the agreement, at least in our unilateral declarations in the document.

In any event, the U.S. should seek a solution that: (a) will not prejudice the future settlement of Taiwan by the "Chinese themselves"; (b) will not discredit the United States in the eyes of friends and foes alike; and (c) will not harm U.S. interests in Asia or divide opinion at home. More specifically, pending a future peaceful solution, we should not abandon the 16 million people in Taiwan and should seek to provide a climate and structure in which a power balance can be maintained in the area. We should not do anything that will tip the scale and prejudice the chance or direction of a future settlement by peaceful means.

We should answer each of the three PRC demands in regard to "normalization" specifically and forcefully. On the question of recognition, our answer should be that our recognition of the PRC will not foreclose our accepting Taiwan as a continuing "friendly de facto entity" so far as U.S. internal laws are concerned, until such time as a permanent solution is found "by the Chinese themselves." On the defense treaty with Taiwan, we should note that the likelihood of a lapse of this and other treaties upon U.S. recognition of Peking (hence, withdrawal of recognition from Taipei) does not ipso facto vitiate U.S. commitments to the security of the people of Taiwan, as President Carter has pledged. We may assure the Chinese that in return for our defense commitments the authorities on Taiwan are expected to pledge not to steer the island into a course of perpetual independence from the rest of China. With respect to U.S. troop withdrawals, we can tie our pledge to complete the withdrawals to an explicit commitment from Peking not to use force in the Taiwan strait but to seek a peaceful settlement for the island's future.

Just as the Chinese have lumped their three conditions in a package, we also treat them as a package. If these terms are acceptable to Peking, we shall proceed to "normalize" relations, or else we should be in no hurry. Peking should be on notice that on these matters our patience will match theirs.



*U.S.-Taiwan Relations:* When the U.S. withdraws recognition from Taiwan, the legal limbo created will require special legislative action by Congress to overcome many of the problems arising from the uncertainty of the preexisting bilateral treaties and the change in Taiwan's status (as part of "China") under U.S. laws. Most problems converge on Taiwan's continued eligibility for certain benefits such as OPIC insurance, most-favored nation treatment, arms sales under the Foreign Military Sales Act, military assistance under the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act (ISAAEC) of 1976, immigration quota, etc. One way to handle the legal limbo is for the U.S. government to enumerate which of the treaties have or have not lapsed and, in the case of lapsed treaties, to introduce legislative amendments in Congress to fill the legal lacunae when necessary. Similarly, Washington can enumerate which of the existing laws, as opposed to treaties, are or are not affected by the withdrawal of recognition. An easier alternative, however, is for Washington to declare that "unless otherwise explicitly stipulated" all existing treaties and legislation before the withdrawal of recognition shall continue to apply to the ROC on Taiwan, and then list the ones that the government wishes to modify or terminate. Where legislative action is required, a simple formula can be used in a blanket Congressional resolution that reads like this:

Whereas the United States is determined to normalize its relations with the People's Republic of China and recognize the latter as the sole legal government of China; and

Whereas the United States shall adhere to the spirit and letter of the Shanghai Communique signed between the two countries on February 27, 1972; and

Whereas it is the wish of the United States to maintain peace and security in the Taiwan area until such time when the island's future is definitively resolved: Therefore be it

*Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

(a) That the United States, for domestic legal and judicial purposes, shall, upon recognizing the People's Republic of China, continue to treat the Republic of China on Taiwan as a friendly political entity as though it enjoyed de facto recognition, at least until a peaceful settlement of the island's future has been reached by the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait; and

(b) That as a friendly entity as such, the Republic of China shall continue to enjoy the privileges, rights, and conveniences or courtesies as it has enjoyed, prior to the United States recognition of the People's Republic, pursuant to bilateral treaties, domestic legislation, and executive decrees and regulations, except as modified, altered, terminated and/or amended as follows: . . .

Such a formula will be more parsimonious than the alternative of enumerating one by one which treaties or laws have lapsed or else fallen into disuse. At the same time, it allows the U.S. enough flexibility to make future adjustments when necessary.

### *Concluding Remarks from an Asian-American Perspective*

We have approached the question of U.S. policy toward China in the 1980s from a review of the challenges to U.S. foreign policy in the post-Kissingerian era. We have noted that we should avoid some of the mistakes or misconceptions made before. We should not, for example, pretend that a once-and-for-all solution can be found to all our outstanding foreign policy problems, the China question included. We should not, to be more exact, pretend that we can find a cut-and-dried answer to the Taiwan impasse overnight, or through bilateral efforts between Washington and Peking, as though the wishes of the people on the island do not matter. Even Peking today accepts the stark reality that the settlement of the Taiwan issue and the "normalization" of relations with the U.S. are two separable matters. In this regard, we should and can take a step-by-step approach, leaving the final settlement of Taiwan's future to the "Chinese themselves," as we stated in the Shanghai communique.

We have noted the danger of not consulting our major allies when crucial decisions are made. More than ever before, we must heed the wishes and interests of Japan, among others, on our future relations with China. A continued U.S.-Japan partnership will strengthen our hands in dealing with China and the Soviet Union. We should take into account Japan's opposition to our duplicating the so-called Japanese formula and the reasons behind it. Another lesson learned from the Kissingerian legacy is that we should not expect any action on our part to alter drastically the course of Chinese or Soviet overall policy. The Chinese, furthermore, are not expected to change their foreign trade capacity in the foreseeable future, any more than their self-reliant policy and closed mentality. For these and other reasons, we have argued that we should not base our China policy on over-optimistic estimates of what we shall gain from China once full diplomatic relations are established. There is no reason to expect that sacrificing Taiwan will offer enough inducement to Peking to change its basic policy toward us or the Soviet Union. If it is in Peking's interest to cultivate better relations with the U.S. because of its fear of the Soviets, it needs no inducement from us to implement that policy. If Peking is inclined otherwise, any inducement from the U.S. will not change that policy. In other words, if "normalization" is to come about, it should not be premised on immediate gains for us, but instead on what is good for long-term U.S. interests and what is appropriate for us in terms of our principles and moral commitments.

We have suggested that as a *quid pro quo* for "normalization" we should require the PRC to pledge to cooperate in the limitation and reduction of strategic armaments, and to undertake not to disrupt the peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. We have recommended a flexible evenhanded policy toward the PRC and the Soviet Union. Instead of a "tilting" policy of trying to influence Sino-Soviet relations by throwing our weight behind one or the other of the two Communist giants, a wiser stance is to maintain a measure of aloofness. A continuance in the present power configuration, with a relatively weak China between two superpowers, may not be undesirable, or less desirable than having to face two Communist superpowers once China has ascended to a position of parity with the Soviet Union. Until a final settlement of the Taiwan issue, the U.S. should endeavor to maintain a power equilibrium in the Taiwan area by pursuing an evenhanded policy toward the two contending Chinese regimes.

As Asian-Americans we are particularly keen on the aspirations of the 16 million people in Taiwan. If we in the U.S. cannot help them achieve their aspirations, the least we can do is not to create a condition where they do not even have a choice other than that of being taken over forcibly by Peking. President Carter has pledged to continue U.S. commitments to the security of the people in Taiwan, and we commend him for it. We support the opinion of the majority of the American public, as revealed in opinion polls, that we should not abandon Taiwan out of any eagerness to establish full diplomatic relations with Peking. We believe that the security of the island is in the U.S. interest at the present stage and that our China policy should be so guided by the conviction.

At one point, we suggested that, after Kissinger, amoral realism should be critically reviewed. Contrary to Kissinger's assumptions, we are persuaded that there are no self-evident practical interests unless judged in accord with our moral conviction. In this respect, we commend President Carter's high regard for moral principles in foreign policy. As Asian-Americans we urge the U.S. never to waiver in its moral conviction in dealings with China or any other country.

Earlier we alluded to the Pacific Doctrine formulated in President Ford's December 7, 1975 speech in Hawaii. The Doctrine called "American strength" basic to any stable balance of power in the Pacific, and defined the partnership with Japan as a "pillar" of our Asia policy. In addition to "normalization" with Peking and U.S. stakes in Southeast Asian stability, the Doctrine postulated a few other premises, none more important than the belief that peace in Asia depended upon a resolution of outstanding political conflicts, including the Korean problem, and upon a "structure of economic cooperation reflecting aspirations of all the peoples in the region." American trade with east Asia, it was noted, now exceeded our transactions with the European community, and America's jobs, currency, and raw materials depended

more than ever before upon economic ties with the Pacific basin.

We are in accord with the major tenets of the Pacific Doctrine, especially its comprehensive outlook on east Asia and the Pacific as an inseparable web both unto itself and in its ever-growing interdependent relationship with the United States. As Asian-Americans we maintain that these tenets should remain as the conceptual bases for our Asia policy in general and our China policy in particular. Looking into the 1980s, our China policy should not fail to appreciate our growing interdependence as a nation with our Asian-Pacific partners, and to recognize that the latter's security and stability is crucial to our own interests. As the importance of the Asia-Pacific community grows, we believe that any sensible policy must place the China question (including Taiwan) within that larger community context. As Asian-Americans we think we have a particular perspective to bring to the public's discourses on U.S. foreign policy.

## Chapter VII

### THE JAPANESE FORMULA FOR NORMALIZATION AND ITS RELEVANCE FOR U.S. CHINA POLICY

JAMES WILLIAM MORLEY

#### THE COMMUNIQUE OF SEPTEMBER 29, 1972

It has been suggested that the "Japanese formula" may serve the United States to unblock its relations with the People's Republic of China. Presumably what is meant is that the terms of the Japan-PRC Joint Communiqué and accompanying statements of September 29, 1972, which established diplomatic relations between Japan and the PRC as of September 29, be taken as a model for the U.S. Government in seeking to normalize its own relationship with the People's Republic of China.

The explicit terms of that settlement which are of particular interest are those relating to Taiwan and to various outstanding economic issues. The Taiwan problem was handled as follows:

1. The Government of Japan "acknowledged" that "the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China" (Article II of the Joint Declaration);

2. The Government of Japan further declared that it "understands and respects" the position of the PRC "that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China, and it firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation." (Article III of the Joint Declaration);

3. Foreign Minister Ohira stated orally, following the signing of the Joint Declaration, that with the normalization of relations with the PRC, "the Treaty of Peace between Japan and the Republic of China has lost the basis for existence and is considered to have ceased to be effective."

All other questions, namely, those concerning trade, aviation, shipping, and fishery, were left for subsequent negotiation, as was a formal Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Peking (Article VIII of the Joint Declaration), this latter to replace the abrogated Treaty of Peace (1952) with Taipei.

The significance of these statements can best be understood against the backdrop of negotiations in the immediate pre-normalization period. For several years the PRC had been insisting that for relations to be normalized, Japan would have to accept "three principles," namely that:

1. The Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China;
2. Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory, a province, of the People's Republic of China; and
3. The so-called "Japan-Taiwan Peace Treaty" is illegal, void and should be denounced.

Japan's memorandum trade negotiators felt compelled to support these principles. So did many other political party and business leaders who visited Peking, usually adding in addition their criticism of the Japanese Government's policy of "separating politics and economics," that is, attempting to do business with the PRC without recognizing it.

In the preamble of the 1972 Communique, Japan said that it fully "understood" the "three principles." The first principle, indeed, presented no problem. In view of the fact that the two Chinese governments agreed that there was only one "China," and in view of the behavior of other states which had normalized relations with Peking, once the decision was taken to normalize, most Japanese had no difficulty with the first principle. It was in fact incorporated in Article II of the Joint Declaration.

Defining the exact territorial status of Taiwan, after de-recognition, however, was another matter. None of the 10 states which had been forced to take up the Taiwan issue in the communiques associated with normalization with Peking in this period had gone beyond acknowledgement or expressing respect for the PRC's position. The Japanese were not prepared to concede more than the others had. With this in mind, the Foreign Ministry advanced the argument that in signing the Instrument of Surrender in September 1945, Japan had pledged itself to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Proclamation. Article 8 of that Declaration had required Japan to agree that the "terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out"; and in the Cairo Declaration the three major Allied Powers (the United States, the Republic of China and the United Kingdom) had proclaimed that "Formosa, and the Peseadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China." Moreover, in the formal Treaty of Peace of San Francisco

in 1952, Japan had renounced "all right, title and claim" to the territory. Thus, the Ministry argued, Japan could not now itself dispose of Taiwan. It had agreed to accept the disposition of it by the Allied Powers; consequently Japan refused to accept the second principle as stated by the PRC. The solution was for the PRC to affirm what it wished about the present status of Taiwan, and for the Japanese to respond that while they "understood" and "respected" this assertion, they could not affirm that it was true and in effect could go no farther than they had previously gone. What this means, the then Head of the Treaties Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has explained, is that the Japanese Government has "no objection to the islands becoming part of the territory of the People's Republic of China and has no intention whatsoever to support the independence of Taiwan."<sup>1</sup> As for Japan, the status of Taiwan is moot and up to others to decide.

The third principle likewise presented problems. The Japanese Government refused to brand its 1952 Treaty of Peace with the Republic of China as "illegal." Japan had been within its rights in concluding that treaty, it argued, and "peace" with China had in fact been secured by it. At stake here was the legality of the diplomatic acts of the Japanese Government as well as concern by some Japanese leaders for sensitivities on Taiwan. Ohira's statement that the Republic of China Treaty had "ceased to be effective" and the agreement later to sign a "Treaty of Peace and Friendship" with Peking were diplomatic devices to compromise the differences.

#### HOW HAS NORMALIZATION OF JAPAN-PRC RELATIONS WORKED OUT?

Within six months the agreement reached in Peking opened the way to the establishment of embassies in Tokyo and Peking and the exchange of ambassadors. A month later, on May 4, 1973, the laying of an undersea cable was agreed upon. On December 13, 1973, a Trade Agreement was signed, by which each accorded most favored nation treatment to the other, and payments could be made in the currencies of each as well as of such third countries as might be agreed upon. On April 24, 1974, an Aviation Agreement was concluded, providing for Japanese flights to Peking, Shanghai and beyond via Rangoon, and Chinese flights to Tokyo and Osaka, and beyond to North America. On November

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1. Takakazu Kuriyama, "Some Legal Aspects of the Japan-China Joint Communique," *The Japanese Annual of International Law*, No. 17 (1973), p. 45.

13 in the same year a Shipping Agreement was signed, and on August 15 a Fisheries Agreement was concluded. So much for the positive side.

Accompanying the conclusion of these Agreements, Japan-PRC trade has been growing. The annual average rate growth of Japan's exports to the PRC in the period for 1972 to 1975 increased to 45%, compared to 23% for the previous four years; the similar figure for Japanese imports from the PRC mounted from 6% to 50% (see Table 1). This growth rate was in excess of that for Japanese trade in general and produced a value in 1975 totaling approximately US \$3.8 billion (see Table 2).

Table 1. Changes in the Average Annual Rate of Growth of Japan's Trade with Chinese Markets

	Total Trade (%)	PRC (%)	Taiwan (%)	Hong Kong (%)
<i>Japan's Exports</i>				
1968-71	23	21	29	23
1972-75	25	45	21	17
<i>Japan's Imports</i>				
1968-71	14	6	21	17
1972-75	46	50	36	36

Source: Derived from Data in Table 2.



Table 2. Japan's Exports to Chinese Markets, 1967-75

Year	Total for All Markets			PRC		Taiwan		HongKong	
	Value*	Rate of Growth (%)		Value*	Rate of Growth (%)	Value*	Rate of Growth (%)	Value*	Rate of Growth (%)
1967	10,441.6			288.3		328.2		349.0	
1968	12,971.7	24		325.4	13	471.6	44	467.6	34
1969	15,990.0	23		390.8	20	606.4	29	614.6	31
1970	19,317.7	21		568.9	46	700.4	16	700.3	14
1971	24,018.9	24		578.2	2	923.3	26	787.4	12
1972	28,591.1	19		608.9	5	1,090.6	18	909.7	23
1973	36,930.0	29		1,039.5	71	1,641.8	51	1,117.9	23
1974	55,535.8	50		1,984.5	91	2,009.0	22	1,359.9	21
1975	55,752.8	0		2,258.6	14	1,821.7	-9	1,378.2	1
Japan's Imports from Chinese Markets, 1967-75									
1967	11,663.1			269.4		137.1		53.4	
1968	12,987.2	11		224.2	-17	150.7	10	54.0	1
1969	15,023.5	16		234.5	5	180.5	20	68.1	26
1970	18,881.1	26		253.8	8	250.8	39	91.8	34
1971	19,711.7	4		323.2	27	286.0	14	98.1	7
1972	23,470.7	19		491.1	52	421.9	41	119.4	22
1973	38,313.6	63		974.0	98	890.7	111	277.4	132
1974	62,110.5	62		1,304.8	34	955.2	7	273.1	-2
1975	57,863.1	-7		1,531.1	17	811.6	-15	245.5	-10

Source: Derived from data in Japan Ministry of Finance, *The Summary Report: Trade of Japan (Japan Tariff Association: Tokyo, December 1975)*.

\*Unit = US\$1 million.

But all has not proceeded smoothly. Four years after the "normalization" of relations, the two countries have still not been able to agree on a Treaty of Peace and Friendship. Preliminary negotiations were opened by Chao Nien-lung, Deputy Foreign Minister of the PRC, when he visited Tokyo, November 11-15, 1974, following the conclusion of the last of the preliminary economic agreements. Since then talks have continued on and off at the level of ambassadors, deputy foreign ministers, and foreign ministers, but little progress has been made.

On the Japanese side, the pro-Taipei group of LDP Diet members, who remain unreconciled to the break with Taiwan, has raised various issues. One was that the Japan-Taiwan air service, which was suspended in April 1974, should be resumed prior to the signing of a Japan-PRC Treaty. This was accomplished in July 1975, but the group has continued to press other conditions. It opposes a treaty of "peace," continuing that argument that "peace" was already secured in the 1952 treaty with the Republic of China. As for a treaty of "friendship," it has argued that the PRC should first delete the so-called "Japan clause" in its 1950 alliance treaty with the Soviet Union, which refers to "aggression by Japan".<sup>2</sup> In addition, it has called for a recognition in the treaty of Japan's claims to the disputed Senkaku Islands.

The Miki Government has had difficulty in reconciling these views to its own. The Government has depended on the support of the Fukuda faction, for example, in which these "hawks" are strong. Nevertheless, the Japanese press reports that the Government of Japan has not gone along with the "hawks" demands. Premier Miki and his foreign ministers appear to have favored as simple a treaty as possible, one which places a formal seal to the normalization of relations and that is all.

They might well have carried the day had it not been for the insistence of the Chinese on including the so-called "anti-hegemony clause." Following the example of the Shanghai Communiqué between the U.S. and the PRC, the Japan-PRC Joint Declaration of 1972 included the statement that "neither of the two countries should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each country is opposed to efforts by any other country or

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2. Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China, February 14, 1950. *United Nations Treaty Series*, Vol. 226, p. 12 ff. Article 1 of the Treaty provides: "The two Contracting Parties undertake to carry out jointly all necessary measures within their power to prevent a repetition of aggression and breach of the peace by Japan. . . ."

group of countries to establish such hegemony" (Article VII). It might seem unexceptionable that the Chinese should ask for the confirmation of such a sentiment along with other statements of principle in the peace treaty. The difficulty is, of course, that the Soviet Union has come to interpret such a statement as directed against itself and has warned Japan not to include it. Since nearly all Japanese are anxious to keep clear of the Sino-Soviet dispute and support therefore a policy of even-handedness toward each, the conservative pro-Taipei bloc has found support for rejecting any Chinese draft which includes such a clause.

Even among the opposition parties, only the Japan Socialist Party supports the inclusion of such a clause unequivocally, and within that party there is uneasiness. Reportedly, various compromises have been proposed. Under Foreign Minister Miyazawa the Japanese suggested that an anti-hegemony clause might be put in the preamble to the treaty or else included in an oral statement to be made at the time the treaty is signed. These proposals seem to have been rejected. In September 1975 Foreign Minister Miyazawa talked with the PRC foreign minister, Chiao Kuan-hua, at the UN, apparently offering to include an anti-hegemony clause in the treaty text if Japan could be given certain assurances, namely, that the clause was consistent with the principles of the UN Charter, was not directed at any particular third country or geographical region, and did not imply joint consultations or action. The PRC was silent. A year later, another foreign minister, Kosaka Zentarō, again met with Chiao at the UN. Kosaka reported back to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, that he felt now that China's conception of "anti-hegemonism" was consistent with the UN Charter, was not directed at Japan's security relations with the U.S. or Japan's overseas economic activities, and that support for it did not imply a kind of Sino-Japanese alliance. But the PRC again remained silent. Further negotiations await the formation of a new Japanese Government and the consolidation of political leadership in Peking.

#### ORAL OR TACIT UNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT JAPAN'S RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN

##### *Economic Relations with Taiwan*

Throughout the postwar period the Japanese have worked hard to promote trade with the Chinese. They have been motivated by memories of the importance of this trade in the

prewar and wartime periods, visions of the complementarity of the Chinese and Japanese economies, and desires to lessen the dependency on the United States. As a result of their efforts over the last decade, Japan's exports to Chinese markets, embracing the mainland, Taiwan and Hong Kong, have accounted for about 10% of Japan's total exports; imports from the same area, 3-4% (see Table 3). This is hardly a controlling share, but it is a significant one, for in real terms it amounted in 1975 to more than 8 billion dollars both ways.

Table 3. Japan's Trade with Chinese Markets as Percentage of Japan's Total Foreign Trade

	PRC, Taiwan and Hong Kong (%)	PRC and Taiwan (%)
<i>Japan's Exports</i>		
1968	10	6
1975	10	7
<i>Japan's Imports</i>		
1968	3	3
1975	4	4

Source: Derived from data in Table 2.

Among Chinese markets before 1972 Taiwan was the most important. In 1971, for example, it accounted for 40% of Japan's exports to these areas and 49% of its imports (see Table 4). The Japanese were, therefore, naturally concerned about how normalization with Peking would affect Japan's economic relations with Taiwan. Nevertheless, there is no mention of this question in the Joint Communique of September 29, 1972. The terms of the understanding can only be surmised.

We do know that on August 3, 1972, the then Parliamentary Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Masahisa Aoki, reportedly told his fellow Vice Ministers that the negotiations were proceeding on the basis of the principle that, after normalization, practical relations between Japan and Taiwan would be handled on a non-governmental level. That conveyed the impression that the PRC was prepared to permit Japanese to continue their economic relations with Taiwan, providing they were conducted only through private, that is, unofficial instrumentalities. Reportedly, Premier Tanaka sought assurances of this in Peking and was given them orally by Chou En-lai during their final negotiations.

Table 4. Japan's Trade with the PRC, Taiwan, and Hong Kong as Percentage of Total with Chinese Markets\*

	Total Value**	PRC (%)	Taiwan (%)	Hong Kong (%)
<i>Japan's Exports</i>				
1968	1,264.6	26	37	37
1969	1,614.8	24	38	38
1970	1,969.6	29	36	35
1971	2,288.9	25	40	35
1972	2,609.4	23	42	35
1973	3,799.2	27	43	30
1974	5,353.4	37	38	25
1975	5,458.5	41	33	26
<i>Japan's Imports</i>				
1968	428.9	52	35	13
1969	483.1	41	39	20
1970	596.4	43	42	15
1971	707.3	46	49	5
1972	1,032.4	48	41	11
1973	2,132.1	46	42	12
1974	2,533.1	52	38	10
1975	2,588.2	59	31	10

\* By Chinese Markets is meant the total of the PRC, Taiwan and Hong Kong.

\*\* Unit = US\$1 million.

Source: Derived from data in Table 2.

Developments after September 29 support the conclusion that an understanding on this subject was reached, but its terms can only be surmised. On that very day Vice Foreign Minister Shinsaku Hogen told the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) Ambassador that while diplomatic relations were no longer possible, Japan wished to continue economic relations. The Japanese Embassy in Taipei was instructed to issue travel documents in place of visas for persons in Taiwan wishing to visit Japan. The GRC's response was itself to break off diplomatic relations, but to state that it "believed firmly in continued friendship with the anti-Communist people of Japan."

While preparation was made to close the embassies (completed in December), both countries proceeded promptly to set up "unofficial" instrumentalities to handle the day-to-day business which continued relations would require. On the Japanese side a foundation (*zaidan hōjin*) was established under the aegis of the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of International Trade and

Industry, called the Exchange Association (*Kōruy kyokai*). Teizo Horikoshi, vice president of Keidanren, was named President; former Ambassador to the Republic of China Osamu Itagaki was named Chairman of the Board; and Shugen Takahashi, former chief of the Osaka Bureau of International Trade and Industry was named Managing Director. Headquarters were set up in Tokyo and offices were set up in Taiwan. It was charged with handling consular type work: protecting the lives and property of Japanese in Taiwan, educating Japanese children, issuing travel documents to serve in place of visas, the maintaining economic relations, guaranteeing the safety of fishing vessels, promoting cultural and sports exchanges, etc. The Taiwan leadership set up a corresponding organ, known as the East Asian Relations Association, with branch offices in Japan.

In some instances relations with Taiwan have gone smoothly, in others, not. One of the most difficult problems arose in the course of Japan's negotiating the aviation agreement with Peking. When preliminary negotiations were opened on March 10, 1973, the PRC authorities made clear that while they did not object to the continuation of the Japan-Taiwan air route, they could not approve of the continuation of service by China Airlines and Japan Air Lines as national carriers. A deadlock ensued. The GRC took a hard line. On July 14, 1973, it announced that if the Japanese complied with such demands from the PRC, it would not permit Japanese planes to land in Taiwan or fly over it. Foreign Minister Ohira visited Peking the following January and reported back to the Political Affairs Committee of the Liberal Democratic Party that if an air navigation agreement were to be concluded in the near future with Peking, the Japanese would need to seek new civil air arrangements with Taiwan on an unofficial level. He suggested the desirability of another Japanese airline replacing JAL on the Taiwan route. He proposed, further, that the China Airlines planes be redesignated as "China Airlines (Taiwan)," that they land at Haneda (thus leaving Narita to the PRC) and that they entrust their ground maintenance and business dealings in Japan to another agency. Although the Taiwan authorities found this unacceptable, Foreign Minister Ohira went ahead to sign the Civil Air Agreement with the PRC on April 20 anyway and announced that henceforth the Japanese Government would not recognize the "blue sky, white sun" flag on the planes from Taiwan as being a national flag. The GRC reacted immediately. It stopped all air navigation by JAL and CAL planes on the Japan-Taiwan air route.

Emotion-fraught negotiations ensued. They were conducted partly between the Exchange Association and the East Asian Relations Association, but more significantly between senior Liberal Democratic Party Diet-members and the leaders of the Government of the Republic of China. It was not until July 9, 1975 that representatives of the two non-governmental bodies were able to conclude a "private" agreement which provided for the resumption of the service on a new basis: CAL, not recognized by the Government of Japan as a national carrier, to land at Haneda on a schedule which does not overlap with arrivals from the PRC; and a new airline (subsequently identified as Japan Asia Airways, a wholly owned subsidiary of JAL) to conduct Japanese flights to Taipei.

The shift from embassies to non-governmental organizations to handle their business and from flag carriers to other airlines, may suggest that the limits Peking placed on Japan's relations with Taiwan were purely political, but that is probably not the case. Since normalization, neither the EX-IM Bank nor the Economic Cooperation Fund has extended any aid to Taiwan. Very little Japanese money, even private, has gone into the 10 large construction projects on which the GRC counts for economic growth — projects, for example, for road and railroad building, harbor construction, power generation, and heavy and petrochemical industrial production. Japanese private entrepreneurs appear to be limiting their investments in Taiwan to those in which their capital can be recouped in a short, 2-3 year space of time.

Such behavior seems to accord quite well with the first two of the "four trade principles" which Chou En-lai first laid down to Japanese business in April 1970: that the PRC would have no dealings with Japanese enterprises which "aided" Taiwan or south Korea, that is, sold goods to them on a long-term deferred payment basis, or which invested large amounts of capital in either area.<sup>3</sup> While these principles were not cited in the Joint Communique of 1972, they were reiterated in the Joint Communique released by Okazaki and Liu at the conclusion of the Memorandum Trade Negotiations on March 1, 1971. Obviously, Japanese corporations have taken them seriously. Nearly all have absented themselves from the meetings of the Japan-[Republic of] China Cooperation Committee (*Nikka kyoryoku iinkai*), which

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3. The other two principles were that the PRC would not deal with Japanese firms producing weapons or ammunition for the Indochina War, or those involved in joint ventures with or that are subsidiaries of American corporations in Japan.

had been serving as a conference of senior political leaders and businessmen interested in Taiwan and meeting annually with their counterparts; and as late as July 1972 Japanese firms were pledging their allegiance to the "four principles."

Trade figures, in turn, seem to reflect the Japanese corporations' decisions. While the China markets as a whole have held their own as a share of Japan's total trade since 1972, Taiwan has been losing ground to the PRC; so to a less degree has Hong Kong. The PRC share of Japan's exports to these markets has risen from 23% to 41% in the period from 1972 to 1975; in contrast, Taiwan's has followed the reverse course, dropping from 42% to 33% and Hong Kong's likewise, from 35% to 26% (See Tables 4 and 5). Similarly, over the same period, the PRC share of Japan's imports from these Chinese sources rose from 48% to 59%, while Taiwan's fell from 41% to 31% and Hong Kong's from 11% to 10%.

Table 5. Comparison of the Imbalances of Trade  
Between the PRC and Japan, and Taiwan  
and Japan, 1968-1975

	PRC Exports to Japan as % of Imports	Taiwan Exports to Japan as % of Imports
1968	61	32
1969	60	30
1970	45	36
1971	56	31
Average for 1968-71	56	32
1972	80	39
1973	94	54
1974	61	48
1975	61	45
Average for 1972-75	74	47

Source: Derived from data in Table 2.

One seems driven to conclude that while Peking did agree to the continuation of certain economic relations between Japan and Taiwan after normalization, it clearly set limits, whether secret, oral or tacit, which the Japanese have understood to mean no Japanese Government aid, no deferred payment arrangements in support of trade even by Japanese corporations, and no large



investments in Taiwan, even if private. The natural consequence of these constraints is a gradual decline in the importance of Taiwan as a Japanese trading partner.

*Security Relations with Taiwan*

The long history of PRC hostility to the US-Japan Security Treaty and the sharp criticism of alleged Japanese "militarism" and American "imperialism" in the April 7 communique following Chou En-lai's talks with Kim Il Sung in 1970, made the Japanese extremely apprehensive that the Security Treaty might be an issue in negotiations. Japan, after all, is pledged under that Treaty to grant the use of "facilities and areas in Japan" for use by the armed forces of the United States not only for the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan, but also for "the maintenance of peace and security in the Far East" (Article VI). From the beginning Taiwan has been understood to be a part of the area embraced by the "Far East clause." However, since 1960 the United States has agreed that it would not use these facilities for "military combat operating" in the Far East without "prior consultations," which is understood to mean the agreement of the Government of Japan. Thus, under the Treaty, if hostilities developed in the Taiwan Strait, for example, the U.S. would be within its rights to ask Japan for permission to use its facilities in Japan for launching combat operations in and around Taiwan.

In the summer of 1972, the PRC seems not to have made this an issue. Chou did reportedly say in the final negotiations that with normalization, he assumed that the "Far East" clause would be a dead letter. However, Tanaka is said not to have responded to that ploy. Instead he expressed a hope of his own, that the Taiwan problem would be resolved by peaceful means — to which Chou reciprocated with silence.

Was a tacit understanding reached? If so, what was its character? The Chinese must have realized for some time that if they had continued to demand the abolition of this Treaty, the negotiations could not have gone forward. The American alignment is simply too important to Japan. In any event, there would seem to be sufficient evidence to conclude that by 1972 the PRC leaders themselves did not want abolition. They saw the Treaty as serving their own purposes of keeping the U.S. forces in the western Pacific where they could confront those of the USSR. In these circumstances, it would seem that they simply wanted an understanding that, should hostilities break out over Taiwan,

Japan would not permit American forces to launch combat operations from facilities in Japan. Korea may also have been in their minds. At the same time Chou must have realized that if he insisted on receiving an explicit agreement on that proposition from the Japanese Government, he would undoubtedly have jeopardized the negotiations, for it would have forced Japan to challenge its relationship with the United States. Consequently, the observation by Chou.

Tanaka, on the other hand, would have liked very much to have secured a commitment from the PRC not to use force in the Taiwan Strait. He may have felt that only with this could he confirm Chou's interpretation of the Far East clause. But he must have judged from the long US-PRC negotiations on that point — and possibly Japanese discussions as well — that Chou was simply not going to give the necessary assurance.

A bargain was stated, but was it struck? Perhaps even the principals are not sure. It does not seem unreasonable to suppose that now that normalization has been accomplished, it would be much more difficult than before for Japan to respond positively to a "prior consultation" request concerning Taiwan; and the PRC may have a stronger apprehension than before that violence in the Strait would jeopardize its Japan relationship. But beyond that?

#### APPLICABILITY OF THE JAPANESE FORMULA TO THE AMERICAN SITUATION

On balance, the formula has worked out reasonably well for the Japanese. They have not yet managed to secure a formal treaty with the PRC, but they do have relatively "normal" diplomatic relations with it; they have completed the negotiation of various practical agreements, and Japan-PRC trade has taken a spurt. Japanese investments in Taiwan have declined and growth of trade with Taiwan has begun to slow down, but, in absolute terms, the trade continues to be relatively vigorous; the island's security has not been threatened, and Japan's allies and friends have found the settlement understandable. The question naturally arises then whether such a formula would be applicable to the American situation.

My own view is that the formula could not be expected to work out for us as it has for the Japanese. Let us list some reasons why:

1. Japan seems to have made its policy on the assumption that the openness and security of Taiwan would continue to be

guaranteed by the U.S. In our case, there is no one else to turn to for this service.

2. Were the United States to terminate diplomatic relations with the Republic of China, most of the states who continue to recognize Taipei, being close friends or allies of the U.S., would probably follow suit, thus weakening fundamentally the Republic of China's international position.

3. Were we to accept the restrictions on U.S. economic relations with Taiwan which Japan appears to have, the effects on Taiwan would be more severe since we have been a major supplier of its foreign capital needs. Taiwan's economic growth could be expected to be seriously slowed.

4. Were we to terminate treaty relations with Taiwan, this would presumably extend to the Treaty of Mutual Defense; and were we to be content to replace it with only a "tacit understanding," we would undoubtedly convey the message — to the PRC, GRC, the Japanese, and to our own people — that our interest in Taiwan's security is far less than it was. In view of the fact that we have been Taiwan's chief guarantor, such an act could be expected to confront the GRC with choices it has up to now put off: whether to make its peace with Peking or to seek alternative postures, possibly as an independent Taiwan and/or nuclear power. Were the message to be read in Peking as offering the PRC the opportunity to carry out a military conquest of the island, then the United States and Japan would be forced to confront the situation they have long hoped to finesse.

5. In view of these greater consequences for the GRC and the people on Taiwan of an American use of the formula, our adopting it would undoubtedly shock again the US-Japan relationship. To be sure, Japan may, as suggested above, already have made a subtle revision of its own attitude toward the "Far East clause." We are probably more alone in the defense of Taiwan today than before Japan's "normalization," and one may feel justified in saying that if Japan is no more willing to share in Taiwan's defense than to remain silent when the PRC challenges the "Far East clause," then it can hardly complain if we do the same and break off the Taiwan Treaty as well.

However, there can be no question but that the Japanese will be deeply shocked by our action. They would see it as confronting them with the possibility of a serious change in their immediate environment — a loss of trade, a disruption of personal relations,

or the threat of violence. The anticipated result would be a repolarization of Japanese opinion on the China question. The danger of a split in the extremely tenuous coalition of conservative forces now running the country, would be real, and the possibility of a re-crystalization of forces around a changed foreign policy, possibly more dangerous, is also real. The message from Tokyo to Washington, therefore, is: please, don't make waves. Don't revise your China policy unless you are sure that mutually beneficial economic relations can go forward with all parties and there will be no serious effect on peace and stability in the region.

A worst-case analysis need not be controlling. Timing and style also are important. In any event, there are other considerations than the Japanese dimension which the United States must also weigh in devising its China policy. But the Japanese dimension is an important one. Japan is our most important ally in Asia. It would be foolish to jeopardize it by adopting the Japanese formula or any other formula which does not take Japan's leaders into our confidence and Japan's needs for economic access and regional stability into our planning.

## SELECTED DOCUMENTS

**Document 1 Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China, December 2, 1954 and Notes Exchanged on December 10, 1954.**

**MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA**

The Parties to this Treaty,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the West Pacific Area,

Recalling with mutual pride the relationship which brought their two peoples together in a common bond of sympathy and mutual ideals to fight side by side against imperialist aggression during the last war,

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity and their common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the West Pacific Area, and

Desiring further to strengthen their present efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the West Pacific Area,

Have agreed as follows:

**ARTICLE I**

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace, security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

**ARTICLE II**

In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty, the Parties separately and jointly by self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and communist subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.

## ARTICLE III

The Parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to cooperate with each other in the development of economic progress and social well-being and to further their individual and collective efforts toward these ends.

## ARTICLE IV

The Parties, through their Foreign Ministers or their deputies, will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty.

## ARTICLE V

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the territories of either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

## ARTICLE VI

For the purposes of Articles II and V, the terms "territorial" and "territories" shall mean in respect of the Republic of China, Taiwan and the Pescadores; and in respect of the United States of America, the island territories in the West Pacific under its jurisdiction. The provisions of Articles II and V will be applicable to such other territories as may be determined by mutual agreement.

## ARTICLE VII

The Government of the Republic of China grants, and the Government of the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose such United States land, air and sea forces in and about Taiwan and the Pescadores as may be required for their defense, as determined by mutual agreement.

## ARTICLE VIII

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

## ARTICLE IX

This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and the Republic of China in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Taipei.

## ARTICLE X

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE in duplicate, in the English and Chinese languages, at Washington on this second day of December of the Year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Fifty-four, corresponding to the second day of the twelfth month of the Forty-third year of the Republic of China.

For the United States of America:

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

For the Republic of China:

GEORGE K. C. YEH

## Exchange of Notes

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
*Washington, December 10, 1954.*

HIS EXCELLENCY GEORGE K. C. YEH,  
*Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China.*

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to recent conversations between representatives of our two Governments and to confirm the understandings reached as a result of those conversations, as follows:

The Republic of China effectively controls both the territory described in Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Defense between the Republic of China and the United States of America signed on December 2, 1954, at Washington and other territory. It possesses with respect to all territory now and hereafter under its control the inherent right of self-defense. In view of the obligations of the two Parties under the said Treaty, and of the fact that the use of force from either of these areas by either of the Parties affects the other, it is agreed that such use of force will be a matter of joint agreement, subject to action of an emergency character which is clearly an exercise of the inherent right of self-defense. Military elements which are a product of joint effort and contribution by the two Parties will not be removed from the territories described in Article VI to a degree which would substantially diminish the defensibility of such territories without mutual agreement.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

/s/ JOHN FOSTER DULLES,  
*Secretary of State of the United States of America.*

DECEMBER 10, 1954.

HIS EXCELLENCY JOHN FOSTER DULLES,  
*Secretary of State of the United States of America.*

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's Note of today's date, which reads as follows:

"I have the honor to refer to recent conversations between representatives of our two Governments and to confirm the understandings reached as a result of those conversations, as follows:

"The Republic of China effectively controls both the territory described in Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Defense between the Republic of China and the United States of America signed on December 2, 1954, at Washington and other territory. It possesses with respect to all territory now and hereafter under its control the inherent right of self-defense. In view of the obligations of the two Parties under the said Treaty and of the fact that the use of force from either of these areas by either of the Parties affects the other, it is agreed that such use of force will be a matter of joint agreement, subject to action of an emergency character which is clearly an exercise of the inherent right of self-defense. Military elements which are a product of joint effort and contribution by the two Parties will not be removed from the territories described in Article VI to a degree which would substantially diminish the defensibility of such territories without mutual agreement."

I have the honor to confirm, on behalf of my Government, the understanding set forth in Your Excellency's Note under reply.

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

GEORGE K. C. YEH,  
*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China.*

(*United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, Vol. 6, p. 433 ff;  
*United Nations Treaty Series*, Vol. 248, p. 213 ff.)

**Document 2 U.S. Congressional Authorization for the President to Employ the Armed Forces of the United States to Protect Formosa, the Pescadores, and Related Positions and Territories of that Area, Joint Resolution 159, 84th Congress, 1st Session, January 29, 1955.**

JOINT RESOLUTION

Authorizing the President to employ the Armed Forces of the United States for protecting the security of Formosa, the Pescadores and related positions and territories of that area.

January 29, 1955  
[H. J. Res. 159]

Whereas the primary purpose of the United States, in its relations with all other nations, is to develop and sustain a just and enduring peace for all; and

Whereas certain territories in the West Pacific under the jurisdiction of the Republic of China are now under armed attack, and threats



and declarations have been and are being made by the Chinese Communists that such armed attack is in aid of and in preparation for armed attack on Formosa and the Pescadores,

Whereas such armed attack if continued would gravely endanger the peace and security of the West Pacific Area and particularly of Formosa and the Pescadores; and

Whereas the secure possession by friendly governments of the Western Pacific Island chain, of which Formosa is a part, is essential to the vital interests of the United States and all friendly nations in or bordering upon the Pacific Ocean; and

Whereas the President of the United States on January 6, 1955, submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification a Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China, which recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific area directed against territories, therein described, in the region of Formosa and the Pescadores, would be dangerous to the peace and safety of the parties to the treaty: Therefore be it

*Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That the President of the United States be and he hereby is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

Formosa and  
Pescadores.  
Defense.

This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, and shall so report to the Congress.

Expiration-  
Report.

Approved January 29, 1955, 8:42 a.m.

(*United States Statutes At Large*, Vol. 69 (1955), p. 7. The resolution was repealed on October 26, 1974, see *ibid.*, Vol. 88, Part 2 (1974), p. 1439.)

### Document 3 U.S.-Republic of China Joint Communiqué, October 23, 1958

Consultations have been taking place over the past three days between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Republic of China pursuant to Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty. These consultations had been invited by President Chiang Kai-shek. The following are among those who took part in the consultations:

For the Republic of China:

President Chiang Kai-shek

Vice-President—Premier Chen Cheng

Secretary-General to the President Chang Chun  
Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Shao-ku  
Ambassador to the United States George K. C. Yeh  
For the United States of America:  
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles  
Assistant Secretary of State Walter S. Robertson  
Ambassador to the Republic of China Everett F. Drumright.

The consultations had been arranged to be held during the two weeks when the Chinese Communists had declared they would cease fire upon Quemoy. It had been hoped that, under these circumstances, primary consideration could have been given to measures which would have contributed to stabilizing an actual situation of nonmilitancy. However, on the eve of the consultations, the Chinese Communists, in violation of their declaration, resumed artillery fire against the Quemoy. It was recognized that under the present conditions the defense of the Quemoy, together with the Matsus, is closely related to the defense of Taiwan and Penghu.

The two Governments recalled that their Mutual Defense Treaty had had the purpose of manifesting their unity "so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the West Pacific Area." The consultations provided a fresh occasion for demonstrating that unity.

The two Governments reaffirmed their solidarity in the face of the new Chinese Communist aggression now manifesting itself in the bombardment of the Quemoy. This aggression and the accompanying Chinese Communist propaganda have not divided them, as the Communists have hoped. On the contrary, it has drawn them closer together. They believe that by unitedly opposing aggression they serve not only themselves but also the cause of peace. As President Eisenhower said on September 11, the position of opposing aggression by force is the only position consistent with the peace of the world.

The two Governments took note of the fact that the Chinese Communists, with the backing of the Soviet Union, avowedly seek to conquer Taiwan, to eliminate Free China and to expel the United States from the Western Pacific generally, compelling the United States to abandon its collective security arrangements with free countries of that area. This policy cannot possibly succeed. It is hoped and believed that the Communists, faced by the proven unity, resolution and strength of the Governments of the United States and the Republic of China, will not put their policy to the test of general war and that they will abandon the

military steps which they have already taken to initiate their futile and dangerous policy.

In addition to dealing with the current military situation, the two Governments considered the broad and long-range aspects of their relationship.

The United States, its Government and its people, have an abiding faith in the Chinese people and profound respect for the great contribution which they have made and will continue to make to a civilization that respects and honors the individual and his family life. The United States recognizes that the Republic of China is the authentic spokesman for Free China and of the hopes and aspirations entertained by the great mass of the Chinese people.

The Government of the Republic of China declared its purpose to be a worthy representative of the Chinese people and to strive to preserve those qualities and characteristics which have enabled the Chinese to contribute so much of benefit to humanity.

The two Governments reaffirmed their dedication to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. They recalled that the treaty under which they are acting is defensive in character. The Government of the Republic of China considers that the restoration of freedom to its people on the mainland is its sacred mission. It believes that the foundation of this mission resides in the minds and the hearts of the Chinese people and that the principal means of successfully achieving its mission is the implementation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's three people's principles (nationalism, democracy and social well-being) and not the use of force.

The consultations which took place permitted a thorough study and reexamination of the pressing problems of mutual concern. As such, they have proved to be of great value to both Governments. It is believed that such consultations should continue to be held at appropriate intervals.

*(American Foreign Policy, Current Documents, 1958, pp. 1184-85.)*

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**Document 4 Ely Maurer, "Legal Problems Regarding Formosa and the Offshore Islands," November 20, 1958.**

*International Legal Problems*

On the international front it is best to examine the problem of Formosa separately from the problem of the offshore islands [Quemoy and Matsu in the vicinity of the coast of Fukien Province].

In giving the historical background of Formosa it has been pointed out that at Cairo the Allies stated it was their purpose to restore Formosa to Chinese sovereignty and that at the end of the war the Republic of China receive the surrender of Japanese forces on Formosa. It has also been pointed out that under the Japanese Peace Treaty Japan renounced all right, title, and claim to Formosa. However, neither in that treaty nor in any other treaty has there been any definitive cession to China of Formosa. The situation is, then, one where the Allied Powers still have to come to some agreement or treaty with respect to the status of Formosa. Any action, therefore, of the Chinese Communist regime to seize Formosa constitutes an attempt to seize by force territory which does not belong to it. Such a seizure is prohibited by international law and the United Nations Charter as an attempt to settle claim to territory by force. It would thus appear that the United States is within its legal rights in taking action to defend Formosa.

With respect to the offshore islands the situation is admittedly somewhat different. There is no question that these islands are a part of the state of China. It may be admitted further that these islands are close to the mainland of China. However, the offshore islands have been in the possession and effective control of the Government of the Republic of China since its inception, except for the period of the Japanese war. Since 1949 a status quo has come into existence vis-à-vis the Peiping regime. It is this status quo which the Chinese Communists have threatened with the menace of armed force. It is our view that we have here in fact a situation comparable to that which obtained in Korea preceding the invasion of south Korea by north Korea. In other words, the action of the Chinese Communists in taking warlike measures is an effort to change the status quo and to gain additional territory by force in violation of the prohibitions of the United Nations Charter.

It has been urged that this is essentially a civil war and therefore it is improper for the United States to participate with the Government of the Republic of China in defense of the offshore islands. It should first be pointed out that it is too narrow to look upon the conflict merely as a civil war. Even as early as the end of the war with Japan the Soviet Union, in violation of its treaty with the Chinese Nationalists, turned over large stores of equipment and in other ways furnished material aid to the Chinese Communists. Since that time the Soviet Union has continued giving large assistance to the Chinese Communist regime. Thus much of the ammunition, artillery, and planes that are at present being used by that regime derive from Russian sources. And the Soviet Union is allied by military treaty with the Chinese regime. On the other hand the United States has vital interests in the Formosa area and is allied with the Republic of China in a Mutual Defense Treaty and has agreements to supply arms for defensive purposes. In the circumstances it seems fair to say that we are here involved in what is realistically an international dispute which the Communist regime is attempting to settle by force.

Further with respect to the argument that this is a civil war, it will be recalled that this was the same argument that was made by Vishinsky regarding the north Korean invasion of south Korea. It was an argument however which the United Nations paid no heed to but, instead, viewed the action of the north Koreans as one of aggression which came under the ban of the United Nations Charter. . . .

On this phase of the matter it is our view, then, that the United States would be justified from an international standpoint in cooperating with the Republic of China in the defense of the offshore islands and Formosa.

(Excerpt from *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 39, No. 1017, (December 22, 1958), pp. 1009-10. Maurer was Assistant Legal Adviser for Far East Affairs. This was an address made before the Washington Chapter of the Federal Bar Association on November 20, 1958).

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**Document 5 The Shanghai Communique, February 28, 1972**

President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from February 21 to February 28, 1972. Accompanying the President were Mrs. Nixon, U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, Assistant to the President Dr. Henry Kissinger, and other American officials.

President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Communist Party of China on February 21. The two leaders had a serious and frank exchange of views on Sino-US relations and world affairs.

During the visit, extensive, earnest and frank discussions were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai on the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides. In addition, Secretary of State William Rogers and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei held talks in the same spirit.

President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial and agricultural sites, and they also toured Hangchow and Shanghai where, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, they viewed similar places of interest.

The leaders of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact, to present candidly to one another their views on a variety of issues. They reviewed the international situation in which important changes and great upheavals are taking place and expounded their respective positions and attitudes.

The U.S. side stated: Peace in Asia and peace in the world requires efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. The United States will work for a just and secure peace: just, because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress; secure, because it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The United States supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention. The United States believes that the effort to reduce tensions is served by improving communication between countries that have different ideologies so as to lessen the risks of confrontation through accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. Countries should

treat each other with mutual respect and be willing to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge. No country should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared to re-examine its own attitudes for the common good. The United States stressed that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny without outside intervention; its constant primary objective has been a negotiated solution; the eight-point proposal put forward by the Republic of Vietnam and the United States on January 27, 1972 represents a basis for the attainment of that objective; in the absence of a negotiated settlement the United States envisages the ultimate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of self-determination for each country of Indochina. The United States will maintain its close ties with and support for the Republic of Korea; the United States will support efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of tension and increased communication in the Korean peninsula. The United States places the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan; it will continue to develop the existing close bonds. Consistent with the United Nations Security Council Resolution of December 21, 1971, the United States favors the continuation of the ceasefire between India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all military forces to within their own territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir; the United States supports the right of the peoples of South Asia to shape their own future in peace, free of military threat, and without having the area become the subject of great power rivalry.

The Chinese side stated: Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution — this has become the irresistible trend of history. All nations, big or small, should be equal; big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind. The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation and that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according to their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries.

The Chinese side expressed its firm support to the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of

their goal and its firm support to the seven-point proposal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam and the elaboration of February this year on the two key problems in the proposal, and to the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples. It firmly supports the eight-point program for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971, and the stand for the abolition of the "U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea." It firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people's desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan. It firmly maintains that India and Pakistan should, in accordance with the United Nations resolutions on the India-Pakistan question, immediately withdraw all their forces to their respective territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir and firmly supports the Pakistan Government and people in their struggle to preserve their independence and sovereignty and the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination.

There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States and the People's Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations.

With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that:

- progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries;
- both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;

- neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and

- neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.



Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest.

The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments," "two Chinas," and "independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined."

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.

The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.

Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit are in the interest of the peoples of the two countries. They agree to facilitate the progressive development of trade between their two countries.

The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various channels, including the sending of a senior U.S. representative to Peking from time to time for concrete consulta-

tions to further the normalization of relations between the two countries and continue to exchange views on issues of common interest.

The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. They believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world.

President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon and the American party expressed their appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and people of the People's Republic of China.

*(Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXVI No. 1708 (March 20, 1972), pp. 435-438.)*

## CHINESE TEXT

## 中美联合公报

中美双方二十七日在上海就联合公报达成协议。公报全文如下：

应中华人民共和国总理周恩来的邀请，美利坚合众国总统理查德·尼克松自一九七二年二月二十一日至二月二十八日访问了中华人民共和国。陪同总统的有尼克松夫人、美国国务卿威廉·罗杰斯、总统助理亨利·基辛格博士和其他美国官员。

尼克松总统于二月二十一日会见了中国共产党主席毛泽东。两位领导人就中美关系和国际事务认真、坦率地交换了意见。

访问中，尼克松总统和周恩来总理就美利坚合众国和中华人民共和国关系正常化以及双方关心的其他问题进行了广泛、认真和坦率的讨论。此外，国务卿威廉·罗杰斯和外交部长姬鹏飞也以同样精神进行了会谈。

尼克松总统及其一行访问了北京，参观了文化、工业和农业项目，还访问了杭州和上海，在那里继续同中国领导人进行讨论，并参观了类似的项目。

中华人民共和国和美利坚合众国领导人经过这么多年一直没有接触之后，现在有机会坦率地互相介绍彼此对各种问题的观点，对此，双方认为是有益的。他们回顾了经历着重大变化和巨大动荡的国际形势，阐明了各自的立场和态度。

中国方面声明：哪里有压迫，哪里就有反抗。国家要独立，民族要解放，人民要革命，已成为不可抗拒的历史潮流。国家不分大小，应该一律平等，大国不应欺负小国，强国不应欺负弱国。中国决不做超级大国，并且反对任何霸权主义和强权政治。中国方面表示：坚决支持一切被压迫人民和被压迫民族争取自由、解放的斗争；各国人民有权按照自己的意愿，选择本国的社会制度；有权维

护本国独立、主权和领土完整，反对外来侵略、干涉、控制和颠覆。一切外国军队都应撤回本国去。中国方面表示：坚决支持越南、老挝、柬埔寨三国人民为实现自己的目标所作的努力，坚决支持越南南方共和临时革命政府的七点建议以及在今年二月对其中两个关键问题的说明和印度支那人民最高级会议联合声明；坚决支持朝鲜民主主义人民共和国政府一九七一年四月十二日提出的朝鲜和平统一的八点方案和取消“联合国韩国统一复兴委员会”的主张；坚决反对日本军国主义的复活和对外扩张，坚决支持日本人民要求建立一个独立、民主、和平和中立的日本的愿望；坚决主张印度和巴基斯坦按照联合国关于印巴问题的决议，立即把自己的军队全部撤回本国境内以及查谟和克什米尔停火线的各自一方，坚决支持巴基斯坦政府和人民维护独立、主权的斗争以及查谟和克什米尔人民争取自决权的斗争。

美国方面声明：为了亚洲和世界的和平，需要对缓和当前的紧张局势和消除冲突的基本原因作出努力。美国将致力于建立公正而稳定的和平。这种和平是公正的，因为它满足各国人民和各国争取自由和进步的愿望。这种和平是稳定的，因为它消除外来侵略的危险。美国支持全世界各国人民在没有外来压力和干预的情况下取得个人自由和社会进步。美国相信，改善具有不同意识形态的国与国之间的联系，以便减少由于事故、错误估计或误会而引起的对峙的危险，有助于缓和紧张局势的努力。各国应该互相尊重并愿进行和平竞赛，让行动作出最后判断。任何国家都不应自称一贯正确，各国都要准备为了共同的利益重新检查自己的态度。美国强调：应该允许印度支那各国人民在不受外来干涉的情况下决定自己的命运；美国一贯的首要目标是谈判解决；越南共和国和美国在一九七二年一月二十七日提出的八点建议提供了实现这个目标的基础；在谈判得不到解决时，美国预计在符合印度支那每个国家自决这一目标的情况下从这个地区最终撤出所有美国军队。美国将保持其与大韩民国的密切联系和对它的支持；美国将支持大韩民国为谋求在朝鲜半

岛缓和紧张局势和增加联系的努力。美国最高度地珍视同日本的友好关系，并将继续发展现存的紧密纽带。按照一九七一年十二月二十一日联合国安全理事会的决议，美国赞成印度和巴基斯坦之间的停火继续下去，并把全部军事力量撤至本国境内以及查谟和克什米尔停火线的各自一方；美国支持南亚各国人民和平地、不受军事威胁地建设自己的未来的权利，而不使这个地区成为大国竞争的目标。

中美两国的社会制度和对外政策有着本质的区别。但是，双方同意，各国不论社会制度如何，都应根据尊重各国主权和领土完整、不侵犯别国、不干涉别国内政、平等互利、和平共处的原则来处理国与国之间的关系。国际争端应在此基础上予以解决，而不诉诸武力和武力威胁。美国和中华人民共和国准备在他们的相互关系中实行这些原则。

考虑到国际关系的上述这些原则，双方声明：

——中美两国关系走向正常化是符合所有国家的利益的；

——双方都希望减少国际军事冲突的危险；

——任何一方都不应该在亚洲—太平洋地区谋求霸权，每一方都反对任何其他国家或国家集团建立这种霸权的努力；

——任何一方都不准备代表任何第三方进行谈判，也不准备同对方达成针对其他国家的协议或谅解。

双方都认为，任何大国与另一大国进行勾结反对其他国家，或者大国在世界上划分利益范围，那都是违背世界各国人民利益的。

双方回顾了中美两国之间长期存在的严重争端。中国方面重申自己的立场：台湾问题是阻碍中美两国关系正常化的关键问题；中华人民共和国政府是中国的唯一合法政府；台湾是中国的一个省，早已归还祖国；解放台湾是中国内政，别国无权干涉；全部美国武装力量和军事设施必须从台湾撤走。中国政府坚决反对任何旨在制造“一中一台”、“一个中国、两个政府”、“两个中国”、“台湾独立”和鼓吹“台湾地位未定”的活动。

美国方面声明：美国认识到，在台湾海峡两边的所有中国人都认为只有一个中国，台湾是中国的一部分。美国政府对这一立场不提出异议。它重申它对由中国人自己和平解决台湾问题的关心。考虑到这一前景，它确认从台湾撤出全部美国武装力量和军事设施的最终目标。在此期间，它将随着这个地区紧张局势的缓和逐步减少它在台湾的武装力量和军事设施。

双方同意，扩大两国人民之间的了解是可取的。为此目的，他们就科学、技术、文化、体育和新闻等方面的具体领域进行了讨论，在这些领域中进行人民之间的联系和交流将会是互相有利的。双方各自承诺对进一步发展这种联系和交流提供便利。

双方把双边贸易看作是另一个可以带来互利的领域，并一致认为平等互利的经济关系是符合两国人民的利益的。他们同意为逐步发展两国间的贸易提供便利。

双方同意，他们将通过不同渠道保持接触，包括不定期地派遣美国高级代表前来北京，就促进两国关系正常化进行具体磋商并继续就共同关心的问题交换意见。

双方希望，这次访问的成果将为两国关系开辟新的前景。双方相信，两国关系正常化不仅符合中美两国人民的利益，而且会对缓和亚洲及世界紧张局势作出贡献。

尼克松总统、尼克松夫人及美方一行对中华人民共和国政府和人民给予他们有礼貌的款待，表示感谢。

一九七二年二月二十八日

（《人民日报》1972年2月28日）

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**Document 6 Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China [On Normalization of Relations], September 29, 1972.**

Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka of Japan visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier of the State Council Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from September 25 to September 30, 1972. Accompanying Prime Minister Tanaka were Minister for Foreign Affairs Masoyoshi Ohira, Chief Cabinet Secretary Susumu Nikaido and other government officials.

Chairman Mao Tse-tung met Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka on September 27. They had an earnest and friendly conversation.

Prime Minister Tanaka and Minister for Foreign Affairs Ohira had an earnest and frank exchange of views with Premier Chou En-lai and Minister for Foreign Affairs Chi Peng-fei in a friendly atmosphere throughout on the question of the normalization of relations between Japan and China and other problems between the two countries as well as on other matters of interest to both sides, and agreed to issue the following Joint Communiqué of the two Governments:

Japan and China are neighboring countries, separated only by a strip of water, with a long history of traditional friendship. The peoples of the two countries earnestly desire to put an end to the abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed between the two countries. The realization of the aspiration of the two peoples for the termination of the state of war and the normalization of relations between Japan and China will add a new page to the annals of relations between the two countries.

The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself. Further, the Japanese side reaffirms its position that it intends to realize the normalization of relations between the two countries from the stand of fully understanding "the three principles for the restoration of relations" put forward by the Government of the People's Republic of China. The Chinese side expresses its welcome for this.

In spite of the differences in their social systems existing between the two countries, the two countries should, and can, establish relations of peace and friendship. The normalization of relations and development of good-neighbourly and friendly relations between the two countries are in the interests of the two

peoples and will contribute to the relaxation of tension in Asia and peace in the world.

1. The abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed between Japan and the People's Republic of China is terminated on the date on which this Joint Communiqué is issued.

2. The Government of Japan recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China.

3. The Government of the People's Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of the People's Republic of China, and it firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation.

4. The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China have decided to establish diplomatic relations as from September 29, 1972. The two Governments have decided to take all necessary measures for the establishment and the performance of the functions of each other's embassy in their respective capitals in accordance with international law and practice, and to exchange ambassadors as speedily as possible.

5. The Government of the People's Republic of China declares that in the interest of the friendship between the Chinese and the Japanese peoples, it renounces its demand for war reparation from Japan.

6. The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China agree to establish relations of perpetual peace and friendship between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence.

The two Governments confirm that, in conformity with the foregoing principles and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, Japan and China shall in their mutual relations settle all disputes by peaceful means and shall refrain from the use or threat of force.

7. The normalization of relations between Japan and China is not directed against any third country. Neither of the two countries should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

8. The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China have agreed that, with a view to solidifying and



developing the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries, the two Governments will enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding a treaty of peace and friendship.

9. The Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China have agreed that, with a view to further promoting relations between the two countries and to expanding interchanges of peoples, the two Governments will, as necessary and taking account of the existing non-governmental arrangements, enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding agreements concerning such matters as trade, shipping, aviation, and fisheries.

Done at Peking, September 29, 1972

Prime Minister of Japan

(Signed)

Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan

(Signed)

Premier of the State Council of  
the People's Republic of China

(Signed)

Minister for Foreign Affairs of  
the People's Republic of China

(Signed)

(*The Japanese Annual of International Law*, No. 17, 1973, pp. 81-83. The Chinese version of English translation is slightly different, see *Peking Review*, Vol. 15, No. 40 (October 6, 1972), pp. 12-13).

## CHINESE TEXT

**中华人民共和国政府  
日本国政府 联合声明**

日本国内阁总理大臣田中角荣应中华人民共和国国务院总理周恩来的邀请，于一九七二年九月二十五日至九月三十日访问了中华人民共和国。陪同田中角荣总理大臣的有大平正芳外务大臣、二阶堂进内阁官房长官以及其他政府官员。

毛泽东主席于九月二十七日会见了田中角荣总理大臣。双方进行了认真、友好的谈话。

周恩来总理、姬鹏飞外交部长和田中角荣总理大臣、大平正芳外务大臣，始终在友好气氛中，以中日两国邦交正常化问题为中心，就两国间的各项问题，以及双方关心的其他问题，认真、坦率地交换了意见，同意发表两国政府的下述联合声明：

中日两国是一衣带水的邻邦，有着悠久的传统友好的历史。两国人民切望结束迄今存在于两国间的不正常状态。战争状态的结束，中日邦交的正常化，两

国人民这种愿望的实现，将揭开两国关系史上新的一页。

日本方面痛感日本国过去由于战争给中国人民造成的重大损害的责任，表示深刻的反省。日本方面重申站在充分理解中华人民共和国政府提出的“复交三原则”的立场上，谋求实现日中邦交正常化这一见解。中国方面对此表示欢迎。

中日两国尽管社会制度不同，应该而且可以建立和平友好关系。两国邦交正常化，发展两国的睦邻友好关系，是符合两国人民利益的，也是对缓和亚洲紧张局势和维护世界和平的贡献。

（一）自本声明公布之日起，中华人民共和国和日本国之间迄今为止的不正常状态宣告结束。

（二）日本国政府承认中华人民共和国政府是中国的唯一合法政府。

（三）中华人民共和国政府重申：台湾是中华人民共和国领土不可分割的一部分。日本国政府充分理解和尊重中国政府的这一立场，并坚持遵循波茨坦公告第八条的立场。

（四）中华人民共和国政府和日本国政府决定自一九七二年九月二十九日起建立外交关系。两国政府决定，按照国际法和国际惯例，在各自的首都为对方大使馆的建立和履行职务采取一切必要的措施，并尽快互换大使。

（五）中华人民共和国政府宣布：为了中日两国人民的友好，放弃对日本国的战争赔偿要求。

(六) 中华人民共和国政府和日本国政府同意在互相尊重主权和领土完整、互不侵犯、互不干涉内政、平等互利、和平共处各项原则的基础上, 建立两国间持久的和平友好关系。

根据上述原则和联合国宪章的原则, 两国政府确认, 在相互关系中, 用和平手段解决一切争端, 而不诉诸武力和武力威胁。

(七) 中日邦交正常化, 不是针对第三国的。两国任何一方都不应在亚洲和太平洋地区谋求霸权, 每一方都反对任何其他国家或国家集团建立这种霸权的努力。

(八) 中华人民共和国政府和日本国政府为了巩固和发展两国间的和平友好关系, 同意进行以缔结和平友好条约为目的的谈判。

(九) 中华人民共和国政府和日本国政府为进一步发展两国间的关系和扩大人员往来, 根据需要并考虑到已有的民间协定, 同意进行以缔结贸易、航海、航空、渔业等协定为目的的谈判。

中华人民共和国国务院总理	日本国内阁总理大臣
周恩来(签字)	田中角荣(签字)

中华人民共和国外交部长	日本国外务大臣
姬鹏飞(签字)	大平正芳(签字)

一九七二年九月二十九日于北京

(《人民日报》1972年9月30日)

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**Document 7 Statement of the Government of the Republic of China on Severance of Diplomatic Relations with Japan, September 29, 1972.**

Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka of Japan and the Chinese Communist rebel regime made public a Joint Communiqué establishing diplomatic relations between Japan and Chinese Communists beginning from September 29, 1972. Furthermore, the Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira announced that the Peace Treaty and the diplomatic relations between the Republic of China and Japan were henceforth terminated.

The Government of the Republic of China, in view of perfidious actions of the Japanese Government in total disregard of treaty obligations, hereby declares its decision to sever diplomatic relations with the Japanese Government, and wishes to point out that the Japanese Government shall assume full responsibility for the rupture.

The Government of the Republic of China under the leadership of President Chiang Kai-shek is the government which accepted Japanese surrender after her defeat in World War II. It is the government which concluded in 1952, on the basis of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty ending the state of war and reestablishing the diplomatic relations between the two countries. Furthermore, the Government of the Republic of China continues to exercise its sovereign right on its own soil in accordance with the Chinese Constitution. Since the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty, the status in and between both countries has not been changed. Therefore, any action or situation arising out of or created by Tanaka Government's unilateral abrogation of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty and its fraternalization with the Chinese Communists that is damaging to the lawful position, territorial right and all lawful rights and interests of the Government of the Republic of China shall be illegal and null and void. Whatever consequences that may result therefrom, the Japanese Government shall also be held totally responsible.

The Japanese militarists, in attempt to achieve their ambition of conquering China, had created many incidents before they finally launched an all-out war on China in 1937 which was expanded to World War II, causing China and the Asian and Pacific region to suffer unprecedented calamity. The Chinese Communists, taking advantage of our Government's total mobilization of troops and people in resisting the Japanese

invasion, expanded their military strength and rebellious activities and eventually over-ran the mainland of China, bringing untold sufferings to the seven hundred million Chinese people. This was a great historical crime committed by the Japanese militarists in their invasion of China for which Japan must bear undeniable responsibility.

President Chiang Kai-shek, in the interest of peace and stability for China and Japan as well as for the whole of Asia, advocated at the Cairo conference the preservation of the Japanese Emperor Institution, adopted the policy of returning kindness for malevolence after Japan's surrender, and repatriated more than two million Japanese prisoners of war to Japan. Our Government also gave up the demand for war damage reparations and the right of dispatching occupation forces in order to avoid the division of Japan and afforded her the opportunity of speedy national reconstruction.

Now that the Tanaka Government has unilaterally nullified the Sino-Japanese peace treaty, recognized the Chinese Communist regime and broke the diplomatic relations with the Republic of China, these actions not only demonstrate ungratefulness and perfidy, bringing shame to the Japanese nation, but also run counter to the wishes of the great majority of the Japanese people. Above all, these actions seriously damage the long-range interests of China, Japan and entire Asia.

The objective of the Chinese Communists to impose communism on Japan, Asia and even the world has never been changed. The Chinese Communists are still actively instigating war and unrest throughout the Asian and Pacific region. By inviting Communist wolves to Japan, mistaking an enemy for a friend and helping the Chinese Communists in their infiltration and subversive activities, Mr. Tanaka is bound to bring endless disasters to Japan and the Asian and Pacific region.

The recovery of the mainland of China and the deliverance of our compatriots is the fundamental policy of the Republic of China. This policy will never be changed under any circumstances. The Chinese Communist rebel regime is the root of all evils in Asia. Only after the overthrow of this tyrannical regime, can Japan and Asia expect to have dependable assurances of their security, freedom and prosperity.

The Government of the Republic of China believes that the erroneous policy of the Tanaka Government can not affect the gratitude and respect of the Japanese people toward the great kindness of President Chiang Kai-shek. With all those Japanese

people who are opposed to communism for the cause of democracy, the Government of the Republic of China will continue to maintain friendship.

(*Free China Weekly*, Vol. XIII, No. 39 (October 1, 1972), p. 1.)

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**Document 8 The Great Victory of Chairman Mao's Revolutionary Diplomatic Line, April 4, 1973.**

***CONFIDENTIAL***

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**Outline of Education on Situation for Companies  
(Lesson Three)**

**The Great Victory of Chairman Mao's  
Revolutionary Diplomatic Line**

The great leader Chairman Mao teaches us: "What determines everything is whether the ideological and political line is correct or not." In all these years, the revolutionary diplomatic line of Chairman Mao, guided by the correct leadership of Chairman Mao himself and the Party's Central Committee, has prevailed over Liu Shao-ch'i's line of "three reconciliations and one reduction" [The reconciliation in our relations with imperialism, the reactionaries and modern revisionism, and reduction of assistance and support to the revolutionary struggle of other peo-

ples] and "three capitulations and one elimination" [capitulating to the imperialists, to the Soviet revisionists and to foreign reactionaries and abolishing the anti-imperialist struggle of the suppressed people of the world] and over Lin Piao's line of "isolationism" and "great-nation chauvinism" which were aimed at capitulating to Soviet revisionism and betraying the country. After the elimination of this interference, we have carried into effect Chairman Mao's line and won great victories in the international arena.

The great victories are manifested prominently in: (1) the restoration of our country's legitimate rights of representation at the United Nations; (2) the visit of Nixon to China; and (3) the establishment of China-Japan and China-West Germany diplomatic relations. The attainment of these victories has greatly elevated the international prestige of our country, shattered the schemes of U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism to isolate and encircle our country, and has propelled and supported the development of the revolutionary struggle of all countries in the world. Revolutionary people throughout the world are hailing and applauding the victories of our country.

Nevertheless, the reactionaries at home and abroad have left no stone unturned in their efforts to slander and vilify us, saying that our talks with the United States meant a "collusion between China and the United States," an "alliance with the United States against the Soviet Union," etc. It is not surprising at all that the class enemies have made such condemnations of us. For their class nature tells them to do so. The problem is that some comrades within our own ranks, owing to their lack of a high consciousness in regard to the struggle between lines, and because of their low ability to make distinctions, are being plagued by an erroneous cognizance. For example, there are some comrades who say that, in the past, we interpreted negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union as U.S.-Soviet collusion, but now we too are negotiating with the United States. Hence, they asked whether we have changed our policy. There are still other comrades who are of the opinion that we and the United States have seemingly taken the same viewpoint, because both the United States and our country took Soviet revisionism to task for its backing India's aggression against Pakistan the year before. All these points of view are wrong and erroneous. The implementation of Chairman Mao's revolutionary diplomatic line will inevitably be affected, as long as these problems remain unsolved. To this end, we must study Chairman Mao's revolutionary diplomatic line in the light of two events of paramount importance, the visit of Nixon to China and the visit of Tanaka to China, so that the erroneous thinking which has cropped up among comrades may be clarified.

The Sino-U.S. talks and the U.S.-Soviet talks are alike in form but different in essence. Chairman Mao has taught us time and again, "We must look into the essence of a matter, using its superficial phenomenon as a guide for taking us into the house, but laying a firm hold on its essence the moment you have stepped into the house." It was primarily for the sake of the people that Chairman Mao invited Nixon to visit China. Chairman Mao pointed out that we established diplomatic relations with many countries, "basically by relying on the people of these countries, rather than by relying on the governments of these countries." In our diplomatic



work and in our activities in foreign countries, we consider the people as a major target. It is for the sake of making the people of the United States a major target of ours that we invited Nixon to visit China.

Some people may ask: Since it is all for the sake of the people, why then should Nixon be allowed to come for a visit? This question was already answered clearly by Chairman Mao while talking to Edgar Snow. Chairman Mao said, "The people of the United States—the leftists, the intermediate elements, the rightists—must all be permitted to come." He added, "In seeking a solution of problems, the intermediate elements and the leftists can do nothing. It is necessary to have problems settled with Nixon, temporarily." By "temporarily," we mean making a transitional solution with a transitional personage. Nixon holds the baton of power. To solve problems, we must have talks with him. Nixon is a man of transition, through whom we settle the Sino-U.S. relations and get in touch with the people of the United States. If you do not talk to him, it is impossible for you to get in, nor is it possible to have your influences brought into the United States, much less is there the possibility of doing a good job in the work with the people and in publicizing Marxism-Leninism.

Chairman Mao's wise decision to invite Nixon to visit China has thrown open the gate of contacts between us and the people of the United States. It has had an influence on the people of the United States. In the past, U.S. imperialism had adopted a policy of isolating, blockading and containing our country, thus isolating us from the American people for over 20 years. There were very few contacts between people of the two countries, and the U.S. government described us as being very bad. Nixon's seven-day visit to China was made known to the world through the media's use of satellites. Originally he (Nixon) was attempting to make publicity for himself, without noticing that the true state of affairs in China was thus made known to people of all countries in the world. Especially noteworthy was the tremendous impact resulting therefrom when people in the United States, West Europe and North America saw the spiritual aspects and the actual situation of the people of our country. Thus, the past U.S. lies slandering China were all shattered by facts, and our international influence was expanded.

Before and after Nixon's visit to China, newspapers and journals in the United States devoted whole pages to introductions of the situation in China, specifically publicizing Chairman Mao, reprinting Chairman Mao's poems and "Quotations from Chairman Mao," and reporting how the Chinese books were warmly welcomed. In many book stores and libraries the books concerning China were either bought up or loaned out at once. The number of students studying the Chinese language in various universities of the United States increased rapidly and tremendously. In some universities the number of students studying the Chinese language increased by three to four times. This explains that China and Chairman Mao have had an influence on the people of the United States.

The visit of Nixon to China led to the announcing of a Sino-U. S. joint communique, in which both sides agreed to expand understanding between the two countries, to establish people-to-people contacts and exchanges in science, technology, culture, sports and the press. This is a matter of profound significance in going

one step further to open up the gate of contacts between the people of China and the United States. In the days to come, the people of the United States may come to our country, and we may also go to the United States. Since the visit of Nixon to China, many American people have come to China. These people have had a deep impression of China. They went back to write articles making publicity for China. Didn't the American columnist Alsop visit Yunnan not long ago? He went home and wrote many good articles on the changes in Yunnan and Kunming, saying that the city of Kunming was neat and clean, that the spiritual aspect of the people was excellent. By making use of the established channels of friendly contacts with the American people, our country has sent out to the United States pingpong teams, acrobatic troupes, and delegations of scientific workers, to show our work methods to the American people and to promote understanding and friendship between the people of China and the United States. Chairman Mao once said, "The salvoes of the October Revolution brought us Marxism-Leninism." When Marxism-Leninism is integrated with the revolutionary practices of China, the Chinese revolution puts on a new look. Now our influences have reached the United States. If only we work with patience and enthusiasm, Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung's Thought will definitely be integrated with the practices of the revolutionary movement in the United States, thereby speeding up the process of revolution in the United States. Chairman Mao also said, "Hope is pinned on the people of the United States." Revolution has already triumphed in China. If revolution triumphs also in the United States, it will create a tremendous impact on the whole world.

Furthermore, Chairman Mao invited Nixon to visit China in order to exploit contradictions. He teaches us: "It is necessary to pool together all struggles and gaps and contradictions which exist in the enemy camps and to use them as a weapon of primary importance against the existing enemy." Our invitation to Nixon to visit China proceeds precisely from Chairman Mao's tactical thinking: "exploiting contradictions, winning over the majority, opposing the minority, and destroying them one by one." And this by no means indicates a change in our diplomatic line.

The two arch enemies facing us are U. S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism. We are to fight for the overthrow of these two enemies. This has already been written into the new Party constitution. Nevertheless, are we to fight these two enemies simultaneously, using the same might? No. Are we to ally ourselves with one against the other? Definitely not. We act in the light of changes in situations, tipping the scale diversely at different times. But where is our main point of attack and how are we to exploit their contradictions? This involves a high level of tactics. Whether or not these tactics are applied properly is a question of paramount importance that determines the fate of the world. Standing at a tower overlooking the general situation of the world, having far-sightedness and a correct recognition of questions, and correctly laying a firm hold on contradictions, our great leader Chairman Mao sent out all at once our pingpong teams and invited Nixon to visit China. This wise strategic decision of Chairman Mao is significant in the following ways:

1. Firstly, it frustrates the strategic deployment of the Soviet revisionists, making them panic-stricken and plunging them into convulsions. Strategically, the Soviet revisionists have cherished the hope of putting us at loggerheads with the United States on a long-term basis, counting on a fight between us and the United States, so that they may fish in the troubled waters. Chairman Mao's invitation of Nixon to visit China alleviates Sino-U. S. relations. Soviet revisionists are very much afraid of this. They, therefore, switch on all their propaganda machines to whip up a new anti-China chorus. The chieftains of Soviet revisionism—Leonid I. Brezhnev, Aleksei N. Kosygin, Nikolai V. Podgorny—were thus out performing a so-called "visiting diplomacy." They called a black meeting in the Crimea of the petty revisionists to engineer anti-China and counterrevolutionary schemes. They signed with India a so-called treaty of friendship, yet pointed the spearhead at our country. They even colluded with the Chiang gang and agreed to Nixon's tour of the Soviet Union. All this was a vain attempt to cope with our diplomatic offensive. Why is Soviet revisionism so deadly opposed to the talks of our country with Nixon? Chairman Mao teaches us: "It is a good thing, rather than a bad thing, to be opposed by the enemy... If the enemy energetically opposes us, saying that we are all in a mess and are good for nothing, that is all the more better for us. For it shows that we have drawn a clear line of demarcation between the enemy and us, that our work has produced fruitful results." The energetic attack of Soviet revisionism on us explains that in carrying out Chairman Mao's revolutionary diplomatic line we have won outstanding achievements and hit right at their vital part.

2. Secondly, it aggravates the contradictions between the United States and the Soviet Union. Strategically the Soviet revisionists are plotting to plunge U. S. imperialism into the mire of Asia, of Vietnam, so that the hands of U. S. imperialism are tied up there and cannot move more of its forces to Europe, the Middle East and other areas to rival Soviet revisionism. Favorable conditions are thus created for Soviet revisionism to impose a hegemony of its own in those areas. We agreed to Nixon's tour of China in order that on the one hand we could curb the collusion between the United States and the Soviet Union, weaken their strength, and keep them from taking reckless and impetuous actions to start a war. On the other hand, we use the peace talks as a means of forcing U. S. imperialism, now beset with difficulties at home and abroad, to withdraw its forces from Indochina, Taiwan, the Taiwan Strait, of propelling a peaceful settlement of the questions of Taiwan, Indochina, Vietnam, and of alleviating the tension in Asia and other parts of the world. For over a year now, the war in Vietnam has come to an end as a result of the struggle of the Vietnamese people and of the work we did there. And U. S. imperialism is kicked out of the area. From Asia and Vietnam, U.S. imperialism has moved its forces over to Europe and the Middle East. This has greatly aggravated the contradictions between the United States and the Soviet Union, putting the two dogs at loggerheads. This struggle of theirs is advantageous to the revolution of ours and the world's people.

3. Thirdly, it aggravates the contradictions between U. S. imperialism and its lackeys. The visit of Nixon to China was bitterly condemned by the Chiang gang

as a "perfidious and unrighteous act" of U. S. imperialism. A meeting was held to discuss the question of neutralization of Southeast Asia by the foreign ministers of Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Eisaku Sato, the former prime minister of Japan, condemned the United States for "lack of uprightness and friendship." He also talked about giving up the policy of following the footsteps of the United States and of adopting a policy of independence. Contradictions between Japan and the United States were unprecedentedly sharpened. In this situation we may see that the enemy camp is in chaos, that the morale of the enemy camp is falling and crumbling, and that a centrifugal tendency is getting more and more serious with the passage of each day. This state of affairs benefits our work and the people's revolution.

4. Fourthly, it benefits our liberation of Taiwan. After its failure on the mainland, the Chiang gang fled to Taiwan. For over 20 years, the gang has relied on U. S. imperialism and signed all sorts of military and economic treaties with it. The gang depends entirely on "U. S. aid" as a means of survival. Taiwan is in reality forcibly occupied by U.S. imperialism. Taiwan is the territory of our country, and liberation of Taiwan is an internal question of ours. Because of the forcible occupation of Taiwan by U. S. imperialism, the Taiwan question has become a question of international dimensions. The Shanghai Communique released during the visit of Nixon to China has forced U. S. imperialism to take cognizance of the fact that Taiwan is a part of Chinese territory and that the ultimate objective is the withdrawal of all U. S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. This keeps U. S. imperialism from making a further intervention in Taiwan. Simultaneously with the improvement in the Sino-U.S. relations, there will arise a gradual alienation in the relations between the United States and the Chiang gang. This is beneficial to our settlement of the Taiwan question without foreign intervention. Meanwhile, the Chiang gang, when formerly banking on the support of U. S. imperialism, appeared to be quite tough. Now, in the wake of the improvement in relations between China and the United States, with the U. S. Army to be withdrawn from Taiwan, the Chiang gang is no longer able to get tough. We can exploit this by urging them to come over for talks in order to strive for the liberation of Taiwan and the unification of the fatherland by peaceful means.

Comrades, the present improvement in the Sino-U. S. relations does not mean that the Taiwan question can be settled immediately. We must see that the liberation of Taiwan is a complex struggle. On the question of liberating Taiwan there exist two possibilities: liberation by peaceful means and liberation by force of arms. At present, U. S. imperialism has not yet withdrawn its forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait, and the Chiang gang is still doing its utmost to repress the demands of those advocating peace talks with us. We definitely must not pin our hope on a peaceful liberation. Our Army must particularly step up preparedness for war and be ready at all times to liberate Taiwan by force of arms.

The invitation for Kakuei Tanaka to visit China, like the invitation for Nixon to visit China, is primarily for the sake of the people. Through contacts with the upper strata of Japan, we open up a road for doing revolutionary work among

the Japanese people and for supporting the Japanese people to rise up and make revolution. The second purpose is to exploit contradictions, or, more specifically, to exploit Japanese-Soviet and Japanese-U. S. contradictions. Why is it that there are Japanese-Soviet and Japanese-U. S. contradictions for us to exploit? After the World War II, the United States was the only country occupying and controlling Japan. Diplomatically Japan was entirely dependent on the United States. Yet, in recent years, owing to the great changes in the international situation, and because of the need to accommodate itself to the changing situation, Japan has attempted to make a gradual revision of her diplomacy of "leaning one-sidedly to the United States" in order to carry into effect a "free and multilateral" diplomatic line.

In connection with the relations between Japan and the Soviet Union, the Japanese have persistently demanded that the Russians return to them the four islands of Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri and Etorofu. They are bargaining with Soviet revisionism for the return of the islands. Now that Japan is attempting to reduce its reliance on the United States and, at the same time, to secure more leverage in negotiating with Soviet revisionism for return of the four northern islands, she inevitably has to do something as a manifestation of her attitude towards us. We, therefore, lay a firm hold on Japan's contradictions with the United States and the Soviet Union and step up our task in this aspect. Doing a good job in this task is of great advantage to us, and it constitutes a heavy blow to U. S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism. Because of the important strategic position of Japan, should a war of aggression against China be started either by U.S. imperialism or by Soviet revisionism, the two robbers, they must necessarily use Japan as a vanguard to fight in the battle. The United States wants to make Japan a springboard for invading China. Japan is an important link in the U. S. imperialist crescent encirclement of China. Soviet revisionism too is attempting to make Japan a bridgehead for starting a war of aggression against our country. It has done its utmost to drag Japan into its Asian Collective Security System, which aims at achieving an all-round strategic encirclement of our country. In addition, Japan has maintained very intimate relations with Taiwan and has a definite influence on some of the lackeys of U. S. imperialism in Asia. Our great leader Chairman Mao foresees the future wisely. His decision to invite Prime Minister Tanaka to visit China and to establish diplomatic relations with Japan has alleviated the relations between China and Japan. This step of Chairman Mao has shattered the plot of U. S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism to achieve a strategic encirclement of our country, has benefited our peaceful liberation of Taiwan and our improvement of relations with the Southeast Asian countries, and has alleviated the tense Asian and international situation. As a result of our improvement of relations with Japan, the Japanese are now in possession of the means of bargaining with the United States and the Soviet Union. They have become all the more daring and brave. Thus, the Japanese-U. S. and the Japanese-Soviet contradictions will be further aggravated. And we can continue exploiting their contradictions and have our work done better.

The revolutionary diplomatic line of Chairman Mao enjoys the support of the revolutionary people of the world. We have friends all over the world. The people

of our country under the leadership of Chairman Mao are holding aloft the banner of proletarian internationalism, persistently standing side by side with the oppressed people and nations of the whole world, firmly supporting the revolutionary struggles of the people of all countries, and resolutely combatting the hegemonism and power politics of the two superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union. This is recognized and acknowledged openly by the revolutionary people of the whole world. The slanderous attack of Soviet revisionism does not harm us a bit, nor does it weaken the faith in us of the people of all countries. The Marxist-Leninist political parties throughout the world and the people of the third world have made a high appraisal of and voiced support for Chairman Mao's invitation of Nixon to visit China and Chairman Mao's revolutionary diplomatic line. Presented in the following are comments by the leaders of the Marxist-Leninist political parties of the world and the people of the third world.

Kim Il-song, premier of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, pointed out that Nixon "advances not as a victor but as a defeated man." Like in the earlier negotiations in Korea, he "carries a white flag to Peking." Naldeck Rochet, a leader of the Communist Party of France (Marxist-Leninist), said, "This is a very great victory of the Communist Party of China led by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in the struggle against U. S. imperialism. This, too is a wise decision of Comrade Mao Tse-tung." Commenting on the Sino-U. S. joint communique, Secretary-General of the Communist Party of New Zealand Victor George Wilcox said: "China has firmly stood on the side of the people in combatting the arch enemy of the whole world . . . . Nixon's visit to China shows that China is correct in adhering unwaveringly to the Leninist concept of 'peaceful co-existence' and in opposing the Soviet leadership's power politics and its advocacy of demarcating spheres of interests in the world." The *Daily News* of Sudan, while commenting on the Sino-U. S. joint communique, stated: "China has not made a change in her announced policy and stand, whereas the United States has made a lot of concessions." There were also some newspapers and journals that refuted the slanderous attacks of Soviet revisionism on us. The *Information Daily* of Iran said: There are some people who pay lip service to peace, but are haunted with "anxiety and uneasiness" at Nixon's visit to China, and they "slander that China is making a compromise, that China is attempting to turn Vietnam over to the United States. . . . All this is done for the purpose of hoodwinking the public's opinions."

Moreover, the restoration of our country's legitimate seat of representation at the United Nations, endorsed by 76 votes of the U. N. General Assembly, shows convincingly that the foreign policy of our country has won the support of the people of the world, that the international prestige of our country has been unprecedentedly elevated, and that we have more and more friends. At present, 90 countries have established diplomatic relations with our country. With the exception of Portugal and Ireland, all the European countries have established diplomatic relations with us. And to this must be added the big increase in the number of people coming to visit our country in recent years. We are now trading with 132 countries and areas. The two trade fairs in Canton last year were visited by some 8,600 people. The volume of last year's foreign trade registered a tremendous increase, an increase of 28 per cent as compared with the foreign trade volume the

year before. In the light of the three afore-mentioned questions, we can see that what renders possible an elevation of the international prestige and influence of our country with friends all over the world is the result of a thorough implementation of Chairman Mao's revolutionary diplomatic line and the great victory of Chairman Mao's revolutionary diplomatic line.

The victory of Chairman Mao's revolutionary diplomatic line delays a world war and gains time for us to step up domestic construction and to make good preparations for a world war. We must make use of this valuable time, by seriously doing a good job in the campaign to criticize Lin Piao and rectify the style of work, by earnestly carrying into effect Chairman Mao's great strategic measures, "Dig tunnels deep, store grains everywhere and never seek hegemony," and by conducting well the military training, so as to be basically well prepared against a war of aggression, to aid and support with concrete actions the revolutionary struggle of the people of the world.

#### Topics for discussion:

1. By integrating ideology and practice, illustrate what you have comprehended about the basic spirit of Chairman Mao's revolutionary diplomatic line.
2. By correlating the great victory of Chairman Mao's revolutionary diplomatic line, criticize and repudiate Soviet revisionism's and Lin Piao's slanders and attacks.

### CHINESE TEXT

## 形 势 教 育 参 考 材 料

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一九七三年四月四日

中国人民

解放军 云南生产建设兵团第十一团政治处编印

一九七三年四月二十日

## 连队形势教育提纲

## (第三课)

## 毛主席革命外交路线的伟大胜利

伟大领袖毛主席教导说：“思想上政治上的路线正确与否是决定一切的。”这些年来，在毛主席党中央的正确领导下，经过激烈的两条路线斗争，毛主席的革命外交路线战胜了刘少奇的“三和一少”、“三降一灭”以及林彪的“闭关目守”、“大国沙文主义”等投降苏修的卖国路线。排除干扰后，我们执行毛主席的路线，在国际上取得了伟大的胜利。这些胜利突出表现在下列三点：一是恢复了我国在联合国的合法席位；二是尼克松访华；三是中日、中西德建交。这些胜利的取得，大大提高了我国的国际威望，打破了美帝、苏修孤立包围我国的阴谋，推动和支援了世界各国革命斗争形势的发展。全世界的革命人民为我国的胜利欢呼、叫好。而国内外的反动派则对我们百般诬蔑，千般诽谤，说什么我们和美国会谈是“中美勾结”、“联美整苏联”等等。阶级敌人如此攻击我们，这是一点也不足为怪的，他们的阶级本性决定了它非如此不可。问题是我们内部的一些同志，由于路线斗争觉悟不高，识别能力不强，在遇到敌人造谣诬蔑时，也产生了一些错误认识，比如，有的同志说，过去我们讲美苏谈判是美苏勾结，现在我们也和美国谈判，是不是我们的政策变了？还有人认为：前年苏修支持印度侵略巴基斯坦时，美国和我国都谴责苏修，好象我

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们和美国的观点一致。凡此种种，这都是一些错误看法，这些问题不解决，势必影响我们对国际共产主义运动的革命外交路线。为此，我们组织通过尼克松访华，其中访华之间的六个重大事件，来学习毛主席的对外外交路线，以澄清国际间的一些错误思想。中美会谈和发表会谈，从形式上看是一回事，但本质是完全不同的。毛主席再三叮嘱我们：要“我们领导群众反对它的错误，而把它对美关系限制在人民的范围，禁止了门就限制住它的活动”。首先，毛主席说“尼克松访华是看和平人民”。毛主席指出，我们向美国人民建立外交关系，“基本上是依靠这些和平人民，不是依靠美国帝国主义”。我们向美国工作，是“面向和平，不是面向人民”。我们邀请尼克松访华是看和平人民的人。也许有人问：既然要看和平人民，为什么不让尼克松来呢？这个问法是毛主席所反对的。说“和平人民”已经过时了。毛主席说：“美国人民左、中、右都混着。”又说：“因为美国是中间派，左派是工人和农民，跟尼克松接近，在暂时。”“在暂时”这四个字，是特别为和平人物作过校式的解释。尼克松是当总统，是“中间派”，我们和他谈，有我们国际和平关系，接近美国人民的一个目的。我们，如果都不去，你就越不去，你的影响越到不了美国，什么做人民的工作、宣传马列主义都不行。毛主席说尼克松访华这一关键决策，打开了我们同美国人民往来的大门；影响了美国人民，美国帝国主义过去对我国采取孤立、封锁和通敌的政策，中美两国人民被隔绝了二十多年，很少接触，美国政府把我们说得很坏，尼克松来访华的七天中，用卫星向世界广播，本来他想宣传自己，但在无意中把中国的真面貌道给了全世界各国人民，特别是美国、西欧、北美人民。中国人民的精神面貌和实际情况影响是很大的。美国过去这般的帝国主义统治被事实揭穿，我们

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际影响扩大了。在尼克松访华前后，美国报刊整版整版地介绍中国的情况，特别突出宣传毛主席，还登载了毛主席的诗词。《毛主席语录》和关于中国的书籍受到热烈欢迎，许多书店、图书馆有关中国的书籍被抢购和借阅一空。美国各大学，学习中文的学生人数突然大增，有的增加三倍到四倍。这说明我们中国、毛主席在美国人民中产生了影响。尼克松访华发表了中美联合公报，双方同意扩大两国之间的了解，科学、技术、文化、体育和新闻等方面进行人民之间的联系和交流。这一条很有深远的意义，它进一步打开了中美两国人民来往的大门。今后不仅美国人民可以来我国，我们也可以到美国去。尼克松访华以来，有很多美国人到我国来，这些人对中国的印象很深，回去写文章宣传中国。前不久美国一个叫艾尔索普的专栏作家不是也到了我们云南吗？他回去也写了好几篇文章，讲到了云南，讲到了交通，说昆明市容整齐，人民精神面貌很好。②我国利用已经打开的向美国人民友好往来的渠道，派乒乓球队、杂技团、青年工作团代表团到美国，做美国人民的工作，加强了中美两国人民之间的相互了解和友谊。毛泽东说：“十月革命一声炮响，给我们送来了马克思列宁主义。”马列主义和中国的革命实践相结合，中国革命的面貌就焕然一新了。现在我们的影响已经进到美国了，只要我们诚心积极地做工作，马列主义、毛泽东思想一定会同美国革命运动的实践结合起来，加速美国革命的进程。毛主席说：“寄希望于美国人民”。中国革命胜利了，如果美国革命也胜利了，对整个世界将产生巨大影响。

其次，毛主席邀请尼克松访华是解决矛盾。伟大领袖毛主席教导我们：“要把握人民中间的一切矛盾、缺点、矛盾就范改邪起正，作为反对当前主要敌人之用。”我们邀请尼克松访华，正是从毛主席

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“利用矛盾，争取多数，反对少数，各个击破”这一策略思想出发的，并不是在外交路线上有什么变化。我们面前的两个主要敌人，一个是美帝，一个是苏修。这两个敌人我们都要打倒，这是新党章上明确写了的。但是，是不是两个都用同等的力量一块打呢？不是，是不是联合那一个打那一个呢？更不是。我们是根据形势的变化，在不同时期有所侧重。但是侧重打击点应当放在那一个，怎么样利用他们的矛盾，这是需要很高超的策略水平的，利用得当与否，是决定世界命运的大问题。我们伟大领袖毛主席站在世界全局，高瞻远瞩，看准了问题，抓准了矛盾，把乒乓球一下打出去，邀请尼克松访华。毛主席这一英明的战略决策，具有很大的意义：

一是打乱了苏修的战略部署，使其惊慌失措，乱了阵脚。苏修在战略上有一个设想，就是想让我们同美国长期对立，打起来，他们好从中得利。毛主席邀请尼克松访华，缓和了中美关系，苏修十分恐慌。他开动所谓宣传机器，掀起反华新浪潮；苏修头目勃列日涅夫、柯西金、波德戈尔内，三架马车四处活动，大搞所谓“访问外交”，纠集小修在克里米亚开黑会，策划反华反华阴谋；和印度签定所谓友好条约，把矛头指向我国；甚至向美国帮勾勾搭搭，并且同意尼克松访苏，妄图阻挡我国的外交攻势。苏修为什么这样反对华里和尼克松会谈呢？毛主席教导我们：“被敌人反对是好事而不是坏事。”“如若敌人起劲地反对我们，把我们说得一塌糊涂，一无是处，那就更好了，那就证明我们不但同敌人划清了界线，而且证明我们的工作是很得成绩的了。”苏修起劲地攻击我们，说明我们执行毛主席革命外交路线取得了很大成绩，打中了他的要害。

二是加剧了美苏矛盾。苏修在战略上还有一个思想，就是想把美

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帝陷在亚洲、陷在越南，使它腾不出手来，拿不出更多的力量在欧洲、中东以及其它地方和它争夺，便利自己称霸。我们向尼克松访华，一方面可以牵制美苏勾结，削弱他们的力量，使他们不敢轻举妄动，贸然发动战争。另一方面，就是用和平谈判的手段，迫使美帝在内外交困的情况下从印度支那和台湾、台湾海峡撤军，推动台湾和印度支那、越南问题的和平解决，缓和亚洲和世界的紧张局势。近一年多来，经过越南人民的斗争和我们的工作，现在越南停火了，美帝滚蛋了，美帝把从亚洲和越南腾出的力量放在欧洲、中东，这样就大大加剧了美苏矛盾，使他们互相狗咬狗，他们的这种斗争对于我们和世界人民的革命是有利的。

三是加剧了美帝和他的走狗的矛盾。因为尼克松访华，蒋帮帮头大骂美帝是“背信弃义”，马来西亚、印尼、菲律宾、新加坡、泰国等，召开外长会议，讨论东南亚中立化的问题。日本前首相佐藤骂美国“不讲义气”，“不够朋友”，还说要放弃跟美国走的政策，采取自主的“政策”，日美矛盾空前尖锐。从这些情况中我们可以看出，敌人阵营一片混乱，人心惶惶，离心倾向日益严重。这些情况有利于我们的工作，也有利于人民革命。

四是有利于我们解放台湾。蒋帮在大陆失败后就逃窜台湾。二十多年来，他进一步投靠美帝，和美帝订立了各种军事、经济条约，完全靠“美援”过日子。台湾实际上被美帝霸占了。台湾是我国的领土，解放台湾是我们的内政问题，由于美帝霸占了台湾，台湾问题就具有了国际性质。邀请尼克松访华，上海公报迫使美帝承认了台湾是中国领土的一部分，确认从台湾撤走全部美国武装力量和军事设施的最终目标，这样就限制了美帝进一步插手台湾；随着中美关系的改善，美

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国同蒋帮的关系将逐渐疏远。这样就有利于我们在没有外来干涉的情况下解放台湾问题。同时，原来蒋帮有美国撑腰，他腰杆好象硬一些。现在，随着中美关系的改善，美军队从台湾撤退，他的腰杆就硬不起来了，我们就可以利用这一点，促使他来谈，争取用和平的方式解放台湾，统一祖国。

同志们，中美关系现在虽然有些改善，但并不意味着台湾问题马上就可以解决。要看到，解放台湾将是一场复杂的斗争。在解放台湾问题上仍然存在着两种可能：一种是和平解放，一种是武力解放。现在蒋帮从台湾和台湾海峡撤军，并最近在拼命压制主张与蒋和谈的要求。我们决不能把希望寄托于和平解放上，尤其我们军队，更应加强战备，时刻准备以武力解放台湾。

美国同苏联同美国尼克松访华一样，第一是着眼于人民。通过加上反霸的，打开到日本人民中去做革命工作的道路，支持日本人民反美斗争。第二是利用矛盾。具体讲，就是利用日苏、日美的矛盾。为什么日苏、日美之间有矛盾给我们利用呢？第二次世界大战后，美国单独占领了日本，控制了日本，日本在外交上是完全倒向美国的。近年来，国际形势起了巨大的变化，为了适应这个变化，日本想逐步改变“对美一边倒”的外交，推行“自由多边”外交路线。在日苏关系上，日本在归还北方领土后，择足，南千，色丹四岛，与苏修谈价谈，虽然日本想减少对美国的依赖，想同苏修谈判中收回北方领土讨价还价的资本，那么也就不得不对我们作一些表示。我们就抓住日美日苏的矛盾加紧做工作，使这一工作对我们是最大为有利的。对美帝、苏修是一个沉重的打击。因为日本战略位置很重要，美帝、苏修这两个强盗，不管哪一个，要发动侵略中国的战争，都总必须过日本

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充当打手。美国想利用日本作为侵略中国的跳板，日本是美帝对中国实行月形包围的重要环节；苏修也想把日本作为对我国发动侵略战争的桥头堡，他千方百计地拉日本参加他的亚洲集体安全体系，对我国实行圆形战略包围。另外，日本同台湾关系十分密切，对美帝在亚洲的一些走狗有一定的影响。我们伟大领袖毛主席高瞻远瞩，决定邀请田中首相访华，决定和日本建交，缓和了中日关系。毛主席这一步棋粉碎了美帝、苏修对我国的战略包围阴谋，有利于我们和平解放台湾，有利于改善我国同东南亚国家的关系，缓和了亚洲和国际紧张局势。由于我们和日本改善了关系，日本有了向美苏讨价还价的资本，胆子更大了，这样日美、日苏的矛盾将进一步加剧，我们又可以继续利用他们的矛盾，进一步做好工作。

毛主席的革命外交路线获得了世界革命人民的拥护，我们的朋友遍天下。我国人民在毛主席领导下，高举无产阶级国际主义的旗帜，一贯和全世界被压迫人民，被压迫民族站在一起，坚决进行反帝反修的革命斗争。坚决反对美苏两个超级大国的霸权主义和强权政治。这是全世界革命人民所公认的。苏修的诬蔑攻击，动不了我们的一根毫毛，也动摇不了各国人民对我们的信任。全世界的马列主义政党和第三世界的人民对毛主席邀请尼克松访华，对毛主席的革命外交路线给予了很高的评价，纷纷表示支持。下面我们来看看世界上的马列主义政党和第三世界是怎样评论的。朝鲜金日成首相指出，尼克松“不是胜利者的挺进，而是失败者的跋涉”，他象当年在朝鲜谈判一样“举着白旗到北京去”。法共（马列）领导人儒尔盖同志说：“这是以毛主席领导的中国共产党反对美帝斗争的极其伟大的胜利，也是

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毛泽东同志的英明决策。”新西兰共产党总书记威尔科克斯评中美联合公报说：“中国坚决站在人民方面反对全世界的主要敌人”，“尼克松访问中国一事证实了中国在坚持列宁的‘和平共处’观念，反对苏联领导人的强权政治和在世界上划分利益范围的主张方面的正确性。”苏丹《天天报》评论中美会谈公报时说：“中国在她宣布的政策立场上没有作出改变，而美国作了很多让步。”有些报刊驳斥了苏修对我们的诽谤和攻击，伊朗《消息报》说，有人一方面口头上高唱和平，但同时又对尼克松访华“焦急不安”，“诽谤中国进行妥协，叫嚷什么‘中国的大门将送给美国’”，“这一切都是为了迷惑舆论。”另外，二十六届联大以七十六票通过恢复我国的合法席位一事，也充分表明了我国的对外政策得到了世界人民的拥护，我国的国际威望空前提高，我们的朋友越来越多。目前，同我们建交的国家已经有九十多个，现在欧洲除葡萄牙、爱尔兰两国外，其它都和我们建交了。此外，来我国访问的外宾，近年来大幅度增加。我们现在同一百三十二个国家和地区有贸易往来，去年两批广交会，来宾有八千六百多人，对外贸易额有很大增长，比前年增加百分之二十八。通过以上三个问题我们可以看出，我国之所以在国际上威望高、影响大、朋友遍天下，这完全是贯彻执行毛主席革命外交路线的结果，是毛主席革命外交路线的伟大胜利。

毛主席革命外交路线的胜利，推迟了世界大战，为我们赢得了加强国内建设、准备世界大战的时间。我们要利用这个宝贵的时间，认清当前国际路线，切实落实毛主席：深挖洞、广积粮，不称霸这个伟大战略措施，搞好军事训练，从根本上作好反侵略战争的准备，用实际行动来支援世界人民的革命斗争。

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**讨论题：**

- ( 1 ) 联系思想实际，谈谈对毛主席革命外交路线基本精神的理解。
- ( 2 ) 联系毛主席革命外交路线的伟大胜利，批判苏修、林彪的诬蔑和攻击。

(*Chinese Communist Internal Politics and Foreign Policy*, Taipei: Institute of International Relations, 1974, pp. 133-140, 175-184.)

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**Document 9 Statement of Foreign Minister Shen Chang-huan of the Republic of China on Severance of Civil Aviation Relations with Japan, April 20, 1974.**

In connection with the statement made by Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira of Japan upon the signing of the so-called "civil aviation agreement" between Japan and the Chinese Communist regime on April 20, 1974, Foreign Minister Shen Chang-huan issued the following statement:

Pursuing a policy of appeasement towards the Chinese Communists, the Tanaka Government of Japan demonstrated its ingratitude to President Chiang Kai-shek whose benevolent policy in the post war years facilitated rehabilitation and reconstruction in Japan, by unilaterally abrogating the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty and establishing formal relations with the Peiping regime on September 29, 1972.

After the severance of diplomatic relations with Japan, the Government of the Republic of China, in consideration of the need to help safeguard security and freedom in the Asian Pacific region, to stem the aggressive Communist expansion and also to take into account the friendship of the Japanese people towards the Republic of China, continued to maintain economic and cultural relations between the two peoples. In the past year, the number of Chinese and Japanese people travelling between the two countries rapidly increased to more than half a million. Both



economic and cultural interflows, particularly the trade volume, also made marked advance.

But, anxious to conclude a civil aviation agreement with the Chinese Communist regime, the Tanaka Government totally disregarded the good-will of the Republic of China towards Japan. On the one hand, it subserviently submitted itself to communist manipulations in accepting Peiping's unreasonable demands; and on the other, it ignored the firm and just stand of the Government of the Republic of China which has been made explicit to Japan on many occasions, thus jeopardizing the existing Sino-Japanese civil aviation arrangement. Moreover, Mr. Ohira, in his outrageous statement, cast reflection upon the national flag of the Republic of China, thereby impairing seriously the dignity and interests of the Republic of China, and inflicting serious damage once again upon the friendly relations between the Chinese and Japanese peoples, carefully fostered through their joint efforts since the end of the War.

Determined to protect the honour and dignity of the Nation and never to tolerate anything detrimental to its national interests, which may be done by any party under the coercion of the Chinese Communist regime, the Government of the Republic of China hereby declares the following:

The Government of the Republic of China has decided that the China Airlines shall, as of this date, cease all its operations on the Republic of China-Japan air route. In accordance with the principle of reciprocity in international practice, the Japan Airlines shall, at the same time, also cease all its operations on the same air route.

Meanwhile, no aircraft of the Republic of China shall fly over any Flight Information Region and Air Defense Identification Zone under the control of Japan. Likewise, no Japanese aircraft shall be permitted to fly over the Flight Information Region and Air Defense Identification Zone under the control of the Republic of China.

Should any Japanese aircraft intrude, without permission, into the aforementioned region or zone of the Republic of China, the Government of the Republic of China shall take necessary actions in accordance with international civil aviation rules and regulations and relevant rules and regulations of the Republic of China.

The Japanese Government shall be held responsible for all the consequences resulting from the disruption of the existing Sino-Japanese civil aviation arrangement.

**Editor's Note:** Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira made the following remarks in a news conference at the Foreign Ministry of Japan, following the signing of an aviation agreement in Peking on April 20, 1974:

“The Government of Japan, in accordance with the Joint Communiqué of the governments of Japan and the People's Republic of China and since the date of its issuance, has not considered the flag mark of the aircraft belonging to Taiwan as something which represents a so-called national flag nor has it considered the ‘China Airlines (Taiwan)’ as a carrier representing a state.”

(*The Japan Times*, April 21, 1974, p. 1.)

On July 1, 1975, Japanese Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa spoke before the Japanese House of Councillors that: “Nobody, including Japan, can deny the fact that the flag of Blue Sky and White Sun is the national flag of the Republic of China in the view of countries which have diplomatic relations with the Republic of China.” The Republic of China considered the statement satisfactory and air service between Taiwan and Japan was resumed in August of that year. (*The China Yearbook*, 1976, Taipei: China Publishing Co., 1976, p. 7.)

(*Statements and Communiques, July 1973-June 1974*, Taipei: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China, n.d., pp. 3-6).

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#### **Document 10 Secret Foreign Policy Speech of Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua of the People's Republic of China, May 20, 1975 (Excerpt)**

Editor's Note: According to Taiwan and Hong Kong sources, the speech, delivered at the auditorium of the Political Department of the Tientsin Garrison Command, was restricted to cadres of Grade 13 or higher, many of whom were associated with the foreign affairs system.

#### **7. Taiwan Is a Most Secure and Most Dangerous Place**

The relations between these Southeast Asian countries and Taiwan are generally the same: “nominally the ties are cut,

substantially the ties are existent." They no longer have diplomatic relations, but the economic, trading and cultural ties continue. Politically Taiwan feels pressure, economically the impact is immaterial. From the geographic point of view Taiwan is very important. Hence, the Soviet Union is watching this area and attempts to avail itself of an opportunity to set its foot on it. On the other hand, Taiwan is taking advantage of its important position to play political maneuvers between the United States, Soviet Union and Japan. We should, on the one hand, closely watch their moves and continually expose the shameless mean acts that these countries do to Taiwan and, on the other hand, continually educate our compatriots in Taiwan to the great duties — upholding the national interest, strive to win every force that can be won and cause the conditions for peaceful liberation of Taiwan to reach maturity. We must clearly understand that "Taiwan is most secure and also most dangerous." In the past, we have done much work on Taiwan. From now on, we should make more efforts to strive for better results. Curses alone do not solve any problem. I would like to end the talk on Taiwan here, for the subject of my talk today is the international situation. Taiwan is a part of Chinese territory, and therefore, it has no place in my talk.

*(Foreign-Policy Speeches by Chinese Communist Leaders, 1963-1975, Taipei: Institute of International Relations, pp. 33-34.)*

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**Document 11 Secret Foreign Policy Speech of Foreign Minister Huang Hua of the People's Republic of China, July 20, 1977 (Excerpt)**

Editor's Note: According to Taiwan sources, the speech was ordered by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party as one of the means to prepare its middle level cadres for the 11th Party Congress, which was held between August 11 to 18, 1977.

**[Secretary of State Vance's Forthcoming Visit]**

Mr. Vance, Secretary of State of the Carter administration, will visit China next month. The Vance visit will take place just after our 11th Party Congress has been successfully convened.

The timing is significant. In making the arrangement for his visit, we have considered the recent domestic and international situation beforehand. Prior to Vance's visit to China, he has been to Europe, and has also visited Israel and talked with some Middle East countries. However, that journey was not fruitful. At present, on the diplomatic front, the United States is anxious in solving the problems of peace negotiations for the Middle East, arms limitation with Soviet revisionism, the Rhodesian problem together with Britain, and normalization of relations between China and the United States.

After President Carter's inauguration, although his administration professed the desire to push Sino-US relations one step further on the basis of the Shanghai Communiqué, and to gradually remove the obstacles to normalization, nonetheless, judging from recent changes in the situation, because the United States still refuses to accept the three principles for the solution of the problems of Sino-US relations, there will be no possibility for the establishment of diplomatic relations in the next one or two years. However, there will be progress in trade relations, and in such exchange areas as science, education, culture, sports, and contacts on a people-to-people basis.

After World War II, the United States had, at one time, become the one and only most powerful nation in the world. The basic character of monopolistic capitalism, however, is bound to lead it to become a more exploitative and aggressive imperialist country. Today, the United States is no longer the power it was, and some say that it has been relegated to a second class power. Whether that is true or not is not important. What is important is that from now on, would the U.S. continue to play the role of international gendarmes in world affairs? Or would it become a veteran imperialist nation that is relatively conservative and highly isolationist? We have been watching it, so has Soviet revisionism, and all other countries in the world. No matter what you say, the United States is still a superpower. "Even the skin of a dead tiger carried some of its prowess." Even a paper tiger has nuclear teeth and, though it is incapable of eating people alive, can still scare them away. As long as it is there, the weak ones around it will still be daunted by the tiger's prowess and will have no peace of mind.

The past and the present for the United States — to the Wall Street bosses, to the White House, and to the Pentagon, yesterday was like a dream. What about the future? Up to the present, the United States does not have a far-sighted and distinguished

statesman and leader, who can reflect upon past mistakes, and set up a goal as well as map out concrete plans for the long-range future. In short, no one can draw up a blueprint for tomorrow.

If a foreign friend comes to China and ask a primary student, "What do you want to be when you grow up?" The student might say that he wants to join the PLA, or possibly become a tractor operator. If he is asked further, why the PLA? Naturally the answer is to defend the country against the aggressors. The reason he wants to be a worker will be to help build socialism. And so it goes, eventually the majority of students would say that their goal in the future is to eliminate social imperialism, build socialism and realize communism. Well, what would you do after communism is realized? They won't be able to answer it, and neither can I. After all, that stage is still very remote from the present, and our ideology lags a great distance behind the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung. However, we believe that the times will make its heroes. When social development reaches a certain stage, the revolutionary movement of the masses will bring forth creative theoretical development of Marxism-Leninism and outstanding leadership personalities. This is the reason why theory stems from the practice of the leader.

If you should ask a primary student in the United States as to what he wants to be when he grows up, he would say that he wants to become an engineer, an astronaut, a physician, etc. Why do you want to do these things? While some would say doctors make more money, others have no answer at all. I have asked this question of young people in New York with whom I have come into contact. Sometimes I even asked complete strangers about their plans for future. I discovered that the American people, aside from realistic considerations such as how to live a better life, and how to enjoy more, either do not understand or will not try to understand what to do about the future. Their national consciousness is weak. Seeking personal profits is their goal in life and utilitarianism dominates their philosophy of life. When a country hesitates about its own future, how could there be a stable foreign policy?

Now, some of the American ways of doing things have not only caused us to feel that the United States is wavering, but even her allies have indicated their loss of confidence. Consequently, in addition to a growing tendency toward isolationism within the United States, even her original friends are moving farther and farther away from her. The U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam was wise. From the American standpoint, it only meant that she had

shed a burden. It absolutely does not imply that the United States has started on the way to decline. However, even in the minds of Americans today, the dark shadow of the Vietnam war still looms, and whatever she does cannot but be linked to the Vietnam experience. For instance, whenever the question of war is raised, instead of judging first which side has the just cause in the war, the United States would be preoccupied with the notion whether it would become a repetition of the old path of the war in Vietnam.

Because of the general withdrawal of American influence and the rise of isolationist sentiments, Soviet social imperialism has seized upon the opportunity to fill up the vacuum left by the United States for expansion and infiltration. The withdrawal of American influence, abetted by appeasement and compromise on the part of other Western nations, made it impossible to achieve the balance of power between East and West that is the dream of the Western nations. On the contrary, it has fueled the rampant expansion of Soviet revisionist social imperialism, causing the nations of the world, including those of the Second World, to face an even more dangerous and more formidable enemy.

Whether it would be possible to prevent the expansion of this kind of aggressive influence of Soviet revisionist social imperialism is a matter for the entire world, and it should be handled by the peoples of the world. It is not enough to depend on the strength of socialism alone. It is necessary to unite the Third World, to win over the Second World, and then to utilize the schism between the two superpowers of the First World, to divide them and to disintegrate them, thereby preventing them from reaching some tacit agreement to connive together and to partition the world.

It is necessary to win over the United States in order to focus our strength to cope with the No. 1 enemy — Soviet revisionist social imperialism. This is why although we know that Sino-US relations will remain at the status quo, we must still bring our relationship with the United States one step further. This is also why, while stressing the importance of Sino-US relations, we must, in the meantime, continue to expose the conspiracy of the double-faced strategy of the United States on the question of war and peace, and the perils of its struggle with Soviet revisionist social imperialism for world hegemony, thereby cautioning the people of the world that they must proceed from the premise of ideological preparation for war.

Of course, we have no illusions toward the United States. We have seen its face clearly — the past as well as the present and the

future. Although the Shanghai Communique has stated the key points clearly, what has been agreed upon is not the same as what has already been realized. Did not the Soviet Union sign the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with us? In the end, when the Indian expansionists crossed the McMahon Line to invade Chinese territory, the Soviet Union, instead of helping us to resist that aggression, accused us falsely that our anti-aggressive act was aggression. Later, the Soviets even instigated the Ili incident in Sinkiang, invaded the Chinese territory of Cheng Pao Island, and provoked Sino-Soviet border disputes. When two nations which signed a treaty of friendship become enemies the next day, wouldn't you say that it is equivalent to tearing up the treaty? And what is the use of having treaty when it has already been torn to pieces? It is both very easy and very difficult to sign an agreement. But to scrap an agreement is very easy and not difficult at all.

However, no matter how many international agreements have been discarded, whether by us or by other nations, it is still necessary to conclude diverse agreements between one nation and another. We deem that while an agreement may not necessarily have lasting effect, it would still be somewhat binding in regard to certain aspects. At least, the one who tears up an agreement will find it difficult to defend its action, and will therefore lose support among third parties. In regard to the United States, we are not satisfied with her performance in implementing the commitments of the Shanghai Communique. However, we can understand the situation in the United States. Many nations consider that agreements signed by the U.S. government with other nations are the most worthless exchanges of agreements in the world. The agreement signed by one administration might possibly be denied by the next administration. It is conceivable that the commitment made by the President would not pass the House of Representatives tomorrow, even be vetoed by the Senate the day after tomorrow, and finally come to nothing.

Although the Shanghai Communique, signed jointly by President Nixon and Premier Chou on behalf of their governments, has passed through three different Presidents — Nixon, Ford and Carter — nobody has yet denied that it is necessary to implement it. We hope our comrades would bear in mind that the Communique, like other agreements and treaties, is merely something on paper, and so, before its realization, do not cherish naive illusions about it. When Vance comes this time, China-US relationship will remain on its existing foundation, and it is

rather unlikely that there will be any new proposals in the nature of a breakthrough. How then should we discuss the problems of bilateral relationships of concern to both countries?

Taiwan is Chinese territory. This is recognized by the whole world, and even the Kuomintang regime on Taiwan does not deny it. Therefore, in regard to the liberation of Taiwan, what means would be employed, under what circumstances, and when will this task be completed is the internal affair of China, which no other nation, including the United States, will be allowed to interfere with. This is what we are going to tell the U.S. government; not a sentence more, nor a word less. Incidentally, on this question, we will convey these two hints to their government, whether they can comprehend it or not is their business:

(1) The U.S. does not have the strength to deter the resolution of the Chinese people to liberate Taiwan. This does not mean that American atomic bombs cannot be dropped on Peking, or that American airplanes, guns and tanks are all useless scrap. It is rather that the U.S. government cannot manipulate such a crisis that might lead to war, and the American people will not allow it to do so. The United States and Taiwan have signed many agreements and treaties, one of which, the US-Taiwan mutual defence treaty, is one of the obstacles to the solution of China-U.S. relations. It stipulates that if Taiwan should be attacked by some other party, under this treaty, the United States must come to the aid of Taiwan, by sending troops, by supplying arms, and by joint counter-attack.

Nonetheless, we will simply regard this treaty as a scrap of paper. We dare say that, in fact, to the United States, although the treaty is an obligation, the United States does not regard it as a responsibility. Why is it that the U.S. would not assume the responsibility? When the Chinese people deem the time to be ripe to liberate Taiwan by force, would the American people really have the resolve to live or perish with the Chiang dynasty, and share the fate of the island of Taiwan? Go read American history, we have not seen an instance in which the United States has had such resolve and courage to sacrifice for others. This has been determined by the intrinsic character of the bourgeoisie. That is why we dare to conclude that the United States is a paper tiger. It can be said that we have the deepest insight into the United States and, after having dealt with it for such a long time, we can paint not only its skin, but also its bones.

During the Korean war, United States troops landed at Inchon. A strategic retreat was effected by the Korean People's



Liberation Army, and the flames of war reached the bank of the Yalu River. It was then that we sent our volunteers to fight in the Resist-US, Aid-Korea War. At that time, our nation was just founded, and we were beset with difficulties ourselves. Stalin was also opposed to our action, being apprehensive that this might exacerbate the United States, thereby provoking World War III. However, from the outset, Chairman Mao had perceived the true nature of the American paper tiger, and insisted that we sent troops there. Later on, Stalin learned he was wrong, and eventually supported us in this war. The United States supported Chiang Kai-shek in the Chinese civil war, thereby teaching the Chinese people how to win their war of liberation. It also supported Syngman Rhee in invading North Korea, thereby again teaching the people of the world about the aggressive character of the United States, as well as the frailty of the paper tiger that could not withstand a beating.

What is most gratifying to us is that some of the things the United States did often turned out to have helped us the most. This was true in the case of the war of liberation, and it was true in the Korean War and the Vietnam War. We need not mention ancient history. What did MacArthur, who from the time of World War I had fought in many battles in Asia, get from the battlefield of Korea? He was fired by President Truman. Wasn't it true then Truman had thus given a great help to our cause? In the past, under the flag of the United Nations, the United States aligned itself with many other countries to cope with us, but still failed to win. Now, we are no longer what we were before, and the United States stands absolutely alone, without a single dedicated fellow traveler. Can the United States then insist on fighting such a war and getting herself involved in it? Needless to say, we do not believe it. And don't you believe that Chiang Ching-kuo, who is no fool himself, would believe it 100 per cent!

This treaty may be useless, but unless it is scratched, it would mean that we tacitly recognize the existence of "two Chinas," or "one China and one Taiwan." This is a question of principle, on which we cannot accept any compromise.

(2) We need to let the U.S. government know that, even when China-US relations are normalized, the US-Taiwan mutual defense treaty is invalidated, and U.S. forces are withdrawn from Taiwan, we will not, within the next decade, use force to liberate Taiwan. In diplomatic parlance, even if U.S. troops should evacuate from Taiwan, we won't at least "for the present" liberate Taiwan by force. Although we are impatient with the prolonged

stalemate in China-US relations, we do have the patience to temporarily shelve the Taiwan question until all preparations have been made. This is to ensure that when the time becomes more ripe in future, and we are more sure of the prerequisites, we will then liberate Taiwan, completely unify the fatherland, and consummate Chairman Mao's last behest. Because the main points of my talk today is not the Taiwan issue, I will not dwell on the present conditions and the future of Taiwan, or on how to undertake the work of liberating Taiwan.

Let us go back to Vance's visit to China and see during which time, besides exchanging views on China-US relations, what other topics should be broached. As I said before, the timing of Vance's visit at this particular juncture is by no means accidental. Our purpose is that, by that time, a new party leadership will have been produced through the Third Plenum of the 10th Central Committee and the 11th Party Congress. This new leadership will have emerged on the basis of the decisive victory after the thorough destruction of the anti-Party clique of the Gang of Four. This would show the importance we attach to Vance's visit and, in the meantime, enhance the confidence of the U.S. government in the Vance mission.

To Soviet revisionism this will be quite a blow. If one should ask who would be most worried and nervous concerning the Vance visit? I would say first Soviet revisionism and after that, Taiwan. Soviet revisionism does not want to see any improvement in China-US relations, because such improvement would make it impossible for Soviet revisionism to realize its global strategy. Since they oppose it, we must support it.

Does the United States need to improve her relationship with China? The United States recognizes clearly that the present threat to U.S. security stems not from China, but from the Soviet Union. In his report to the Senate on his trip to China of May 11, 1972, Senator [Mike] Mansfield, majority leader of the Senate, said: "What the People's Liberation Army seems to be held in heroic regard, it is well blended into civilian pursuits and is not in evidence as a force for militancy. There are no appeals for military crusades abroad." China is interested only in developing her own country with her own strength, never in becoming a superpower.

We are resolved to support the revolutionary liberation movements of the peoples of various countries in the world, but we will not export revolution. Since neither side wants to invade the other, and since the Taiwan issue cannot be resolved for the time being, why don't we first leave this matter alone? While there are

wide divergencies between our social and political systems, and since there are many things in the world that are more important and more urgent, and that must be dealt with and examined, we should seek what is common between us. This is our attitude toward the Vance visit today.

We are prepared to exchange views more extensively, not just limited to the Taiwan issue. In the meantime, we also would like to understand through this meeting, the directions of movement of the Carter administration's foreign policy, and convey to the United States our views on the expansion of the Soviet revisionist influences, the possibility that World War III might start in Europe, and the question of European defense.

In many things, the United States really brought on the troubles herself. She got involved in what she should not have been involved with, but in matters where she should have been involved, she refused to do so. She addressed matters that were none of her business, but kept away when it should be her business. She gave up on issues which should not have been given up, but would not give up when she should have washed her hands off some matters. She was stubborn when she should have been flexible, but appeared soft when a show of strength was called for. She meddled in affairs when she should not, but refused to take part when she should have. She pulled back when she should have stood her ground, but would not budge when she should have withdrawn. She settled disputes when they were best left alone, but would not tackle those that urgently needed settlement. As a result of all these, American policy has been wavering and indecisive.

This can be illustrated by a number of cases. On the Angola issue, it was Soviet revisionism that instigated Cuba's invidious aggression. Instead of using her own power to support the revolutionary people of Angola, the United States merely made empty threats, trying to prevent this kind of dirty aggression by withholding U.S. recognition of Cuba. When India dismembered Pakistan, although it was a mistake on the part of Yahya Khan to use troops to suppress the rebellion, Pakistan was right in trying to defend her national sovereignty and territorial integrity. This was a case in which the United States should have intervened but did not, thereby showing her weakness and indecision. The United States should have been firm toward the Soviet revisionists, but instead she was seeking detente with them. In regard to European defense, the United States should have assumed greater responsibility, but she would not make the necessary investment.

On the contrary, the United States should not have meddled in the Middle East, but she did. She should not get involved in Taiwan, but she did. She should have withdrawn her troops from South Korea, but she did not. In regard to Europe and the Indian Ocean, the United States should have done more to stop the infiltration of Soviet revisionist influence, but she didn't either.

There is no lack of natural resources on the earth. The crux of the matter is human wastefulness. Although it is necessary to develop space enterprises for scientific research, but if the purpose is to utilize the resources of the planets, at least that would be impossible in the 20th century. Therefore, what use is there for the United States to compete with the Soviet revisionists in this respect? Would not it be much better to use those staggering amounts of money instead to bolster European defense, to support the Third World, and to improve the living standard of the American people themselves?

In regard to the wavering policy of the U.S. government, we will convey our views at a proper time during Vance's friendly visit. If both sides are sincere, the visit will bring good results. I believe Vance would bring with him the U.S. views and policies on current international issues. We also hope that following the Vance visit, President Carter may also come to visit us at an appropriate time. We will be happy to welcome him.

We will also discuss trade, with a view to expanding it and to opening the door wider in order to expand our trade with the United States on a fair and mutually beneficial basis. In the next few years, our country will enter a stage of great construction, during which we will need to learn the experiences of advanced science, technology and business management of the United States. We need to buy equipment, precision instruments, and scientific research facilities from her, and through diverse forms of exchanges obtain more data on industrial construction and scientific research for our reference. We hope that more communication will promote more friendly contacts between the peoples of China and the United States. Such kind of exchange is beneficial not only to us, but also to the United States. It would be beneficial to our efforts in opposing Soviet revisionism, and to world revolution as a whole.

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